



Exercise Implementation Guidance

Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program

December 2019

Change 1, February 2021



FEMA



Preface

This document complements the *Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) Program Guidebook* and provides guidance on how to implement the CSEPP exercise program. This version supersedes the *Exercise Policy and Guidance for Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program Exercise (2012)* (formerly known as the “Blue Book”).

This guidance book serves as a how-to guide and is deliberately descriptive rather than prescriptive. The content focuses on the exercise program and the design, conduct, and evaluation of the annual CSEPP community exercise. It also reflects updates to national doctrine, including the Federal Emergency Management Agency *National Preparedness System* (2011) and *National Preparedness Goal* (2015), *National Incident Management System* (2017), and *Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program* (2020).

The *Exercise Implementation Guidance* includes three main sections: an introduction that describes the exercise program, organizations, and teams; a design, conduct, and evaluation that provides guidance on how to implement the CSEPP exercise program; and appendices that supplement information in the base document or serve as reference tools for exercise planners.

The purpose of this edition is not only to provide the basis for the CSEPP exercise program but also to assist the CSEPP whole community in implementing the *CSEPP Strategic Plan* provisions.

This document has undergone several iterations reflecting the evolution of the CSEPP exercise program. Planners and responders are encouraged to submit comments for consideration to any future revisions to U.S. Army Chemical Materials Activity (CMA) Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP), ATTN: AMCM-MCS, 8435 Hoadley Road, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010-5424 and/or to the CSEPP Exercise Coordinator, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Technological Hazards Division (THD), Seventh Floor SW (Mail Stop 3025) 400 C Street, SW, Washington, DC 20472-3025.

This page intentionally left blank.

Record of Changes

Date	Summary of Changes	Name
01/25/2021	Correction of typographical errors.	Rory LaRosa

This page intentionally left blank.

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
CSEPP Exercise Background	1
CSEPP Exercise Program	1
Exercise Program Management	4
Exercise Program Organizations.....	4
Department of the Army	4
Federal Emergency Management Agency	4
State Governments	5
Exercise Collaboration and Coordination Teams.....	5
Exercise Work Group and Integrated Process Teams.....	5
Training and Exercise Planning Workshop	5
Exercise Design and Development.....	6
Exercise Planning Team and Events	6
Exercise Planning Team Positions.....	6
Planning Activities.....	6
Exercise Design.....	7
Scope.....	8
Exercise Types	9
Participation	11
Duration: Exercise Schedule.....	14
Exercise Timeline	15
Parameters: Capability Demonstrations outside Annual Exercises	15
Objectives	16
Evaluation Requirements	17
Scenario.....	18
Master Scenario Events List	19
Exercise Documentation	20
Exercise Development.....	26
Planning for Logistics	26
Planning for Exercise Control.....	28
Planning for Exercise Evaluation.....	28
Exercise Conduct and Control	29
Controller Activities.....	30
Evaluator Activities	30
Exercise Conduct Meetings.....	30
Exercise Sign-in, Orientation, and Training	30
Controller and Evaluator Briefings.....	30

Player Briefings	31
Site Visit	32
Exercise Evaluation	34
Hotwash	36
Post-Exercise Controller/Evaluator Debrief	36
Exercise Co-Directors' Team Meeting.....	37
Submit Timeline	37
After Action Report (AAR)and Improvement Plan	37
Community Out-brief.....	38
Army Out-brief	38
After-Action Meeting.....	38
Final After-Action Report.....	39
Track Findings	39
Appendix A: Timeline Guidance and Example	A-1
Appendix B: CSEPP Guide for Exercise Extent of Play Agreements	B-1
Appendix C: CSEPP Emergency Response Outcomes and Exercise Evaluation Guides	C-1
Appendix D: Alignment of Emergency Response Outcomes with National Preparedness Goal, Core Capabilities	D-1
Appendix E: Public Information Planning for CSEPP Exercises	E-1
Attachment E-1: Recommended Public Information Activities.....	E-5
Attachment E-2: Suggested Timelines for Public Information – Support to CSEPP Exercise	E-23
Attachment E-3: Real-World Media Kits.....	E-25
Appendix F: Background and Overview of CSEPP Remediation and Recovery Outcome Evaluation.....	F-1
Appendix G: After-Action Report/Improvement Plan Processes	G-1
Appendix H: CSEPP Exercise Program Glossary	H-1
Appendix I: Acronyms and Abbreviations	I-1
Appendix J: Bibliography	J-1

Introduction

CSEPP Exercise Background

The Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) exercise program is a key element for assessing the adequacy of plans and procedures, capabilities and coordination among response organizations, and availability of equipment. Program exercises identify potential procedural, organizational, or capability gaps and potentially new requirements; they play a crucial role in preparedness, providing opportunities for emergency responders, community organizations, and senior leaders to practice and assess their collective capabilities to build a culture of preparedness within CSEPP communities. The exercise program is a key assessment tool that provides an understanding of the level of emergency preparedness of communities around the installations.

Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), Section 104 (42 U.S. Code Section 9604), Congress delegated broad response authority to the Department of the Army with respect to releases or threatened releases of chemical agents from any facility under the jurisdiction or control of the Secretary of Defense. Section 1521 of 50 U.S. Code directs the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to ensure “maximum protection for the environment, the general public, and the personnel who are involved in the destruction of the lethal chemical agents and munitions.”¹ To achieve this directive, DoD allocated funds to improve on-post emergency preparedness and to assist State and local governments in developing their emergency response capabilities.

In 2004, the Department of the Army and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) establishing a framework of cooperation between the two agencies, identifying their respective roles, responsibilities, and joint efforts for emergency preparedness and response involving storage and ultimate disposal of the U.S. stockpile of chemical warfare weapons. In the MOU, the Army and FEMA agreed to cooperate “in assessing and improving the effectiveness of Federal, Tribal, State, and local response systems and procedures through the design, conduct, and evaluation of exercises.”

CSEPP Exercise Program

The Army and FEMA developed a federally managed exercise program involving Federal, State, and local jurisdictions, which includes Army installations, as part of the increased emphasis on emergency preparedness under CSEPP. CSEPP promotes preparedness at the remaining installations storing the unitary chemical stockpile and the surrounding civilian communities. The term “CSEPP Community,” as used in this document, is the combined area of the installation, surrounding local jurisdictions and

¹ 50 USC §1521 “Destruction of existing stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions.” Accessed online February 25, 2019. <https://codes.findlaw.com/us/title-50-war-and-national-defense/50-usc-sect-1521.html>

agencies, and the State involved in executing CSEPP for that area. Local jurisdictions are counties and cities within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), which encompasses the Immediate Response Zone (IRZ), Protective Action Zone (PAZ), or designated “host” jurisdictions.

The exercise program helps Federal program managers evaluate the emergency response plans and capabilities of the CSEPP Communities. The CSEPP exercise evaluation methodology includes a standard set of eight Emergency Response Outcomes (EROs), and corresponding Exercise Evaluation Guides (EEGs) by ERO (Appendix C). The CSEPP exercise evaluation methodology aligns with and incorporates national policy, including the five mission areas and 32 core capabilities outlined in the *National Preparedness Goal*, all components of the National Preparedness System (shown in Figure 1), and the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP).



Figure 1: Components of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security National Preparedness System

The *National Preparedness Goal* sets the vision for preparedness nationwide and identifies 32 core capabilities necessary to achieve that vision. The National Preparedness System is what the nation uses to build, sustain, and deliver the core capabilities. As such, CSEPP exercises are opportunities to validate core capabilities. Engaging all jurisdictions and including private-sector partners in exercises strengthen the communities’ ability to respond and unifies the 12 CSEPP Benchmarks with the 32 core capabilities as outlined in the *National Preparedness Goal* (shown in Figure 2).



Figure 2: Alignment of 12 CSEPP National Benchmarks to U.S. Department of Homeland Security *National Preparedness Goal* Core Capabilities

In addition to aligning with and incorporating national policy, CSEPP exercises satisfy Army regulatory requirements and State and local government requirements under the FEMA Cooperative Agreement (CA) that funds CSEPP and other emergency management activities.

Exercise Program Management

Exercise program management is the process of overseeing and integrating a variety of exercises over time to identify and close capability gaps. An effective exercise program uses an integrated approach to build, sustain, deliver, and assess exercises that are in alignment with FEMA doctrine and that exercise agencies' core capabilities.

Exercise Program Organizations

The Army and FEMA have joint oversight of the CSEPP exercise program. While CSEPP is a whole community partnership, the principal organizations with defined formal relationships are the Army, FEMA, and State and local governments (shown in Figure 3).




Figure 3: CSEPP Organizational Structure

Department of the Army

The Army Chemical Materials Activity (CMA) is responsible for appointing the Army Exercise Co-Director who conducts, evaluates, and reports on the on-post portion of the exercise and tracks Army exercise findings. Each installation/activity commander appoints an exercise planning coordinator.

Federal Emergency Management Agency

FEMA administers the off-post portion of CSEPP, including the exercise program, through FEMA Headquarters and the Regional offices. For each exercise, the FEMA Regional Program Manager appoints an Exercise Co-Director who oversees exercise planning, conduct, evaluation, and reporting.

State Governments

The Colorado and Kentucky Emergency Management Directors have significant influence over the implementation of the exercise program through the CA process. To that end, the jurisdictions and/or agencies keep them informed of exercise policy recommendations and provide input in the decision-making process. The State CSEPP Manager and staff implement CSEPP by coordinating multi-jurisdictional exercise program activities. As negotiated with the Army and FEMA Exercise Co-Directors, the State may choose to designate the State CSEPP Exercise Officer as a State Co-Director to assume responsibility for defined aspects of exercise planning, conduct, and evaluation.

Exercise Collaboration and Coordination Teams

Working within the organizational structure and in partnership among Army, FEMA, State, and local partners, the CSEPP exercise program is managed and sustained through a collaborative exercise work group (WG), integrated process teams (IPTs), and functional subject matter experts working together to plan, design, and execute CSEPP exercises.

Exercise Work Group and Integrated Process Teams

The Army and FEMA Exercise Co-Directors may provide input to the Exercise WG to develop and maintain the exercise program. Site-specific IPTs make recommendations on site-specific exercise program issues through their respective Exercise WG representatives or through other established channels.

The Exercise WG and site-specific IPTs develop recommendations for the CSEPP exercise program. The WG and IPTs have representation from participating CSEPP counties, States, installations, FEMA Regional Offices, and Army and FEMA program managers. The FEMA and Army Exercise WG Co-Chairs conduct teleconferences on a regular basis to address issues that affect the CSEPP exercise program.

The Exercise WG provides policy recommendations to national leadership regarding exercise guidance and standards. The Exercise WG coordinates recommendations with the Army and FEMA Exercise Co-Directors before presenting them to national leadership for approval.

Training and Exercise Planning Workshop

Each CSEPP Community participates in an annual Integrated Preparedness Planning Workshop (IPPW) to develop exercise program priorities and establish a multi-year schedule of exercise events and training activities to meet those priorities. Priorities are established by reviewing the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) and local risk assessments; areas for improvement identified from real-world events and exercises; external requirements such as Stakeholder Preparedness Reviews, homeland security policy (e.g., the *National Preparedness Goal* [2015]), and industry reports; and accreditation standards, regulations, or legislative requirements.

Conducting a IPPW ensures coordination of exercise initiatives, prevents duplication of effort, promotes efficient use of resources, avoids overextending key agencies and

personnel, and maximizes the efficacy of training and exercise appropriations. The key output of the IPPW is the community's multi-year Integrated Preparedness Plan (IPP)

Following the IPPW, the CSEPP community provides the exercise schedule to its respective jurisdiction and/or State, which then is forwarded to the FEMA Region for inclusion in the Region's IPPW.

Each community provides FEMA Headquarters with its exercise dates, anticipated level of contractor support, and training needs for prioritization and synchronization across the program.

Exercise Design and Development

In the exercise design and development phase, the Exercise Planning Team uses the intent and guidance from its senior leaders, Co-Directors, and identified exercise priorities to plan each exercise.

Exercise Planning Team and Events

As stated in the HSEEP Guidance (2020), the Exercise Planning Team is responsible for and manages exercise design, development, conduct, and evaluation. The Exercise Planning Team will use exercise priorities and guidance from senior leaders to determine exercise objectives and core capabilities to be assessed, create a plausible scenario to assess them, and develop required documentation to support the exercise.

The Exercise Planning Team ensures the exercise supports the Co-Directors' guidance, validates capabilities, and stresses systems and processes within the parameters of the extent of play agreement (XPA). The Exercise Planning Team includes the Exercise Co-Directors or their designated representative (Army and FEMA), installation representatives, the State CSEPP Exercise Officer or other State representatives, emergency management representatives from the CSEPP communities, and representatives from other response agencies, as appropriate. Exercise Planning Team representatives should have the authority to make decisions and commit personnel and resources.

Exercise Planning Team Positions

Ensuring the appropriate positions are represented within the Exercise Planning Team is essential to design, conduct, and execution of an exercise. The structure must be able to expand and contract and involve individuals with the appropriate levels of authority as needed to make pertinent decisions. Each CSEPP community determines the appropriate structure needed to execute a successful exercise. Additional information and examples of Exercise Planning Team structures can be found within the HSEEP Guidance.

Planning Activities

Each CSEPP Community plans the annual CSEPP Community Exercise in accordance with approved guidance. Exercise planning meetings include the following:

- Concept and objectives (C&O) meeting to ensure that exercise planners agree upon the identified type, scope, capabilities, objectives, and purpose of the exercise
- Initial planning meeting (IPM) to determine exercise scope, intent, and direction from senior leaders; and gather input from the Exercise Planning Team to identify exercise design requirements, conditions, objectives, extent of play and scenario variables (based on objectives)
- Midterm planning meetings (MPMs), as needed, to provide further opportunities to engage senior leaders settle logistical and organizational issues, refine the scenario and timelines, and address administrative requirements
- Master scenario events list (MSEL) meeting focusing on developing the MSEL, which is a chronological list that supplements the exercise scenario with event synopses, expected participant responses, objectives, and core capability targets to be addressed
- Final planning meeting (FPM) to ensure that all logistical requirements have been met, outstanding issues have been identified and resolved, and exercise products are ready for printing.

For more information on planning activities, refer to HSEEP Guidance, Chapter 3.

Exercise Design

Exercises are, by their very nature, intended to assess/validate a capability or function. There are several inputs that may shape exercise design: Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis (THIRA), Stakeholder Preparedness Review (SPR), *National Preparedness Goal* (NPG), National Response Framework (NRF), and guidance from senior leaders. The THIRA/SPR can identify potential hazards, capabilities required to respond to the hazard, and the current capability of the jurisdictions to meet the identified requirement. The NPG outlines 32 core capabilities necessary to address hazards across five mission areas: Prevent, Protect, Mitigate, Respond, and Recover. Finally, the NRF outlines 15 Emergency Support Functions that group government and private-sector capabilities to provide support resources and services needed to save lives and protect property in a disaster. It also identifies seven Community Lifelines that comprise services that are vital to continuity of operations, providing critical public and private sector functions, and preserving health and safety. The Exercise Planning Team should consider each of these resources and concepts throughout the exercise design process. Appendix D further illustrate the linkages between these concepts. As outlined in the HSEEP Guidance, the key steps include the following:

- Setting the foundation and scope of the exercise
- Selecting appropriate participants for the Exercise Planning Team and players
- Developing exercise-specific objectives that link to CSEPP EROs and FEMA core capabilities
- Identifying evaluation requirements
- Developing exercise scenario

- Creating appropriate documentation
- Planning for exercise control and evaluation

Scope

The CSEPP exercise program uses HSEEP methodology. HSEEP provides a set of guiding principles for exercise programs and a common approach to exercise program management, design and development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning. CSEPP exercise program key tasks in each HSEEP phase are shown in Figure 4.




Figure 4: Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) Methodology

Through the use of HSEEP, exercise program managers can develop, execute, and evaluate exercises that address priorities established by CSEPP, Army, FEMA, State, and local leadership. These priorities are based on the *National Preparedness Goal*, strategy documents, threat and hazard identification and/or risk assessment processes, capability

assessments (e.g., Stakeholder Preparedness Review), and results from previous exercises and real-world events.

Exercise Types

HSEEP (2020) defines seven exercise types, ranging from seminars to full-scale exercises (shown in Table 1), and, while CSEPP uses all of them, it routinely uses three major exercise types: full-scale, functional, and tabletop (shown in Figure 5).

Traditionally, annual CSEPP exercises are full-scale exercises (FSEs); however, other operations-based exercises such as functional exercises, discussion-based exercises such as tabletop exercises, or combinations of exercise types individually or in series are used to meet programmatic needs at the national or community level.

Table 1: Exercise Types

Exercise Type	Utility/Purpose	Type of Player Action	Duration	Real-Time Play?	Scope
Discussion-based Exercise	Familiarize players with current plans, policies, agreements, and procedures; develop new plans, policies, agreements, and procedures	Notional; player actions are imaginary or hypothetical	Rarely exceeding 8 hours	No	Varies
Seminar	Provide overview of new or current plans, resources, strategies, concepts, or ideas	N/A	2–5 hours	No	Multi- or single agency
Workshop	Achieve specific goal or build product (e.g., exercise objectives, SOPs, policies, plans)	N/A	3–8 hours	No	Multi-agency/ single function
Tabletop Exercise (TTX)	Validate plans and procedures by using a hypothetical scenario to drive participant discussions	Notional	4–8 hours	No	Multi-agency/ multiple functions
Game	Explore decision-making process and examine consequences of those decisions	Notional	2–5 hours	No (though some simulations provide real- or near-real-time play)	Multi-agency/ multiple functions

Exercise Type	Utility/Purpose	Type of Player Action	Duration	Real-Time Play?	Scope
Operations-based Exercise	Validate plans, policies, agreements, and procedures; clarify roles and responsibilities; identify resource gaps	Actual; player action mimics reaction, response, mobilization, and commitment of personnel and resources	May be hours, days, or weeks, depending on purpose, type, and scope of the exercise	Yes	Varies
Drill	Validate a single operation or function of an agency	Actual	2–4 hours	Yes	Single agency/ single function
Functional Exercise (FE)	Evaluate capabilities, functions, plans, and staffs of Incident Command, Unified Command, intelligence centers, or other multi-agency coordination centers (e.g., EOCs)	Command staff actions are actual; movement of other personnel, equipment, or adversaries is simulated	4–8 hours or several days or weeks	Yes	Multiple functional areas/multiple functions
Full-scale Exercise (FSE)	Validate plans, policies, procedures, and cooperative agreements developed in previous exercises through their actual implementation and execution during a simulated scenario; includes actual mobilization of resources, conduct of operations, and integrated elements of functional exercise play (e.g., EOCs, command posts)	Actual	One full day or several days or weeks	Yes	Multi-agency/ multiple functions




	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mandatory, federally-evaluated demonstration of a jurisdiction's full capabilities in a chemical accident or incident; annual requirement for one CSEPP full-scale exercise • Driven by an Extent of Play Agreement negotiated with jurisdictions to address CSEPP emergency response outcomes
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scale determined by co-directors and jurisdiction(s); exercise must be related to a chemical accident or incident; all jurisdictions should participate in the exercise, if applicable • May include out of sequence events (ex., tabletop exercise, training, etc.) • Tests and validates specific capabilities (ex., emergency operations center, joint information center, hospital, decontamination, communications, etc.)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Used to assess plans, policies, procedures, and systems • May apply to mission areas (ex., Response, Recovery, etc.) or procedures (sampling) • Useful for engagement of leadership and decision-makers • Building block to conducting a functional or full scale exercise

Figure 5: Three Types of CSEPP Exercises

In addition, installations have an Army-mandated schedule of exercises consisting of quarterly Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) exercises and the annual CSEPP exercise. Army Regulation 50-6 (AR 50-6) requires at least two CAIRA exercises per calendar year that incorporate external agencies identified in the CAIRA Plan. Off-post jurisdictions are encouraged to participate in CAIRA exercises or other exercises they consider appropriate.

Participation

Each jurisdiction's participation is based on the premise that the CSEPP Community demonstrates applicable emergency response plans and procedures. The Exercise Planning Team should identify exercise objectives and parameters that will determine the extent to which the community will demonstrate its emergency response capabilities. This means that each jurisdiction does not have to demonstrate all EROs each year.

CSEPP exercises involve a large number of people in a variety of roles and responsibilities. This document uses the term "participants" to identify all people involved in CSEPP exercises, regardless of their roles. Table 2 lists each position and describes its responsibilities.

As part of work plan negotiations, the organization should encourage CSEPP-funded employees to receive training and participate as evaluators and/or controllers in the other site's CSEPP exercise. The Federal Exercise Co-Directors will coordinate travel funding and reimbursement for members of the evaluation and/or control team. For those off post, the FEMA Co-Director will coordinate travel funding through FEMA Headquarters.

Table 2: Position Descriptions**CO-DIRECTORS**

These two positions are filled by staff members from the Army and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). They work in partnership and are responsible for exercise planning, conduct, evaluation, and After-Action Report/Improvement Plan (AAR/IP) completion and have final decision-making authority concerning the exercise. The Co-Directors also assign, coordinate with, brief, debrief, and manage the exercise controllers and evaluators. They also brief involved officials before and after the exercise.

EXERCISE PLANNING TEAM

Each CSEPP exercise is developed by an Exercise Planning Team, which comprises the Co-Directors or designated representative, installation, State representatives, local emergency management staff, and representatives from other response agencies as appropriate. The Exercise Planning Team has the authority to make decisions and commit personnel and resources to support the exercise.

TRUSTED AGENTS

Trusted agents are representatives of Federal, State, and local organizations who actively participate in exercise objective and scenario development. They plan, develop, and execute the exercise and are privy to the scenario. Trusted agents should be knowledgeable in the emergency response plans of their respective organizations. They provide crucial input during development of the Extent of Play Agreement (XPA) and in reviews of the exercise plan (ExPlan), exercise scenario, simulations and assumptions, and injects. They should ensure that chosen scripted injects accurately reflect their jurisdiction's plans and procedures and represent a realistic situation in a CAI. They should also be available during the exercise to assist in control of the scenario.

PLAYERS

Players respond to simulated events. Players should be familiar with their organization's plans and procedures and respond in a realistic manner, as the scenario drives. The XPA agrees to specific exceptions to the various participating organizations' plans and procedures. Players must understand which organizations are participating in the exercise and how to use exercise communications directories. During the exercise, players demonstrate their proficiency in accomplishing tasks and responsibilities defined in their organization's applicable plans and procedures and CSEPP standards, using their current response capabilities.

CONTROLLERS

In operations-based and some complex discussion-based exercises, controllers plan and manage exercise play, set up and operate the exercise incident site, and possibly take the roles of individuals and agencies not actually participating in the exercise. Controllers direct the pace of exercise play, provide key data to players, and may prompt or initiate certain player actions and injects to the players as described in the Master Scenario Events List to ensure exercise continuity. Controllers issue exercise materials to players as required, monitor the exercise timeline, and supervise the safety of all exercise participants. Controllers are the only participants who should provide information or direction to players. The Co-Directors will designate a safety controller whose responsibility includes ensuring the safety of all exercise staff, observers, and visitors during exercise activity, from staff arrival and check-in through preparatory meetings, site visits, exercise activity, and demobilization.

EVALUATORS

Evaluators are chosen based on their expertise in the functional areas they will observe. Evaluators use Exercise Evaluation Guides to measure and assess performance, capture unresolved issues, and analyze exercise results. Evaluators passively assess and document players' performance against established emergency plans and exercise evaluation criteria, in accordance with Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program standards and without interfering with exercise flow.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE OUTCOME (ERO) LEADS

ERO leads are responsible for compiling jurisdictional analyses related to their respective outcome. Each ERO Lead works with the Jurisdiction Lead and/or Team, as necessary, to compile the strengths, observations, or findings for their outcome.

JURISDICTION TEAMS/LEADS

Each Jurisdiction Team consists of the evaluators assigned to a specific jurisdiction to observe the exercise and collect data. The Jurisdiction Team prepares a timeline and develops an analysis for their jurisdiction. Jurisdiction Leads are the lead evaluator within a specific jurisdiction and are responsible for validating and submitting their jurisdictions' timeline and analysis to the respective ERO Lead.

MOCK MEDIA

Mock media work for the Exercise Co-Directors. Mock media are controllers acting in the role of real-world media, such as local and national television networks, radio stations, newspapers, and magazines. These simulated media representatives interact with player organizations only during the exercise. Mock media will not interact with the real-world media and must not "play" when in the presence of real-world media. Mock media typically interact with exercise participants at the Joint Information Center (JIC), at exercise locations open to public access, at emergency operations centers (EOCs) and medical treatment facilities to the extent agreed to by players, and from the Simulation Cell (SimCell).

REAL-WORLD MEDIA

Real-world news media are welcome to observe play during the exercise. Interested organizations should proactively make invitations to, and arrangements for, real-world media before the exercise, with the Exercise Co-Directors approval. These organizations should plan an appropriate itinerary at selected locations with knowledgeable escorts for media representatives. The exercise officials consider the group "invisible" for exercise play purposes. The mock media will not interact with the real-world media during the exercise. As part of the real-world media plan, the organizers may provide the media an opportunity to meet with "key" personnel at the exercise locations. The organizers should design this to ensure that there is minimal impact to the conduct of the exercise. See Appendix E for details pertaining to real-world media coverage of exercises.

OBSERVERS

Observers do not directly participate in the exercise; rather, they observe selected segments of the exercise as it unfolds, while remaining separated from player activities. Observers view the exercise from a designated observation area and are asked to remain within the observation area during the exercise. A dedicated controller or sponsor is assigned to manage the observers. Observers visiting multiple locations must have an escort and provide a proposed agenda to the Co-Directors for approval.

VERY IMPORTANT PERSONS (VIPs)

VIPs are a special category of observers, designated by the Co-Directors, and will wear distinctive identification/badges. The Co-Directors will provide escort for, and respond to, queries from VIPs. Additionally, in coordination with players, Co-Directors will provide VIPs with a tour, of selected exercise locations. The Co-Directors will prepare a VIP tour schedule and coordinate with the visited jurisdictions. Public affairs/information representatives or individuals familiar with CSEPP and the site will escort VIPs. VIPs will not be interviewed or interact with Real World Media during the exercise

SPECIAL STAFF

Special staff personnel are those persons supporting management of the exercise. The special staff includes personnel assisting with safety, administration, briefings, communications support, information technology support, logistics, audio-visual support, site setup, public information, and protocol. Special staff personnel are essential to the success of an exercise, but they are neither controllers nor evaluators. They usually have no interaction with players.

VISITORS

Player organizations nominate visitors. These organizations present the nominations to the Co-Directors. The FEMA Co-Director has final approval on nominations by non-Army organizations, and the Army Co-Director has final approval on nominations by Army organizations. The organization may prepare an agenda for visitors if it escorts the visitors. The visited jurisdictions will coordinate in advance concerning unescorted visitors and visitor escorts.

VOLUNTEERS

Volunteers are frequently used in CSEPP exercises to enhance the realism of exercise play and facilitate performance demonstrations. Volunteers may serve in a variety of roles including evacuees at shelters, patients to be decontaminated, or hospital “patients.” CSEPP has developed guidance regarding compensation for exercise volunteers.

Duration: Exercise Schedule

The Blue Grass and Pueblo Exercise Planning Teams identify the desired exercise date 5 years in advance and submit it to FEMA Headquarters exercise managers for approval. The Exercise Planning Teams consider the availability of key players or their designated alternates; State and local activities; other exercises; and audits, inspections, and reviews scheduled at the installations into the scheduling. FEMA may choose to hold exercises or out-of-sequence demonstrations after normal working hours, on alternate days, or on weekends to accommodate volunteer emergency response organizations.

FEMA schedules annual CSEPP exercises using these guidelines:

- There must be a minimum of 3 weeks between exercises.
- There must be a minimum of 1 week prior to the end of or 3 weeks after the beginning of the fiscal year and should not be scheduled during the week of a Federal holiday.

Once approved, the Exercise Planning Team submits the dates to the Exercise Work Group for inclusion in the overall exercise schedule. FEMA Headquarters then submits the exercise dates for inclusion in the Preparation Toolkit.

Exercise Timeline

The Army and FEMA Co-Directors and Exercise Planning Team are responsible for exercise planning, conduct, evaluation, and the After-Action Report (AAR)/Improvement Plan (IP). Each exercise is unique; flexibility is required in exercise development. Figure 6 provides a *suggested* schedule for exercise planning and conduct.




Figure 6: Suggested Schedule of Activities for CSEPP Exercises

Parameters: Capability Demonstrations outside Annual Exercises

States and local jurisdictions and agencies may request to receive CSEPP exercise credit for demonstrating specific capabilities and emergency response functions at other times. Such capabilities and functions may include actual events, CAIRA exercises, out-of-sequence play, and tests of unique capabilities such as information technology, all in accordance with established HSEEP policy. The purpose of requesting exercise credit for real-world events is not to opt out of the annual CSEPP exercise completely but to allow credit for demonstrating some aspect(s) of emergency response during such an event. The credit allows jurisdictions to place emphasis on objectives they do not routinely get to demonstrate and should not be considered a reduction in exercise level of effort. Exercise credit requests are reviewed and approved by the Exercise Co-Director. Certain capabilities and functions may not be permissible for an opt-out credit. The annual

CSEPP exercise report will document any demonstrations of specific capabilities and emergency response functions.

To receive exercise credit, the jurisdictions and/or agencies must submit a written request to the respective FEMA Exercise Co-Director for decision at the Program Manager level. The request must include the following:

- Date, location, and type of event and purpose of request
- Capability demonstrated and corresponding CSEPP exercise response outcome
- Justification of request: why is the exercise credit being pursued and how the proposed activity ensures proper capability demonstration
- Evaluator plan
- Benefit to the program and impact to annual exercise

A request for credit because of an actual event should occur as soon after the event as possible so that the Co-Director can make the most informed decision possible. A request for credit from participation in a separate exercise must be coordinated in advance with the Co-Director, who may need to provide evaluators to observe play or to review the AAR to grant CSEPP credit. These events will be documented in the annual CSEPP exercise report.

Objectives

Exercise priorities identified earlier in the planning process by senior leaders and the Exercise Planning Team will drive development of exercise objectives. To drive an effective exercise, exercise objectives should be specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound (SMART); support CSEPP EROs; and align with FEMA's core capabilities. Figure 7 depicts guidelines for developing SMART objectives:



Figure 7: SMART Objectives

Evaluation Requirements

The level of exercise participation is determined through execution of an XPA. The XPA is a contract between exercise participants and the Exercise Co-Directors that formally outlines the jurisdiction's scope of play. XPAs are the basis by which communities conduct meaningful exercises. An XPA provides exercise planners a basic structure from which to develop those exercises and includes elements that lead to scenario development, exercise scope, scheduling, impact of real-world events, and simulation requirements. The XPA also aligns the EROs with core capabilities as identified in the *National Preparedness Goal*. See Appendix D for additional discussion of ERO alignment with the core capabilities.

The XPA begins with the assumption that the community will fully respond according to their plans and will describe any deviations, such as simulations, out-of-sequence play, or nonparticipating organizations. Simulations should be minimal. Jurisdictions may not simulate capabilities they do not have.

Individual organizations do not sign the jurisdiction's XPA but provide essential input through individual agreements executed with the jurisdiction's emergency management director (or designee). Individual or group agreements identify the agency, capabilities demonstrated in the exercise, a point of contact, etc., that the organizations include in the jurisdiction's XPA. The organization tasks the agreement-development process to the emergency management director, the CSEPP manager, the coordinator, or the training officer who combines individual or group agreements (for example, agreements with the American Red Cross) into the jurisdiction's XPA. The individual accomplishing this task should be a member of the Exercise Planning Team but need not be a trusted agent. Each hospital will complete an XPA tailored to show exactly what the hospital will demonstrate. The hospital XPA may be rolled into the county XPA as long as it is created in conjunction with the hospital trusted agents and provides sufficient detail for evaluation. Whether the hospital XPA is rolled into the county XPA or kept separate, it should be signed by both the hospital trusted agent and the Exercise Co-Directors.

The XPA will indicate by ERO where and by whom activities within those outcomes would be demonstrated. For FSEs, the community will demonstrate all outcomes. The level of detail provided in the XPA should be sufficient to support exercise design and evaluation.

Because the XPA is essential to development of the scenario, simulation requirements, and the exercise evaluation plan, the planning team must complete agreements in the early stage of exercise planning. Specifically, the team should complete an XPA by approximately 270 days prior to the exercise and sign it no later than 150 days prior to the exercise.

Appendix B provides detailed instructions and templates for preparing XPAs.

Scenario

The Exercise Co-Directors will ensure that the initiating event is plausible and that supplemental events drive off-post participation. The initiating event is a chemical accident or incident (CAI) and must be within the CMA accident planning base. Therefore, it must have a frequency of occurrence exceeding one in one million per year. At Pueblo, where mustard is the only chemical agent, igloo fires and fires in general involving mustard are low-probability events that cause difficult time restrictions (i.e., 24-hour standoff) for the Army to demonstrate during a CSEPP exercise. While not intended to restrict using fire scenarios in exercises, communities should consider higher-probability events (i.e., those events more likely to occur) when planning their CSEPP exercises that are within their accident planning base.

In accordance with Co-Directors' input, the Exercise Planning Team will develop a scenario that supports the exercise objectives. The scenario should include the following:

- A description of the scenario as it stands before the start of the exercise (StartEx)
- A description of the scenario, including location, operation, crew composition, equipment, work plan, and work-plan maximum credible event (MCE) plume projection
- A description of what meteorological data will be real-world and what will be simulated.
- Initiating event and supplemental events and demonstrations
- Injured workers
- Diagram of CAI site
- Initial hazard assessments
- Ground truth hazard assessments

The scenario should prompt alert and notification of applicable off-post State and local jurisdictions and agencies. Some stockpile agent scenarios will not produce sufficient effects to drive off-post exercise play to allow community participation. Thus, communities can use supplemental events and out-of-sequence demonstrations, as discussed earlier, to achieve exercise objectives.

Supplemental events must have relevance to the CSEPP hazard and use CSEPP-provided training and equipment to demonstrate the community's preparedness and response capabilities. For example, an accident involving transportation of hazardous materials in close proximity to the installation is an acceptable supplemental event; a school shooting or act of terrorism is not an acceptable supplemental event as it will detract from the exercise and drive exercise play in an unintended direction. The combination of initiating and supplemental events should provide off-post jurisdictions and agencies with the ability to demonstrate the community's capabilities fully.

During the planning process, the Exercise Planning Team will develop a timeline to capture significant events and times, such as transmission and receipt of important

messages, activation of facilities, protective action decisions, and activation of warning systems. During the exercise, evaluators and controllers note when these events occur. After the exercise, evaluators and controllers compile significant events and times and provide them to the evaluators to assist in the analysis of exercise play. Appendix A provides guidance and templates for the timeline.

The Exercise Planning Team will develop a proactive public information plan for accommodating real-world media coverage of the exercise in connection with CSEPP exercises. See Appendix E for a sample CSEPP public information plan for real-world media coverage of an exercise.

Master Scenario Events List

The Master Scenario Events List (MSEL) is a compilation of all injects developed for the exercise. It serves as both a detailed description of all of exercise injects and their expected outcomes provides a guide for evaluators and controllers to anticipate scenario actions.

The MSEL is a chronological timeline of expected actions and scripted events to be injected into exercise play by controllers to generate or prompt player activity. It ensures necessary events happen so that all objectives are met. Larger, more complex exercises may also use a procedural flow, which differs from the MSEL in that it contains only expected player actions or events. The MSEL links simulation to action, enhances exercise experience for players, and reflects an incident or activity meant to prompt players to action.²

As stated previously, the MSEL Meeting is part of the exercise-development process and provides an opportunity to review all injects for purpose, relevance, and integration into the overall exercise.

Inject Development

Once the scenario is developed, the planning team and jurisdictional trusted agents develop exercise injects that guide play to meet objectives. Injects are written descriptions of controller actions used to stimulate player actions or introduce simulations. Injects should describe play acting, moulage and symptom cards, messages (oral, written, telephonic, social media), memorandums, letters, weather, props, etc. The information on the inject includes the responsible controller, inject means, the actual message, controller notes (e.g., “inject only after JIC is activated”), anticipated player response, and an area for evaluator/controller notes, including the actual inject time and the recipient’s response. Injects should also include ERO and task number and supported Core Capability(s), and Mission Areas. Figure 8 illustrates two sample injects.

² U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2020. *Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program* (glossary page 6). Accessed online January 25, 2020. <https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/Homeland-Security-Exercise-and-Evaluation-Program-Doctrine-2020-Revision-2-2-25.pdf>

PCD 18

MINI_ID 2 NEW ID 1077 Time 9:18 Day 5/2/2018 Notes **Exercise Inject** Creator J Short

From Citizen Player Citizen Controller SIMCELL - Army/DoD

To PCD Operator Means Voice ERO 3. Emergency Management

EEG A.3.1.E Activate, Expand, and Operate the EOC

MissionArea Public Information Core Capabilities Protection

Inject Description
Call the PCD operator at 719-549-4111

Expected Response
Should be advised that his employee needs to go to the south gate using evacuation route C and ask the gate guard for further instructions.

Controller Note
Make sure to include: Name, Zone, Age and Location if Applicable
Igloo 425 lessor Sam Johnson calls PCD operator requesting information about his employees safety.

Inject Message
The siren's just went off and one of my employees working at igloo 425, called me he doesn't know what to do.
Is he safe? Where should he go to be safe.

Previous Menu
Create Inject
Save Inject
Delete Inject
Print Current Inject
Close Data Entry

PCD 18

MINI_ID 24 NEW ID 1206 Time 9:15 Day 5/2/2018 Notes **Exercise Inject** Creator Houghton

From SIMCELL Player Pueblo County Emergency Controller SIMCELL - Pueblo County

To Communications Center Means Phone ERO 6. Victim Care

EEG C.6.6.F Transport Evacuees/Patients to a Shelter or Medical Treatment Facility

MissionArea Response Core Capabilities Public Information and Warning; Mass Care Services; Critical

Inject Description
Citizen requested evacuation assistance

Expected Response
Pueblo County Communications Center/Emergency Operations Center to determine the needs of the caller and relays the information to the Incident Commander. Pueblo County Communications

Controller Note
Make sure to include: Name, Zone, Age and Location if Applicable
Call 719-583-6250 (non-emergency communications center number).

Inject Message
"This is a test exercise message. This is Jacob/Jemima Pillsbury. Please help! I live in Boone (421 E 1st Street, Boone CO 81025) and did not evacuate this morning. My house is starting to flood and I'm scared. Can you send someone to get me? I need help right away!"

Previous Menu
Create Inject
Save Inject
Delete Inject
Print Current Inject
Close Data Entry

Figure 8: Examples of Inject Messages

The planning team should clearly mark inject forms with “EXERCISE... EXERCISE...EXERCISE” and “EVALUATOR/CONTROLLER EYES ONLY.” Each entry, at a minimum, contains the following: event number, time, from whom (e.g., media, citizen), to whom (e.g., State EOC, installation operator), ERO, and a summary (e.g., “A New York Times reporter asks the JIC media call taker about the incident”).

Jurisdictional trusted agents are responsible for developing injects, and the Exercise Planning Team may provide input into the development. Injects will identify the mission area and core capability demonstrated. Additionally, injects that drive limited-English-proficiency (LEP) play in a foreign language will have the English translation included with the controller inject. Additionally, injects that drive limited-English-proficiency (LEP) play in a foreign language will have the English translation included with the controller inject.

Exercise Documentation

Exercises require a comprehensive and organized set of documents to ensure an accurate account of the exercise is preserved. This section provides an overview of the main CSEPP exercise documents.

The Exercise Plan

The ExPlan provides an overview and plan for the exercise, including the purpose of the exercise, a list of EROs, a list of participating jurisdictions, and administrative and logistical information for the exercise. The planning team, who may distribute it, structures each ExPlan to a specific exercise. The team will distribute portions of the ExPlan tailored to specific functions within the exercise. Each ExPlan portion may contain descriptive sections and supporting annexes or appendices as needed. Figure 9 describes possible ExPlan components.

INTRODUCTION

This section describes how this exercise fits into the overall exercise program and the purpose of the ExPlan. This section gives the name, type of exercise, date, and hours of play and may include general information on what jurisdictions will participate and what they will exercise (e.g., EOCs, field play). It references the ERO EEGs, includes the XPA and/or XPA summary, and describes any special activities in connection with the exercise.

EXERCISE SIMULATIONS

This section may describe conditions that the drill will simulate during the exercise, including weather, field operations, medical operations, evacuation and sheltering, personnel (e.g., response of recalled off-duty personnel), and security. It also describes what the SimCell is and how it will operate. This section gives instructions for identifying exercise message traffic and distinguishing it from real emergency messages.

LIST OF EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS

This section lists the expected State, local, and private (e.g., hospitals, American Red Cross) organizations, as well as the installation groups and Army augmentation forces, participating in the exercise. This section also describes the roles of controllers, evaluators, and other exercise staff.

SAFETY

This section describes the general safety measures to be followed by all participants in the exercise.

EXERCISE ACTIVITIES

This section briefly describes pre-exercise activities (e.g., orientation and training sessions), exercise play, and post-exercise activities (e.g., post-exercise meetings and reports).

EXERCISE CONTROL

This section summarizes the control mechanism that will be used for the exercise and describes the identification system (color-coded badges) that will be used to identify different groups of exercise participants.

SECURITY

This section discusses classification or sensitivity of exercise information and applicable procedures. The planning team will prepare an annex or separate security plan, if needed, to deal with real-world security problems.

AFTER ACTION REPORT

This section briefly describes the post-exercise report that the planning team will generate and describes responsibility for its preparation.

Figure 9: Example of CSEPP Exercise Plan Components

The ExPlan is also supported by various annexes. Figure 10 provides a list of required CSEPP ExPlan annexes.




Figure 10: Example of CSEPP Exercise Plan Annexes

The Controller and Evaluator Handbook

The Controller and Evaluator (C/E) Handbook provides instructions and information required only by exercise staff. To avoid artificial exercise response, the planning team

will not divulge the scenario to players in advance. The release of any part of the C/E Handbook to players or unauthorized persons is prohibited.

The planning team structures each C/E Handbook to reflect requirements and design of a specific exercise. The C/E Handbook usually contains the following:

- Introduction
- Overview of exercise
- Exercise control and management
- Orientation, training, and meetings
- Control communication
- Exercise site description
- Exercise evaluation and documentation
- Scenario
- Timeline
- Exercise social media observer account log-in information
- Controller checklist for significant events and status reports to the Simulation Cell (SimCell)
- Safety analysis and concerns

The planning team must develop the control structure for the exercise and make plans for controller training and briefings. The control structure will be similar for all exercises, with some controllers assigned to specific locations and others located in the SimCell. Mock media will move from location to location as required to support exercise goals. After the planning team confirms XPAs and develops the scenario and the C/E Handbook, the Exercise Co-Directors finalize the number of controllers and evaluators and types of expertise needed. To the maximum extent possible, the planning team encourages local jurisdictions to provide personnel to act as controllers in the SimCell or as safety controllers at field sites. Because of their local knowledge and understanding of the community, local participation aids in portraying realistic simulations.

Communication Directories

Communication is essential during exercises. Exercise communication directories provide evaluators, controllers, and players the telephone number they will use to contact each other. There are two types of communication directories:

- The **Player Communication Directory** supplements playing organizations' real communication directories by providing telephone numbers for non-participating entities.
- The **Controller/Evaluator Directory** provides telephone numbers and radio call signs to facilitate communication among evaluators, controllers, the SimCell, and the Exercise Co-Directors.

Observer and VIP Plan

The Exercise Co-Directors will develop detailed plans to accommodate observers and VIPs and will develop and coordinate an itinerary with all affected organizations. The itinerary will include a point of contact and phone number for a person at each location. An escort will serve as the safety officer/controller and should, therefore, coordinate with the lead evaluator/safety officer at each location. The ExPlan includes these plans and should address the following:

- The Exercise Co-Directors request exercise observers' attendance and will coordinate visitor/observers' presence with the jurisdictions.
- The Exercise Co-Directors arrange for knowledgeable escorts and transportation for observers, visitors and VIPs. Observers, visitors, and VIPs will follow the guidance their assigned escorts provide.
- Observers, visitors, and VIPs will not play in the exercise and may pose questions only to their designated point of contact. They are "invisible" to players.
- Controllers at locations that observers, visitors, and VIPs visit should provide assistance to ensure that controllers meet the observers' needs without interfering with exercise play.
- The Exercise Co-Directors will provide distinctive identification for all observers, visitors, and VIPs. Observers, visitors, and VIPs will bring any special requirements to the attention of the Exercise Co-Directors.
- The Exercise Co-Directors will provide observers, visitors, and VIPs with travel information, including transportation, lodging, and meals. They will be responsible for making their own travel, lodging, and meal arrangements.
- The Exercise Co-Directors may provide observers, select visitors, and VIPs with briefing materials, handouts, and possible special exhibits or demonstrations as appropriate.

Exercise Logistics Support Plan

The Exercise Co-Directors will provide direction through the Co-Director Tasking from to the exercise support contractor to assist in making appropriate logistical arrangements (e.g., lodging, schedules, meeting rooms for evaluators and controllers, installation of equipment, Internet access). The timing on these will vary according to the task. Typical exercise logistics requirements include the following:

- Travel
- Transportation
- Lodging
- Meeting rooms for various functions
- Equipment (vests, etc.)
- Automation and communication (Wi-Fi, printers, radios, phones with phone lines, etc.)

- Office supplies
- Name cards, tags, and/or tents
- Collection and disposal of exercise materials (referring to printed materials)

Real-world Media Plan

The Exercise Co-Directors will develop a detailed exercise public information plan for real-world media coverage of exercises for each exercise. The Army, FEMA, installation, State, and local public information representatives must take an active role in development of this plan. Input from the planning team will be necessary when developing schedules for media briefings, tours, and other activities. The planning team must deliver exercise public information plan for real-world media coverage of exercises to the Exercise Co-Directors in time for inclusion in the ExPlan. Refer to Appendix E for additional information on the development of a site-specific plan.

Preparation and Distribution of Exercise Information Packets

The Exercise Co-Directors will ensure preparation of exercise packets for attendees as appropriate. Information includes the individual's assignment, the exercise schedule, and logistics arrangements. The Exercise Co-Directors may also provide forms, guidance materials, and location-specific information (including maps, portions of the applicable emergency plans and procedures, applicable portions of previous evaluation reports, and, for evaluators, appropriate EEGs and XPAs). The Exercise Co-Directors will also provide electronic copies of ExPlans, the C/E Handbook, emergency operations plans (EOPs)/standard operating procedures (SOPs), and other materials, if available, 30 days in advance of the exercise to appropriate individuals.

Exercise Development

Exercise development involves planning for critical elements of exercise conduct: logistics, control, and evaluation.

Planning for Logistics

The Exercise Co-Directors are responsible for identifying resources required for all phases of the exercise. The Exercise Co-Directors will define requirements for personnel, equipment, and facilities and relay these requirements to their organizations, which arrange for identified resources to be provided by the exercise support contractor, appropriate government agencies, or military commands. The Army Co-Director will coordinate with the installation and arrange for Army resource support. The FEMA Co-Director will coordinate with the FEMA Exercise Coordinator to confirm contractor, FEMA, and other government agency resource support.

To initiate contractor support for the following year's exercise, the Co-Directors will jointly prepare the "CSEPP Exercise Co-Director Tasking Form" and submit it no later than February 15 of each year through the FEMA Exercise Coordinator.

Essential resources required to conduct and support a CSEPP exercise include personnel (evaluators, controllers, and special staff), office equipment (computers, printers, copiers,

and fax machines), communications (telephones and radios), exercise social media accounts (for players and observers), a reference library, exercise documentation, and facilities (exercise control headquarters, meeting rooms, and administrative space).

Exercise Co-Directors should submit their requirements for mock media, social media controllers, controllers to apply moulage, security evaluators, and medical evaluators in sufficient time for the team to arrange necessary assets. The following considerations are important when arranging exercise support:

- The planning team must allocate and budget sufficient time to permit evaluators and controllers to participate in pre-exercise orientation and training sessions at the exercise location.
- It is particularly important that the planning team permit key evaluators such as evaluation team leaders to remain at the exercise location after the exercise to complete their written evaluation reports (AAR/IP input) to the satisfaction of the Exercise Co-Directors. (FEMA employees should review FEMA overtime and compensatory time-off policies, published separately.)
- Special staff personnel must include public information specialists to assist the Exercise Co-Directors in dealing with real-world media before, during, and after the exercise.
- The planning team should identify agencies that plan to use social media during the exercise. Exercise social media accounts must be used to ensure that exercise communications remain secure and are not misinterpreted as a real-world event. These accounts should be closed and protected so that posts are only visible to approved participants.
- The Army Exercise Co-Director provides a list of on-post controller/evaluators, giving name, security information, and requirements for restricted area access to the installation.
- Computer resources must include software packages that facilitate production of pre-exercise orientation materials, during exercise scenario tracking, and AAR preparation.
- The planning team must install or have available telephones, radios, and other communications used in support of the exercise in sufficient time for evaluators to thoroughly test them before the exercise. The team should arrange to retain telephone and fax capability at the exercise location for as long as necessary (a minimum of 2 days) after the end of the exercise.
- The planning team should ensure that the location of exercise facilities is convenient, safe, and readily accessible to all exercise participants.
- Authorized expenses include printing, postage, telephone calls, and transportation requirements, in addition to those the team normally budgets for in the exercise annual budget; travel funds for exercise planning and execution; and per diem for exercise evaluators and controllers for the exercise. Reimbursement for volunteers is limited to meals and transportation costs and does not cover salaries and benefits.

- Expenses not authorized include separate exercise support contracts, expenses for observers, and overtime for State and county personnel.

Planning for Exercise Control

As outline in HSEEP Guidance (2020), exercise control maintains scope, pace, and integrity during conduct under safe and secure exercise conditions. Key elements that must be planned for include controller staffing, structure, training, communications, and safety and security.

The planning team must identify the number of controllers needed based on the size and scope of the exercise. As a guiding principle, at least one controller should be present at every venue whenever possible; this will provide for an avenue for controlling the flow of information and release of MSEL events and ensure that the exercise is conducted safely with proper security controls.

A SimCell will be established to generate injects, receive player responses, and provide information in place of non-participating organization that would likely participate actively if exercise events were real.

The roles and responsibilities for controllers can be found in the Exercise Design and Development section above.

Planning for Exercise Evaluation

The planning team evaluates the exercise response as an integrated, cohesive effort. The Exercise Co-Directors should review their needs for assistance with management and for coordination of report preparation and should recruit personnel to provide any needed support. This could include one or more report coordinators.

The Exercise Co-Directors use local plans, procedures, and agreements (e.g., MOUs and memorandums of agreement [MOAs])—and XPAs, objectives, and the scenario—as bases for identifying locations and functions the planning team will evaluate. The Exercise Co-Directors then determine the number of evaluators and the expertise needed. Evaluator recruitment should begin 9 months prior to the exercise.

The planning team will assign evaluators to jurisdictional teams that are responsible for completing all required forms and documents. Jurisdictional team leaders coordinate their evaluators' data collection and analysis. Select evaluators will join community ERO teams to participate in the community analysis and the report-development process.

Co-Directors should especially consider evaluator assignment for jurisdictions who had a finding in the previous year's exercise. They should assign evaluators that have significant experience and expertise in the given area/function and differ from those who evaluated the particular jurisdiction/function in the previous exercise. This will ensure the best team is assigned to an area of concern and mitigate potential evaluator bias

Exercise Conduct and Control

The Exercise Co-Directors are responsible for the conduct of the exercise and use an organizational structure for executing the exercise. (ICS is the preferred system; an example of an exercise organization structure is illustrated in Figure 11). The Exercise Co-Directors are responsible for initiating the exercise and ending the exercise after the on- and off-post communities have reasonable opportunity over the exercise duration (typically 4.5 hours) to demonstrate their emergency response capabilities and reach objectives established in the XPAs. Jurisdictions or supporting agencies that reach their objectives prior to the end of the exercise may assess the level of their staffing and adjust accordingly after agreement between the senior jurisdiction player and the lead evaluator and coordination with the Exercise Co-Directors. The jurisdiction may then end exercise play but should sustain sufficient staffing levels to provide information and support to overall exercise play. Jurisdictions may permit exercise play to continue beyond the planned timeframe to allow participants the opportunity to gain additional experience or training. At the discretion of the Exercise Co-Directors, jurisdictions may reduce staff at various locations while overall exercise play continues. Any participant can suspend exercise play for a real-world emergency or if safety is compromised. Evaluators will immediately report this action to the Exercise Co-Directors and/or the Safety Controller, as applicable.




Figure 11: Example of an Incident Command System Exercise Structure

Controller Activities

Controllers establish and maintain the scenario structure and ensure compliance with simulations and XPAs at all exercise locations. Controllers and evaluators input information (injects, messages, accident site setup, condition of patients, etc.) developed during the pre-exercise planning phase. Controllers and evaluators relay administrative information on the exercise progress to players and inform them when play ends. They also relay information on timing of significant events the jurisdictions demonstrate to the SimCell to ensure proper timing of injects and keep the Exercise Co-Directors informed of exercise progress.

Evaluator Activities

Evaluator activities are key to developing a clear, concise AAR that can help the community be better prepared for an emergency. In general, evaluators observe players' activities, make appropriate notes, and record the time events occurred. During the exercise and after the exercise has ended (EndEx), evaluators collect copies of all documents and records players produce at all locations (i.e., in the field and at the EOC and JIC). These include sign-in sheets, player and computer logs, Emergency Alert System (EAS) messages, emergency declarations, incoming and outgoing faxes, and news releases. Evaluators should collect audio and video data, if available. Evaluators will use these products to analyze players' actions and compile the AAR. Evaluators should turn in all exercise materials to administration for archiving. In the event there is no administrative support, materials should be delivered to the Co-Director.

Exercise Conduct Meetings

The Exercise Co-Directors may hold various meetings during exercise week for players, evaluators, and controllers. This section will outline each of the meetings.

Exercise Sign-in, Orientation, and Training

Upon arrival, evaluators and controllers will register and receive badges, necessary equipment, and exercise and location-specific information. The Exercise Co-Directors will be present to address any questions if necessary.

Controller and Evaluator Briefings

The Exercise Co-Directors will provide time, location, and attendance requirements for the meetings. They may ask representatives from the installation and State and local organizations to provide some of the information. The Exercise Co-Directors should consider the following topics for inclusion at these meetings:

- Purpose and scope of the exercise
- Concept of operations
- XPAs
- Schedule for exercise play and other exercise-week activities
- Contingency plan for real-world emergencies
- Safety and/or security (general and site-specific information)

- Injects
- Exercise scenario, including initiating event, supplemental events, and expected impact
- Basic demography, geography, political boundaries, and emergency planning zones
- Location of various facilities and field activities
- Overview of emergency response plans and procedures
- Evaluation and control team structure
- Operation of the SimCell
- Communications, including radio and telephone protocols, and use of communications directories
- Evaluator and controller assignments, reporting requirements, and instructions, including the release process for controllers and evaluators
- Report writing requirements, including form, content, and approval process
- Real-world public information plan and telephone numbers for CSEPP real-world public information contacts
- Role of the mock media
- Use of social media
- Observer plans
- Protocols, including wearing of identifying badges, safety equipment, appropriate dress, media interaction, participant interactions, and pre-exercise site visits.

Player Briefings

The Exercise Co-Directors or the evaluators and controllers the organizers have assigned to that location should brief players. In some cases, a member of the player's organization, whom the Exercise Co-Directors has previously briefed, will brief members of his or her organization. The Exercise Co-Directors provide a briefing guide and/or checklist to the lead evaluators to aid in briefing players. They will hold sessions for controllers and evaluators that may include the following:

- Purpose and scope of the exercise
- Introduction of the evaluation/control team and structure
- Timeframe of exercise
- Safety and/or security
- Exercise weather information
- Description of evaluation process
- Procedures for any variations to the XPA and guidelines for simulations
- Explanation of purpose of exercise control and the SimCell

- Distribution of player's communications directories and explanation of their use
- Description of identification system (badges) for evaluators, controllers, and observers, and their interactions, if any, with players
- Status of previous findings
- Current EOPs, SOPs, MOUs, and MOAs
- Public information plan for real-world media coverage
- Role of the mock media
- Use of social media
- Schedule for and explanation of post-exercise meetings (e.g., exit interviews and briefing, players' self-assessment, and hot washes)
- Arrangements for player data collection for use in analysis and report writing
- Schedule for issuing exercise report

Site Visit

Evaluators and controllers who work at player facilities (rather than the SimCell) should arrange for and carry out a site visit prior to the exercise. The site visit allows them to meet players; confirm the location of activity; and verify communications, protocols, and understandings of the extent of play prior to the start of the exercise. Site visits may include the following:

- Confirmation of the XPA
- Review of Preparedness (ERO 1) activities
- Clarification of items in EOPs that are unclear or have been modified
- Identification of parking location for evaluators and controllers
- Arrival times for evaluators and controllers at all locations
- Security and/or sign-in procedures
- Time clock location and synchronization (e.g., using www.time.gov)
- Verification of phone numbers and date and time of fax machines
- Verification of SimCell phone numbers and ability to contact the SimCell, including fax number
- Working and break locations for evaluators and controllers during exercise
- Verification of phone and computer availability for use by controllers and evaluators during exercise
- Identification of point of contact and phone number for information clarification or verification after EndEx
- Follow-on field location visits

- Confirmation of arrangements for player data collection
- Hospital and/or decontamination site-specific issues, as required

Exercise Evaluation

CSEPP requires States and local jurisdictions and agencies within the CSEPP community to demonstrate applicable emergency response plans and procedures. As such, a team of Federal, State, local, and contractor subject matter experts evaluates the annual CSEPP exercise. The Army Co-Director coordinates evaluation of the Army response; the FEMA Co-Director coordinates evaluation of off-post response; and the Exercise Co-Directors jointly manage evaluation of the overall community response.

The annual CSEPP full-scale exercise evaluation process uses a hierarchical structure that guides how evaluations are assigned, written, reviewed, and submitted. Prior to the exercise, the Co-Directors assign a Lead and a team of evaluators to assist in assessing player actions within a jurisdiction (i.e., county, State, etc.). During the exercise, evaluators may evaluate at emergency operations centers (EOCs), JICs, shelters, hospitals, decontamination sites, traffic control points, and/or other locations where exercise operations and player actions occur. After the exercise, evaluators write a narrative in collaboration with their Jurisdiction Lead and team that encompasses applicable strength(s), observation(s), and/or finding(s). The evaluator's documents are submitted to the Jurisdictional Lead for review; he or she may request additional information or clarification. When approved by the Jurisdiction Lead, documents are submitted to the ERO Lead for review and validation; the ERO Lead may ask for additional information or clarification as well. Upon validation by the ERO Lead, the evaluators upload their documents to be compiled and integrated into the exercise AAR. The process and structure illustrated in Figure 12 reflects the scope of a CSEPP exercise and clearly delineates exercise roles and responsibilities; depending on available resources, the same personnel can be used to execute multiple functions.




Figure 12: Sample CSEPP Exercise Evaluation Process and Structure

Evaluators use a standard set of eight EROs to plan and evaluate each exercise (Figure 13). Each outcome has a series of tasks and a corresponding Exercise Evaluation Guide (EEG) that includes the task name, evaluated components, expected outcomes, steps, and applicable references. Evaluators use the EEGs before and after the exercise as a guide to assist in evaluation and analysis of the community response.




Figure 13: CSEPP Emergency Response Outcomes

Evaluators observe player actions and collect data required to analyze performance at both the jurisdiction and community levels. The exercise report consists of analysis from evaluators who observed exercise play and may include player self-assessment. Development of accurate, useful information requires cooperation and candor among evaluators, controllers, and players. This evaluation involves comparing performance against applicable regulations and guidance from the Army, FEMA, and other Federal agencies; the jurisdiction's response plans and procedures; CSEPP guidance documents; and good response practices, using the exercise EEGs as a roadmap. After the exercise, evaluation teams and controllers hold a series of meetings to determine what took place during the exercise and analyze the results.

Hotwash

The evaluation team will meet with players to discuss the exercise. This meeting, called a hotwash, is informal and open, with players encouraged to discuss their activities and ask questions. The Exercise Co-Directors encourage evaluators to clarify questions they have about the exercise play at their location. Evaluators provide players with initial impressions on their portion of the exercise and should stress that the information provided during the hotwash is preliminary. Lead Evaluators may have a post-exercise consultation with the jurisdictional emergency manager or point of contact to briefly discuss significant capability gaps observed during the exercise.

Post-Exercise Controller/Evaluator Debrief

Each jurisdictional team will meet to review and discuss collected data and evaluators' notes. This review also includes responses to implementers and from SimCell jurisdictional table leads. Information generated by observation of facility, field, and out-of-sequence play is correlated. Evaluators identify data discrepancies and contradictions and resolve them as quickly as possible. They discuss preliminary analyses of inter-jurisdictional impacts of player actions and identify issues.

As part of the evaluation process, the Exercise Co-Directors coordinate with evaluation teams to develop a list of strengths, observations, and findings based on evaluator and player input and any other information available. CSEPP defines strengths, observations, and findings as follows:

- **Strength:** A strength is a peer-validated technique, procedure, and/or solution that had significant positive impact resulting in successful response and solidly grounds itself in actual experience in operations, training, and exercises. A player merely doing his or her job should not be considered a strength. The Exercise Co-Directors will determine whether a described capability warrants reporting as a strength in the report. Strengths require action to capture the activity as a best practice and codify it in a way that promotes its repetition.
- **Observation:** An observation is an action that indicates a capability gap that may impact successful performance of a task or an action that shows unusual initiative or effectiveness that had positive impact on task accomplishment. Unlike a finding, an observation does not require a formal improvement plan; however, it should have a recommendation to correct a deficiency or capitalize on an innovation. In most

cases, a reference such as a regulation or a local standard operating procedure (SOP) should be listed for negative observations. Informally, there is an expectation that organizations will internally address observations. Community-level observations will need placement on site IPT agendas for resolution.

- **Finding:** A finding indicates a significant gap in a capability required to successfully perform a function or operation that could result in response failure. A finding requires a formal improvement plan that addresses specific actions the organization(s) will take to correct noted deficiencies that led to the finding and a timeline that the corrective actions will occur. Findings may involve deviation from applicable laws, regulations, policies, standards, or plans and often involve life-safety issues. A reference such as a regulation or a local SOP must be listed for a finding. Additionally, at the discretion of the Exercise Co-Directors, similar observations occurring during more than one-annual CSEPP exercise may become findings if the jurisdiction has not made any correction to the observation. The intent is not to increase the number of findings but rather to promote proactive improvement.

Exercise Co-Directors' Team Meeting

The Exercise Co-Directors may conduct a team meeting to exchange and validate information and to provide preliminary identification of inter-jurisdictional issues.

Submit Timeline

Evaluators should capture jurisdictional times for the timeline during the exercise. The evaluators compile the list as soon as possible after the exercise to make themselves available to support the evaluators' analysis by the morning after the exercise. A representative from both on- and off-post communities develops the official exercise timeline. Appendix A describes the timeline development process in detail.

After Action Report (AAR) and Improvement Plan

An AAR details the evaluation of the annual CSEPP exercise. The Exercise Co-Directors are responsible for production of the report. The AAR provides feedback that enables exercise participants to continually improve emergency preparedness.

The Exercise Co-Directors will provide a draft AAR with initial strengths, observations, and findings within seven days of the conclusion of the exercise to all participating jurisdictions. The draft document is clearly identified as draft and is not released to the general public because it may contain unresolved issues. CSEPP considers the draft AAR a working document, and participating organizations are to hold it in strict confidence. Comments or concurrences to the draft AAR are due to the Exercise Co-Directors 30 days after the jurisdictions receive the draft report. If the jurisdictions do not provide comments, CSEPP assumes that all the jurisdictions agree with the draft report.

The IP includes the finding number, agency responsible, and the finding correction date. The IP addresses all findings identified and coordinated with the appropriate Exercise Co-Director. (See Appendix G for the IP format.) If a jurisdiction does not agree with a

finding or recommendation for correction of a finding, the Exercise Co-Directors work with the jurisdiction to resolve differences.

The IP is the jurisdiction's plan to address observations or findings from the exercise report and AAR. The IP identifies specific corrective actions, assigns them to responsible parties, and establishes target dates for their completion. The IP is developed in conjunction with the After-Action Report. It includes the finding number, agency responsible, and the finding correction date. The IP addresses all findings identified and coordinated with the appropriate Exercise Co-Director. (See Appendix G for the IP format.) If a jurisdiction does not agree with a finding or recommendation for correction of a finding, the Exercise Co-Directors work with the jurisdiction to resolve differences.

In the event of repeat findings, Region and State CSEPP Program Managers and Exercise Directors will work with the jurisdiction in developing an improvement plan to resolve the finding within 180 days from the submission of the AAR and develop processes to prevent future similar findings. They will develop solutions that should include training, additional exercises/drills, and procedures to address the gaps that contributed to the finding.

The Exercise Co-Directors issue the final AAR 30 calendar days after receiving comments on the draft AAR. Jurisdictions are responsible for developing IPs. The Exercise Co-Directors track progress towards completing the IP corrective actions.

Community Out-brief

The Off-post Exercise Co-Director should hold, as the community requests, a review meeting with representatives from the installation, State, and off-post jurisdictions. The Co-Director will provide the community with a preliminary analysis of the exercise and deliver the draft AAR. He or she may discuss potential strengths, observations, and findings identified during the exercise. This meeting also provides an opportunity for group discussion of recommendations for resolving the findings. Because the draft AAR may contain unresolved issues, it is a working document, and participating organizations must hold it in confidence.

Army Out-brief

The Army Co-Director meets with the Army Installation Commander within seven days of the conclusion of the exercise. The Co-Director gives the Commander a draft copy of the AAR and discusses any potential findings identified during the exercise. Potential observations and strengths may also be discussed. This is an opportunity for the Commander to provide initial feedback and to discuss resolution of issues as applicable. The draft AAR is a working document and will be held in confidence.

After-Action Meeting

Communities may choose to hold an after-action meeting to collectively write improvement plans and modify the draft AAR/IP. The Exercise Co-Directors and trusted agents should identify corrective actions to address the recommendations, who (what agency or person) is responsible, and the timeframe for implementation.

Final After-Action Report

The draft AAR requires review and comment by the playing organizations and development of an IP to correct findings. The jurisdictions shall submit IPs and comments to the State and the off-post Co-Director for incorporation in the final AAR. The installation representative provides their IP to the Army Co-Director for incorporation into the final AAR. The Exercise Co-Directors sign the final report and authorize its release and distribution. The final report should include a list of all participating organizations (governmental, nongovernmental, private agencies, etc.).

Track Findings

The Exercise Co-Directors will assign all findings an identifying number (see Appendix G) and list them in the exercise report. The CSEPP community will implement IPs. When planning starts for the next exercise, the Exercise Planning Team should consider including opportunities to demonstrate emergency response capabilities that may clear findings remaining open from previous exercises.

Additionally, the states should use the FEMA Prep Toolkit to track all findings. The Prep Toolkit is a web-based tool that enables Federal, State, and local emergency response and homeland security officials to develop, prioritize, track, and analyze corrective actions following exercises or real-world incidents. The primary goal of the system is to help officials resolve preparedness gaps or deficiencies in a systematic manner, ultimately strengthening national preparedness. Users should use existing HSEEP AAR guidance to implement this program.

This page intentionally left blank.

Appendix A: Timeline Guidance and Example

The exercise timeline establishes a standardized basis for key events and milestones during the exercise around which player actions revolve. The Exercise Co-Directors will establish key events based on the exercise scenario and Master Scenario Event List (MSEL) timing of key injects. Evaluators will record the time these events and actions occurred. Once adjudicated, the recorded times for these events become the official timeline. Lead evaluators turn in exercise times by 1700 following the exercise to the exercise support contractor.

The timeline examples in this appendix (Table 3 and Table 4) have entries that the Exercise Co-Directors, with input from Lead Evaluators and other key exercise staff, believe are needed for analysis during preparation of the draft After-Action Report/Implementation Plan (AAR/IP) and, with appropriate editing, for inclusion in the final AAR/IP. The templates cover only Army activities at the accident site and the EOC, off-post early warning points and EOCs, and the Joint Information Center (JIC). Evaluators should note activities at medical treatment facilities, traffic and access control points, decontamination stations, reception centers, and shelters; some of this information may be included in the timeline. It is worth noting that actions on each timeline may not occur in chronological order, and other significant events may be added after original publication.

The “Actual Time” column should use the four-digit 24-hour clock format (e.g., 0932, 1350) without colons and be the local time at the installation where officials hold the exercise.

The “Jurisdiction” column in Table 4 will identify the off-post jurisdiction where the activity occurred. This entry will be a standard brief abbreviation for each jurisdiction, preferably the same abbreviation used for finding designations (see Section 4 of the AAR/IP).

The “Activity” column in both tables describes the activity briefly but with enough detail for the reader to understand what happened. These entries usually correspond with a specific step in an exercise evaluation guide (EEG).

The final column in both tables identifies the Emergency Response Outcome (ERO) that covers the activity.

Table 3: Timeline Example: On-post

Time Executed	Evaluator	Activity	ERO
		StartEx—Workers recognize the event by workers in the field as a reportable emergency.	4
		Workers reported emergency to EOC.	4
		Workers initiated action to protect themselves.	6
		Sirens and TARs activated in all affected on- and off-post zones.	5
		Initial hazard analysis determined the on-post area at risk was the restricted area of the depot.	5
		Initial hazard analysis determined plume tip will arrive in off-post zone.	2
		Senior Army official made PAD for on-post.	5
		First WebPuff plume plot broadcast to off-post 24-hour warning points.	2
		Senior Army official classified event as Community Emergency.	2
		Senior Army official dispatched Public Affairs Officer (PAO) to JIC.	7
		Off-post 24-hour warning points updated with initial CENL, agent type, wind direction, and PARs.	2
		Initial Response Force (IRF) Commander notified CMA.	2
		EOC fully operational (all key positions staffed).	3
		Demilitarization facility notified	2
		Headquarters Department of the Army (Army Operations Center) notified.	2
		AMC Safety Office notified.	2
		Officials distribute first Army news release (mock media receive).	7
		National Response Center (NRC) notified.	2
		An operational RTAP establishes and supports mobile PDS.	4
		Health Clinic staff notified off-post medical facilities concerning possible transport of injured workers.	6
		Medical staff in EOC requests off-post ambulance.	6
		Initial report of ground truth received in the EOC.	4
		Off-post EOCs notified of updated PAR.	2
		RTAPs advised to prepare for off-post deployment.	2
		Decontamination Team arrived at accident site.	4
		EndEx.	

Table 4: Timeline Example: Off-post

Expected Time	Actual Time	Jurisdiction	Activity	ERO
			Heads-up call received from Installation	2
			PAR and plume data received via CSEPP hotline	2
			Verified notification to CSEPP counties through CSEPP hotline	3
			Off-post received first plume plot broadcast received through WebPuff	2
			Officials activate EOC	3
			Activated call-down processes	3
			Call-down processes complete	3
			EOC operational	3
			County declares State of Emergency	3
			Installation PAR accepted as PAD	3
			EOC activated	3
			EOC notifies agencies of activation	
			EOC operational	3
			EOC notifies hospitals of emergency	3
			EOC notifies schools (and vulnerable populations) of emergency	3
			Schools receive notification of emergency	5
			Over-pressurization operational at school	5
			Officials activate sirens and alert radios in all affected on- and off-post zones	5
			EOC orders establishment of traffic control points (TCPs)	3
			TCPs operational	5
			EOC orders activation of Reception Center/Shelter	3
			Reception Center/Shelter operational	5
			County requested State notify Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Union Pacific Railroad, and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)	3
			PAD issued through Emergency Alert System (EAS)	5
			Officials reactivate sirens and alert radios in all affected on- and off-post zones	5
			Governor declares State of Emergency	3
			Public Information Officer (PIO) departed for the JIC	7
			Hospital received notification of emergency	6
			Hospital EOC operational	6
			First patient (off post) arrived at hospital	6
			First on-post patient arrived at hospital	6

Expected Time	Actual Time	Jurisdiction	Activity	ERO
			Hospital EOC orders activation of decontamination site	6
			First patient through decontamination	6
			Last patient through decontamination	6
			Hospital ends play	6
		JIC	JIC activation	7
		JIC	JIC operational	7
		JIC	Officials distribute first JIC news release (SimCell receives)	7
		JIC	News conference began	7
		JIC	News conference ended	7

Most significant events are an instant in time when a key event occurs that drives scenario outcomes, that is a major objective and/or outcome driven by the scenario, or when a key decision is made by an official. Evaluators record the times of these key events or actions in the timeline as they occur. Some actions require time to complete. Except as noted below, the entry on the timeline will be the time that the official completes the action. If entries are intended to show both beginning and end times of an activity, be sure the entries so state (e.g., “1901—Joint News Conference began”; “1929—Joint News Conference ended”).

StartEx is the instant in time when an event occurs that officials will eventually characterize at the Army Chemical Event Notification Level (CENL) of Community Emergency. This is usually when the event releases the chemical agent outside of engineering controls or when a condition occurs that will eventually and directly cause the release. There might not be an eyewitness to the event when it occurs, or the eyewitness might not be in a position to make an immediate report. Only an evaluator at the chemical accident or incident (CAI) site can make this entry on the timeline. No other evaluator at any other location should make this entry.

The entry about the recognition of the occurrence of a reportable emergency is the time when the first person who is trained to recognize a CAI realizes that such an event has occurred, is equipped to make the report, and has the opportunity to report it safely. This is also the time that starts the clock for the Army to report the event to off-post authorities. Note that this time might be a time later than StartEx.

The entry about someone notifying the Army decision authority of the event is the time when the person who has the authority to make protective action recommendations (PARs) and protective action decisions (PADs) learns enough to classify the event, usually from a direct telephone or radio call from a responsible person at the CAI site. However, there is no assurance that the person who makes the initial report from the CAI site will communicate directly with the decision authority who can make PARs and PADs. Thus, it is necessary to track the initial report from the CAI site in sufficient detail

to assess the totality of the initial report sequence. Only the evaluator who is with this decision authority can make this entry on the timeline.

The entry about the classification of the CAI refers to the decision to classify the event based on the initial reports from the CAI site. Officials might make this decision immediately when the decision authority receives the initial report. However, the decision authority might solicit hazard analysis input, in addition to the initial report from the site, to classify the event. Only the evaluator who is with this decision authority can make this entry on the timeline.

The entry about the notification of off-post 24-hour warning points is the time when an official receives the CENL, agent type, wind direction, and PARs at the off-post 24-hour warning point, regardless of “heads-up” calls and other information that officials might exchange during the notification transaction. The time when on-post officials pass a PAR is the time that stops the clock for the Army to report the event to off-post points of contact, even if the notification call continues for additional time to discuss matters pertaining to notification and protective actions. Note that the 24-hour warning point might be an off-post EOC during duty hours. Both the Army evaluator who is monitoring the off-post alert and notification action and the evaluator located at the off-post 24-hour warning point should make this entry on the timeline. The jurisdiction lead evaluators or ERO leaders should reconcile discrepancies in the time of this entry. It would be prudent for both evaluators to log in the time as precisely as possible when the notification exchange process began, the time within the exchange when officials passed the essential information, and the time that the notification exchange process ended to help reconcile any differences in the observation.

Note that the clock to time the protection of citizens off-post begins to run when an official tells the CENL, agent type, wind direction, and PARs the 24-hour warning point. The off-post clock stops when the affected population has specific information about actions to take to protect themselves.

This page intentionally left blank.

Appendix B: CSEPP Guide for Exercise Extent of Play Agreements

Extent of Play Agreements (XPAs) should be developed for each organization that is participating in the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP). The XPA identifies conditions that will be used to develop, conduct, control, and evaluate organizations' CSEPP community exercise, as agreed to and signed off by the Federal Emergency Management Agency and U.S. Army Exercise Co-Directors and the organization.

Extent of Play Agreement Outline Description

There are several critical elements that comprise the XPA. The first part is a narrative that describes the purpose of the XPA; standards and references (emergency plans, agreements, policies); exercise parameters (types of events and hazards the scenario will involve); exercise participants (jurisdictions, points of contact, and contact information); expected levels of participation; exercise support (design and development, simulations and considerations, After-Action Report [AAR] and improvement planning); and a signature page between the jurisdiction official and the Exercise Co-Directors.

Following the narrative is a matrix that outlines specifics related to the exercise: the task to be performed from the Exercise Evaluation Guides ("Task" column); the mission area/core capability the task supports ("Mission Area" and "Core Capability" column[s]); the jurisdiction or function performing the task ("Player" column); and what will be demonstrated and expected outcomes ("Description of Play" column). (See Table 6 and Table 7 for sample matrices using these columns and descriptions.)

A description of each section of the XPA follows below. Example XPAs can also be found on the CSEPP Portal.³

- **Introduction and Purpose:** The XPA is an agreement between participating jurisdictions (or agencies) and the Exercise Co-Directors detailing the scope of each jurisdiction's exercise participation and the "ground rules" for conducting the exercise. This section details the purpose of the exercise, including background and other information to orient participants and provide context for conduct of the exercise.
- **Standards and References:** This section provides standards and references, such as plans, policies, and procedures, that each jurisdiction or agency must abide by. It also references the CSEPP Emergency Response Outcomes (EROs) and related core capabilities.

³

https://www.cseppportal.net/secure/portal/ipts/exercise_IPT/Exercise%20IPT%20Documents/Forms/AllItems.aspx?RootFolder=%2Fsecure%2Fportal%2Fipts%2Fexercise%5FIPT%2FExercise%20IPT%20Documents%2FExtent%20of%20Play%20Documents&FolderCTID=0x012000A9D668F4C0DFD04F998A8D9675FC0B90&View=%7B9A8599D7%2D0F75%2D48E9%2DB382%2D45D635608683%7D&InitialTabId=Ribbon%2EDocument&VisibilityContext=WSSTabPersistence.

- **Exercise Parameters:** This section provides a brief outline of the exercise scenario. It includes the duration of the exercise (traditionally averaging 4.5 hours) and must be sufficient to involve community response agencies. Exercise play concludes when the Co-Director makes the determination that the jurisdiction has reached its exercise objectives after consultation between the jurisdiction lead evaluator and the senior player at the jurisdiction location. If there are other player organizations that require a particular entity to continue the exercise, then they may do so with a limited crew as needed. This section does not include specific details of the exercise but only discusses parameters.
- **Exercise Players:** This section provides a list of all of participants that have direction and control responsibilities in the event of a chemical accident at a U.S. Army Chemical stockpile site and that will be participating in the exercise in a manner consistent with exercise objectives and the exercise scenario. It should contain a table with the organization, contact name, telephone number, and email address; see Table 5 for an example.

Table 5: Exercise Player Point of Contact Table

Organization	Name	Telephone	Email Address
Sheriff's Office	John Doe	xxx-xxx-xxxx	John.Doe@xxx.org
County Coroner	John Smith	xxx-xxx-xxxx	John.Smith@xxx.org

- **Expected Level of Conduct Participation:** This section indicates when the exercise begins and states that exercise play will continue uninterrupted for a specified time (traditionally averaging 4.5 hours or until objectives are addressed to the satisfaction of the Exercise Co-Directors or real-world activities require termination of some or all activities. This section also outlines any specific goals the organization has identified for the exercise, such as public information dissemination or mock media requirements.
- **Exercise Simulations:** This section provides an overview of any simulation or special considerations that have been identified to ensure the safety of all participants. This may include such things as the use of simulated weather to promote scenario expectations, simulated access control points/traffic control points (ACP/TCP), and the use of out-of-sequence events to meet exercise requirements.
- **After-Action Report (AAR):** This section should provide an overview of the AAR process. Points to be detailed in this section include the following:
 - A draft AAR should be given to the jurisdictions within 7 calendar days after the exercise. This draft document should reflect CSEPP-specific guidance and methodology and closely conform to Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) guidance current at the time.
 - The draft AAR will not be released to the general public because it may contain unresolved issues. The AAR is considered a working document and should be held in strict confidence by all participating organizations.

- Comments or concurrence to the draft AAR are due to the Exercise Co-Directors 30 calendar days after jurisdictions receive the draft AAR; otherwise, the jurisdiction will be assumed to have agreed with the draft report.
- Each participating organization will designate and provide a representative(s) as appropriate to present, discuss, and refine the draft AAR at the After-Action Meeting. Once the AAR has been finalized and corrective actions have been identified, the organization's representatives will identify a person who is responsible for the corrective action and the timeframe for implementation.
- **Signatures:** Each XPA is required to be signed by the organization representative and an Exercise Co-Director. Off-post XPAs are signed by the FEMA Exercise Co-Director, and on-post XPAs are signed by the Army Exercise Co-Director. Both the FEMA and Army Co-Directors jointly sign the Joint Information Center XPA. These signatures acknowledge that the signatory participating organizations agree to support the exercise as described therein. By signing this agreement, the representative of the named organization acknowledges the need for and is authorized to obligate agency resources to ensure successful participation in exercise and agrees to support this exercise as describe within the XPA.
- **XPA ERO Matrix:** The ERO Matrix outlines specifics related to the exercise: the task to be performed from the Exercise Evaluation Guides ("Task" column); the mission area/core capability the task supports ("Mission Area" and "Core Capability" column[s]); the jurisdiction or function performing the task ("Player" column); and what will be demonstrated and expected outcomes ("Description of Play" column).
- **Task Column:** This column refers to the task in the exercise evaluation guides (EEGs) and includes the EEG identification number and description for each task set for demonstration. See Appendix D, Table 16 for additional discussion of ERO alignment with the core capabilities. The EEGs in Appendix C provide a starting point for the tasks set; however, the Exercise Planning Team should review those tasks and determine which ones to include in a particular exercise. Considerations for that review process include the following:
 - Why is the task being performed and is it necessary?
 - Is it part of the plan? If not, does it need incorporation into the plan?
 - Does it support your exercise focus, goals, or objectives?
 - What is the desired outcome?
 - Is it a key function toward your community's readiness?
- **Mission Area/Core Capability Column(s):** These columns show the relationship of the task to be performed to the *National Preparedness Goal's* five mission areas and 32 core capabilities. This is useful because each task can then be related to risk and/or hazard assessments and preparedness reports to determine if capabilities demonstrated during the exercise met capability targets or narrowed identified gaps.

- Player Column:** This column indicates who will perform the identified task (i.e., County EOC, American Red Cross Shelter, local elementary school, fire departments). It is important to know who will participate and who will not participate in the exercise and in the particular task that will be demonstrated. This information determines the level and type of support and other resources required. The Evaluated Component portion of the EEGs in Appendix C provides a starting point for determining which players perform each task; however, the listings in the EEGs are generic and the Exercise Planning Team should determine which particular organizations and groups of staff will perform each Task in this particular exercise. For example, where the EEG component lists “Medical Treatment Facility,” the XPA should indicate which particular hospitals or clinics will perform the task.
- Objectives of Play:** During the exercise planning process, participants will develop objectives of play that illustrate what they intend to accomplish in the task execution. The objectives will use the SMART format (see Figure 14). SMART objectives identify who should do what, under what conditions, and according to which standards. These objectives are to be aligned to core capabilities outlined in the *National Preparedness Goal*.



Figure 14: SMART Objectives

- Description of Play Column:** The Description of Play column begins with the Expected Outcome from the EEGs, then often gives an example of the specific kind of action the jurisdiction might take to demonstrate that Expected Outcome. The jurisdiction should include exercise-specific agreements as to locations, level of play, and allowed simulations. The component steps in the EEGs provide a baseline for how the participant should demonstrate each Task and how many Tasks need no additional guidance. This column should detail agreements as to level of play and deployed resources, particularly for field play. The level of detail provided in the XPA should be sufficient to support exercise design, the

level of exercise support needed, and allocation of evaluators and controllers. It should demonstrate out-of-sequence actions clearly.

CSEPP Community ERO Tables may be formatted slightly differently for each community. Table 6 and Table 7 provide examples of ERO table formats found in CSEPP Community XPAs. These examples should not be considered as complete and should only be used as an example for building out the remaining EROs in the respective CSEPP Community.

Table 6: Community ERO Table Example

Jurisdiction	Task	Mission Area	Core Capability	Players	Description of Play
ES	A/C.1.1.E Maintain Coordinated Emergency Plans and Procedures	Protection	Planning	County Emergency Management (EM) Director and EOC staff	Emergency plans related to the possibility of a CAI are current, coordinated, and available where needed.
ES	A/C.1.2.E Maintain an Active Exercise Program	Protection	Operational Coordination	County EM Director and EOC staff	An active joint on-post/off-post exercise program is in place.
ES	A/C.1.3.E Maintain a Continuing Education Program for Responders	Protection	Operational Coordination	County EM Director and EOC staff	Emergency responders are identified, trained, and certified as required. Training records are kept and organized.
ES	A/C.1.4.E Maintain Public Outreach and Public Education Programs	Protection	Public Information and Warning	County EM Director and EOC staff	Public Outreach and Public Education Programs are in place and materials are distributed to inform the public about CSEPP emergency preparedness.
	A/C.1.5.E. Maintain the CSEPP Emergency Response Physical Infrastructure in an Operational Status	Protection	Physical Protective Measures	County EM Director and EOC staff	All components of the CSEPP emergency response physical infrastructure (e.g., facilities, vehicles, equipment, supply stockpiles, and

Jurisdiction	Task	Mission Area	Core Capability	Players	Description of Play
					alert and notification systems) are checked, tested, and maintained on a regular basis; all components of the infrastructure are available and operational
	C.1.6.E Confirm Readiness to Respond	Response	Operational Communications	County EM Director and EOC staff	Information about planned operations is available at off-post warning points or EOC; someone with authority is immediately available to decide PADs and activate alert and notification systems promptly should the Army report a community emergency

Table 7: Community ERO Table Example

Jurisdiction	Core Capability ERO Task	Players	Description of Play
PC	ERO: A/C.1.1.E Maintain Coordinated Emergency Plans and Procedures Core Capabilities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Community Resilience Planning Risk Management for Protection Programs 	Emergency Services Bureau Chief and EOC staff	Emergency plans related to the possibility of a CAI are current, coordinated, and available where needed. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To be discussed during the evaluation team site visit with ESB EOC staff
PC	ERO: A/C.1.2.E Maintain an Active Exercise Program	Emergency Services Bureau Chief and EOC staff	An active joint on-post/off-post exercise program is in place.

Jurisdiction	Core Capability ERO Task	Players	Description of Play
	Core Capabilities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Operational Communications Operational Coordination Planning 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To be discussed during the evaluation team site visit with ESB EOC staff
PC	ERO: A/C.1.3.E Maintain a Continuing Education Program for Responders Core Capabilities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Environmental Response/Health and Safety Operational Coordination Planning 	Emergency Services Bureau Chief and EOC staff	Emergency responders are identified, trained, and certified as required. Training records are kept and organized. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To be discussed during the evaluation team site visit with ESB EOC staff
PC	ERO: A/C.1.4.E Maintain Public Outreach and Public Education Programs Core Capabilities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Operational Communications Public Information and Warning Situational Assessment 	Emergency Services Bureau Chief and EOC staff	Public Outreach and Public Education Programs are in place and materials are distributed to inform the public about CSEPP emergency preparedness. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Demonstrate community engagement of those with limited English proficiency To be discussed during the evaluation team site visit with ESB EOC staff

Extent of Play Agreement Alternative Formats

The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) offers additional formats for extent of play agreements (XPAs) that incorporate the same information as the traditional CSEPP format. The HSEEP formatted XPA (shown below) provides a concise purpose, summary, objectives, and core capabilities. It also includes standards and references, parameters, participants, and signatures. In coordination with the Exercise Co-Director, communities may choose to use HSEEP or other alternative formats for CSEPP exercises.

Exercise Evaluation Guides

In addition to XPA formats, HSEEP offers formats for exercise evaluation guides (EEG) that are typically used as tools to guide data collection and capture performance results. CSEPP uses Emergency Response Outcomes (EROs) and associated tasks listed in Appendix C as the tool for evaluators to collect exercise performance data. These standardized EROs allow for consistent and uniform exercise evaluation across the program. However, jurisdictions may choose to use the HSEEP EEG format to show the linkage between objectives and tasks. This may be used as an appendix to the XPA and allows for somewhat greater clarity the degree of jurisdictional participation. Figure 15 provides a suggested template for using an EEG format to compliment the XPA.

Exercise Name: CSEPP XXEX19	ERO: 5- Protection	ERO Task:
Response		
<i>Goal:</i> This outcome includes all activities related to protecting off-post populations, including vulnerable populations, by making appropriate protective action decisions, activating alert and notification systems, disseminating protective action messages, providing access control and security, activating and operating reception centers and mass care shelters, and coordinating support services for affected populations.		
<i>Core Capability:</i>		
EEG / SMART Objective 1: Within XXX minutes of initial notification and PAR receipt from BGCA, determine PAD and initiate appropriate actions to protect the public <i>Critical Task: C.5.1.E Make Off-post Protective Action Decision</i> <i>Critical Task: C.5.2.E Select and Approve Protective Action Messages</i> <i>Critical Task: C.5.3.E Activate Off-post Alert and Notification Systems</i> <i>Critical Task: C.5.5.E Direct and Control Activation of Access and Traffic Control Points</i> <i>Critical Task: C.5.7.E Issue a Protective Action for Schools and/or Daycare Centers</i> <i>Critical Task: C.5.9.E Issue a Protective Action for Access and Functional Needs Population</i>		
EEG / SMART Objective 2: Within 30 minutes of PAD and in a field environment, provide protective action guidance and traffic control to prevent exposure to the hazard area. <i>Critical Task: C.5.4.F Conduct Route Alerting</i> <i>Critical Task: C.5.6.F Establish Traffic and Access Control Points</i> <i>Critical Task:</i> <i>Critical Task:</i>		
EEG / SMART 3: Within 10 minutes of notification, execute a protective action decision for schools/daycare centers and other care facilities in accordance with established plans and procedures <i>Critical Task: C.5.8.F Implement a Protective Action for Schools or Daycare Centers</i> <i>Critical Task: C.5.10.F Implement a Protective Action for Access and Functional Needs Population</i>		

Figure 15: Optional HSEEP Exercise Evaluation Guide Format

Appendix C: CSEPP Emergency Response Outcomes and Exercise Evaluation Guides

Contents

Overview of CSEPP Exercise Evaluation.....	C-3
Integrated Performance Evaluation Method	C-3
Outcomes and Emergency Evaluation Guides.....	C-3
Timeline	C-3
Jurisdictional Narrative	C-3
List of Emergency Response Outcomes and Exercise Evaluation Guides	C-4
Complete EROs and EEGs	C-8
Outcome 1: Preparedness.....	C-9
Outcome 2: Emergency Assessment.....	C-19
Outcome 3: Emergency Management	C-31
Outcome 4: Hazard Mitigation	C-41
Outcome 5: Protection	C-54
Outcome 6: Survivor and Patient Care	C-78
Outcome 7: Emergency Public Information	C-106
Outcome 8: Remediation and Recovery	C-113

This page intentionally left blank.

Overview of CSEPP Exercise Evaluation

Integrated Performance Evaluation Method

This appendix describes the Integrated Performance Evaluation (IPE) method of observing, analyzing, and reporting on annual Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) exercises. The IPE method provides a comprehensive summary of a community's exercise demonstration through the observation and evaluation of Emergency Response Outcomes (EROs).

This appendix provides detailed information on the tasks that comprise each ERO. For each task, there is a one-page exercise evaluation guide (EEG) that includes the task name; expected outcomes of the task; which individuals, teams, or groups of staff perform the task; the task's component steps; and applicable references. The planning team uses the EEGs before and after the exercise to assist in the evaluation and analysis of the community response. The following pages provide a list of the EEGs.

Outcomes and Emergency Evaluation Guides

The planning team identifies a series of component tasks for each ERO. Each task is divided into a series of supporting steps to aid the evaluator in collecting data needed to determine if the exercise task was successfully demonstrated in each response function.

EEGs describe the types of activities that the staff expects to carry out at specific locations to achieve desired outcomes. However, they also serve as a guide for evaluators to use during the exercise.

Timeline

The jurisdictional evaluation team will develop a consolidated jurisdiction timeline from collected player data and evaluators' notes, using the template the team provides during exercise preparation. This timeline must accurately depict the jurisdiction's response times and actions taken. Each entry will identify the applicable ERO. The exercise support contractor team will combine all jurisdictional timelines into a master timeline for use in writing the After-Action Report (AAR).

Jurisdictional Narrative

The document the analysis of the jurisdiction's response performance. Specifically, CSEPP uses the narrative summary worksheets to:

- Summarize jurisdictional performance;
- Identify noteworthy performances;
- Identify problems in the performance of responding organizations, including those that have a potential impact on the health and safety of workers, public health, or the environment;
- Identify specific measures that could improve an organization's level of preparedness; and
- Indicate whether previous findings at the evaluator's location have been corrected.

The evaluator must provide a reference to the applicable regulation or guidance document and make a recommendation for resolving identified issues. The evaluator should describe and document each observation and indicate whether it is a strength, observation, or finding. However, the final recommendation for classification of observations is the responsibility of the Exercise Co-Directors, who will also consider information received from other evaluators.

Submission of Completed Evaluations

Jurisdictional team leaders will submit their completed timeline and narrative to a designated person, usually a report coordinator. The designated person will review the completed forms to make sure that the evaluation team has provided all appropriate data and information.

List of Emergency Response Outcomes and Exercise Evaluation Guides

This section lists the eight EROs and their associated tasks. Detailed EEGs for each task are provided beginning on page C-9. The tasks are arranged in approximate chronological order by location.

Each EEG has a unique identifier:

- A = Army; C = Community (or off-post jurisdiction).
- The first number refers to one of the Emergency Response Outcomes 1–8 (listed below)
- The second number is a chronological listing of the EEG within the ERO.
- E = EOC; F = Field; J = Joint Information Center (JIC).

Outcome 1: Preparedness

- A/C.1.1.E—Maintain Coordinated Emergency Plans and Procedures (p. C-11)
- A/C.1.2.E—Maintain an Active Exercise Program (p. C-13)
- A/C.1.3.E—Maintain a Continuing Education Program for Responders (p. C-14)
- A/C.1.4.E—Maintain Public Outreach and Public Education Programs (p. C-15)
- A/C.1.5.E—Maintain the CSEPP Emergency Response Physical Infrastructure in an Operational Status (p. C-16)
- A.1.6.E—Decide on Daily Operations and Inform Off-post Warning Points (p. C-17)
- C.1.6.E—Confirm Readiness to Respond (p. C-18)

Outcome 2: Emergency Assessment

- A.2.1.E—Collect Input for Hazard Analysis (p. C-20)
- A.2.2.E—Make Hazard Assessments and Predictions (p. C-21)

- A.2.3.E—Determine CENL and Off-post PAR (p. C-22)
- A.2.4.E—Notify Off-post 24-hour Warning Points or EOCs (p. C-23)
- A.2.5.E—Notify Government Agencies and Officials (p. C-24)
- A.2.6.E—Report Events and Decisions to Headquarters (p. C-25)
- A.2.7.F—Set Up Monitoring and Sampling Equipment (p. C-26)
- A.2.8.E—Coordinate Monitoring and Sampling Operations (On- and Off-post) (p. C-27)
- A.2.9.F—Conduct Monitoring and Sampling Operations (p. C-28)
- C.2.1.E—Receive CENL and PAR from Installation EOC (p. C-29)
- C.2.2.E—Coordinate Response Phase Monitoring and Sampling (p. C-30)

Outcome 3: Emergency Management

- A.3.1.E—Activate, Expand, and Operate the EOC (p. C-32)
- A.3.2.E—Stand Up and Command the Initial Response Force (IRF) (p. C-34)
- A.3.3.E—Perform Duties as the Federal On-scene Coordinator (FOSC) (p. C-35)
- A.3.4.E—Direct and Control Distribution of Supplies and Equipment (p. C-36)
- A.3.5.E—Request and Coordinate Additional Response Support (p. C-37)
- C.3.1.E—Alert and Activate EOC Staff (p. C-38)
- C.3.2.E—Operate the EOC (p. C-39)
- C.3.4.E—Prepare, Sign, and Transmit Emergency Declaration (p. C-40)

Outcome 4: Hazard Mitigation

- A.4.1.F—Make Immediate Chemical Area Incident (CAI) Reports (p. C-42)
- A.4.2.F—Conduct Firefighting Operations at the Chemical Area Incident (CAI) Site (p. C-43)
- A.4.3.E—Direct and Control Field Response Operations (p. C-44)
- A.4.4.F—Provide Direction and Control at the Chemical Area Incident (CAI) Site (p. C-45)
- A.4.5.E—Direct and Coordinate Preservation of Evidence and Records of Decisions (p. C-47)
- A.4.6.F—Preserve Evidence at the Chemical Area Incident (CAI) Site (p. C-48)
- A.4.7.F—Stage Response Teams (p. C-49)
- A.4.8.F—Operate a Personnel Decontamination Station (PDS) (p. C-50)
- A.4.9.F—Operate an Equipment Decontamination Station (EDS) (p. C-51)
- A.4.10.F—Conduct Agent Containment Operations (p. C-52)

- A.4.11.F—Mitigate the Effects of the Agent Release (p. C-53)

Outcome 5: Protection

- A.5.1.E—Make On-post Protective Action Decisions (PADs) (p. C-55)
- A.5.2.E—Activate On-post Alert and Notification Systems (p. C-56)
- A.5.3.E—Direct and Control Protection of the Post Population (p. C-57)
- A.5.4.F—Evacuate and Secure the Predicted Hazard Area (p. C-58)
- A.5.5.F—Control On-post Population Evacuation (p. C-59)
- A.5.6.F—Assemble, Screen, and Account for the On-post Population (p. C-60)
- A.5.7.F—Provide Transportation for Evacuation p. C-61)
- A.5.8.E—Coordinate Support Services for the Army Community (p. C-62)
- A.5.9.E—Coordinate Claims Services for the Affected Population (p. C-63)
- C.5.1.E—Make Off-post Protective Action Decisions (p. C-64)
- C.5.2.E—Select and Approve Protective Action Messages (p. C-65)
- C.5.3.E—Activate Off-post Alert and Notification Systems (p. C-66)
- C.5.4.F—Conduct Route Alerting (p. C-67)
- C.5.5.E—Direct and Control Activation of Access and Traffic Control Points (p. C-68)
- C.5.6.F—Establish Traffic and Access Control Points (p. C-69)
- C.5.7.E—Issue a Protective Action for School(s) and/or Daycare Center(s) (p. C-70)
- C.5.8.F—Implement a Protective Action for School(s) and/or Daycare Center(s) (p. C-71)
- C.5.9.E—Issue a Protective Action for Access and Functional Needs Population (p. C-72)
- C.5.10.F—Implement a Protective Action for Access and Functional Needs Population (p. C-73)
- C.5.11.E—Activate a Reception Center (p. C-74)
- C.5.12.F—Operate a Reception Center (p. C-75)
- C.5.13.E—Activate a Shelter (p. C-76)
- C.5.14.F—Operate a Shelter (p. C-77)

Outcome 6: Survivor and Patient Care

- A.6.1.F—Provide Immediate Emergency Aid at the Incident Site (p. C-79)
- A.6.2.F—Prepare Medical Treatment Facility to Receive Patients (p. C-80)

- A.6.3.F—Provide Emergency Triage, Treatment, and Stabilization in the Field (p. C-81)
- A.6.4.F—Make Survivor Status Reports (p. C-82)
- A.6.5.E—Track the Location and Status of Survivors (p. C-83)
- A.6.6.F—Decontaminate Patients in the Field (p. C-84)
- A.6.7.F—Transport Patients to a Medical Treatment Facility (p. C-85)
- A.6.8.F—Treat Patients at a Medical Treatment Facility (p. C-86)
- A.6.9.E—Notify Next of Kin (p. C-87)
- A.6.10.F—Collect and Decontaminate Human Remains (p. C-88)
- A.6.11.E—Coordinate Disposition of Human Remains (p. C-89)
- C.6.1.F—Establish Incident Command and/or Join a Unified Command (p. C-90)
- C.6.2.F—Communication—Medical Staff (p. C-92)
- C.6.1.E—Communication—EOC/JIC Medical Representative (p. C-93)
- C.6.3.F—Prepare Medical Treatment Facility to Receive Patients (p. C-94)
- C.6.4.F—Pre-decontamination Triage (p. C-96)
- C.6.5.F—Decontamination and Post-decontamination Triage (p. C-98)
- C.6.6.F—Transport Survivors/Patients to a Shelter or Medical Treatment Facility (p. C-100)
- C.6.7.F—Treat Patients at a Medical Treatment Facility (p. C-101)
- C.6.8.F—Collect and Decontaminate Human Remains (p. C-103)
- C.6.9.E—Track the Location of Survivors, Patients, and Fatalities (p. C-104)

Outcome 7: Emergency Public Information

- A/C.7.1.E/J—Operate a Joint Information System (JIS) (p. C-107)
- A.7.2.E—Inform Headquarters Public Affairs Offices (p. C-108)
- A/C.7.2.J—Activate and Operate a Joint Information Center (JIC) (p. C-109)
- A/C.7.3.E/J—Disseminate Public Health and Safety Information to the Media (p. C-110)
- A/C.7.4.E/J—Disseminate Public Health and Safety Information Directly to the Public (p. C-112)

Outcome 8: Remediation and Recovery

- A.8.1.E—Initiate Environmental Remediation (p. C-114)
- A.8.2.E—Initiate Accident Investigation (p. C-115)
- A.8.3.E—Provide Support Services to the Army Community (p. C-117)

- A/C.8.1.E—Make Recovery-phase Protective Action Decisions (p. C-118)
- A/C.8.2.E—Coordinate Recovery-phase Monitoring and Sampling (p. C-119)
- A/C.8.3.E/J—Provide Recovery Information to the Media and the Public (p. C-121)
- A/C.8.4.E—Provide Claims Services to the Affected Population (p. C-122)
- A/C.8.5.E—Implement Unrestricted Re-entry (p. C-123)
- C.8.1.E—Limit Access to Restricted Areas (p. C-124)
- C.8.2.E—Make and Implement Ingestion Pathway Protective Action Decisions (p. C-125)
- C.8.3.E—Arrange Post-emergency Medical Screening (p. C-126)
- C.8.4.E—Arrange Temporary Shelter for Evacuees (p. C-127)
- C.8.5.E—Secure Disaster Assistance for Affected Communities (p. C-127)

Complete EROs and EEGs

The following pages contain a complete set of EROs and their component task EEGs. Each ERO also contains, at the beginning, a brief introduction and an Evaluation Map, which shows the flow of tasks and whether staff accomplish them on post, off post, within facilities, or out in the field.

Outcome 1: Preparedness

Within the limits of the CSEPP exercise program, this outcome encompasses tasks associated with preparedness to respond to a chemical accident or incident at an Army chemical storage site as well as community all-hazards preparedness and resilience. This includes maintaining coordinated emergency plans, participating in an active exercise program, conducting comprehensive training programs, maintaining active public outreach and education programs, and ensuring readiness of the emergency response physical infrastructure (e.g., facilities, vehicles, equipment, supplies, and alert and notification systems). This outcome also includes daily consideration by the Army of the impact of ongoing operations on preparedness and exchange of information between the Army and off-post jurisdictions concerning these operations.

The CSEPP exercise program requires comprehensive and detailed review of preparedness activities. The exercise evaluation process focuses only on preparedness activities incidental to the scope of extent-of-play agreements and the dynamics of the scenario, as well as onsite interviews and document reviews associated with preparation to conduct the exercise. If the results of this preliminary review or player responses during the exercise indicate a specific shortcoming in plans, programs, and the physical infrastructure, evaluators will make a more-detailed inquiry to establish and report on the extent of the problem.

Outcome 1 deliberately does not include prevention considerations because Army safety and security programs to prevent chemical accidents and incidents are independent of CSEPP, and participants do not evaluate them during CSEPP exercises.

Other activities—such as inspections, reviews, exercises, and assistance visits by higher Army headquarters personnel; oversight of prevention and preparedness by the community IPT; and the community assessment reflected in the community profile—can help identify capability gaps in preparedness that might not appear during the macro-level review of the preparedness characteristics of a CSEPP Exercise.

Table 8: Outcome 1 Evaluation Map

Installation Field	Installation EOC	State/County Field	State/County EOC
	A/C.1.1.E Maintain Coordinated Emergency Plans and Procedures		A/C.1.1.E Maintain Coordinated Emergency Plans and Procedures
	A/C.1.2.E Maintain an Active Exercise Program		A/C.1.2.E Maintain an Active Exercise Program
	A/C.1.3.E Maintain a Continuing Education Program for Responders		A/C.1.3.E Maintain a Continuing Education Program for Responders
	A/C.1.4.E Maintain Public Outreach and Public Education Programs		A/C.1.4.E Maintain Public Outreach and Public Education Programs
	A/C.1.5.E Maintain the CSEPP Emergency Response Physical Infrastructure in an Operational Status		A/C.1.5.E Maintain the CSEPP Emergency Response Physical Infrastructure in an Operational Status
	A.1.6.E Decide on Daily Operations and Inform Off-post Warning Points		C.1.6.E Confirm Readiness to Respond

A/C.1.1.E

Task: Maintain Coordinated Emergency Plans and Procedures

Evaluated Components: Incident Commander, Command Staff, general staff, emergency management officials, Emergency Operations Center (EOC) staff, Joint Information Center (JIC) staff, Public Affairs Officers (PAOs), Public Information Officers (PIOs), CSEPP planners and coordinators, hospital administrators, and law enforcement officials

Expected Outcomes: Emergency plans related to the possibility of a CAI are current, coordinated, and available where needed.

Steps

1. The planning team revises emergency plans as necessary following each CSEPP exercise, following publication of new guidance, or when changes are made to local emergency response capabilities or agreements.
2. The planning team reviews related plans when it revises an individual plan to ensure that they remain compatible.
3. The authors write emergency plans to be consistent with Army and CSEPP policy and guidance.
4. The authors write emergency plans to incorporate the National Incident Management System.
5. Emergency plans relating to protective action provide for both temporary shelter-in-place and evacuation.
6. Evaluators review implementing SOPs, checklists, and job aids; and validate that they are revised as necessary whenever changes are made to the emergency plan on which they are based.
7. Appropriate authorities formally approve all emergency plans.
8. The planning team distributes emergency plans to all locations needing them.
9. The planning team reviews contact phone lists and revises them regularly.
10. The planning team assesses whether it needs to write plans to address the needs of those with limited English proficiency (LEP).
11. The planning team assesses methods for disseminating emergency information to those with LEP.

References

- 40 CFR 300.120
- AR 360-1, *Army Public Affairs Program* (May 25, 2011)

- AR 525-27 *Army Emergency Management Program* (March 29, 2019) and DA PAM 525-27, *Army Emergency Management Program* (September 20, 2012)
- Community JIC/JIS Plan
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *CSEPP Shelter-in-Place Protective Action Guide Book* (May 2006)
- DA Directive 2013-03, *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance* (April 4, 2013)
- Executive Order 13166, *Improving Access to Services for Persons with Limited English Proficiency*
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures
- Jurisdiction CAIRA/CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures
- National Response Framework (June 2016)
- Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

A/C.1.2.E

Task: Maintain an Active Exercise Program

Evaluated Components: EOC staff, JIC staff, CSEPP planners and coordinators, and CSEPP community IPT members

Expected Outcomes: An active joint on-post/off-post exercise program is in place.

Steps

1. The planning team incorporates lessons learned from previous exercises in emergency plans and capabilities.
2. On-post and off-post responders participate regularly in joint exercises in addition to annual CSEPP exercises and quarterly CAIRA exercises.
3. The CSEPP Community IPT actively supports and oversees the local exercise program.
4. Exercises incorporate relevant National Incident Management System (NIMS) standards, guidelines, processes, and protocols.

References

- AR 50-6: *Chemical Surety* (July 2018)
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- DA Directive 2013-03, *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance* (April 4, 2013)
- AR 525-27 *Army Emergency Management Program* (March 29, 2019) and DA PAM 525-27, *Army Emergency Management Program* (September 20, 2012)
- Extent-of-play descriptions and lessons learned from exercises other than annual CSEPP exercises
- Jurisdiction CAIRA/CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A/C.1.3.E

Task: Maintain a Continuing Education Program for Responders

Evaluated Components: EOC staff, JIC staff, CSEPP planners and coordinators, training officers, and emergency responders

Expected Outcomes: Officials identify, train, and certify emergency responders as required.

Steps

1. CSEPP provides formal training and refresher training to responders consistent with their duties.
2. Training reflects relevant NIMS standards, guidelines, processes, and protocols.
3. Officials maintain individual training records and keep them conveniently accessible for inspection and management review.

References

- CSEPP *Program Guidebook* (2019)
- AR 575-27 Army Emergency Management Program (March 13, 2009)
- Jurisdiction CAIRA/CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures
- Training records

A/C.1.4.E

Task: Maintain Public Outreach and Public Education Programs

Evaluated Components: CSEPP planners, PAOs/PIOs, outreach office staff, and CSEPP community IPT members

Expected Outcomes: Public outreach and public education programs are in place, and CSEPP distributes materials to inform the public about CSEPP emergency preparedness.

Steps

1. CSEPP community Public Outreach and Public Education Programs provide public events, handouts, public service announcements, information displays, and other initiatives to increase the level of protective action knowledge in the community.
2. The CSEPP Community IPT routinely assesses CSEPP community Public Outreach and Public Education Programs for adequacy and effectiveness.
3. CSEPP operates an awareness program to inform the public about the testing of sirens, indoor alerting systems, and other alert and notification systems and their use during an actual emergency.

References

- AR-360-1: Army Public Affairs Program (May 25, 2011)
- AR 50-6 Chemical Surety (July 28, 2018)
- CSEPP *Program Guidebook* (2019)
- Public Affairs Guidebook, second edition (2014)
- CSEPP Shelter-in-Place Protective Action Guide Book (May 2006)
- Jurisdiction CAIRA/CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures
- Public Outreach and Public Education Program documents

A/C.1.5.E

Task: Maintain the CSEPP Emergency Response Physical Infrastructure in an Operational Status

Evaluated Components: EOC staff, JIC staff, emergency managers, PAOs/PIOs, CSEPP planners and coordinators, hospital administrators, and law enforcement officials

Expected Outcomes: In accordance with time intervals specified in each jurisdiction's plan, checks, tests, and maintains all components of the CSEPP emergency response physical infrastructure (e.g., facilities, vehicles, equipment, supply stockpiles, and alert and notification systems); all components of the infrastructure are available and operational.

Steps

1. CSEPP checks EOC and JIC equipment (e.g., radios, telephones, fax machines, recorders, collective protection systems, computer systems, backup power systems, and electronic displays) and alert and notification systems (e.g., computer systems, sirens, indoor alerting systems, EAS, and reader boards) and tests them for operability, functionality, and time synchronization in accordance with jurisdiction maintenance and sustainment plans and procedures.
2. CSEPP maintains EOC equipment (to include outdoor meteorological instruments), JIC equipment, and alert and notification systems.
3. CSEPP tests primary and backup communication links between and among designated on-post and off-post notification points daily.
4. In accordance with jurisdiction plans and procedures, checks, tests, and maintains facilities, vehicles, equipment, and supplies dedicated to or planned for CSEPP emergency response use not covered in steps 1, 2, and 3 above (e.g., mobile systems used to support the ICS and air sampling capabilities). This includes dedicated special-purpose and general-purpose facilities, vehicles, equipment and supplies identified in local plans for use during emergency response.
5. CSEPP maintains records of checks, tests, and maintenance on components of the CSEPP emergency response physical infrastructure and makes them available for review.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- Jurisdiction CAIRA/CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures
- Records of checks, tests, and maintenance

A.1.6.E

Task: Decide on Daily Operations and Inform Off-post Warning Points

Evaluated Components: EOC staff

Expected Outcomes: The Army installation will only conduct operations deemed an acceptable risk; the installation provides planning information about these operations daily to off-post jurisdictions to expedite response should an accident or incident occur.

Steps

1. Identify operations the installation has scheduled to conduct and determine the maximum credible event (MCE) associated with each storage operation.
2. Consider the impact on the off-post community for each operation scheduled for the day and postpone those for which the risk is unacceptable under the conditions and circumstances at the time.
3. Develop a work plan that identifies the operation that has the potential for the maximum credible event in off-post jurisdictions.
4. Send the work plan to off-post warning points before beginning daily operations.

References

- Army Material Command Memorandum (April 30, 1997), Subject: *Maximum Credible Events (MCE) for Daily Chemical Operations*
- DA PAM 385-61, *Toxic Chemical Agent Safety Standards* (November 1, 2008)
- AR 525-27 *Army Emergency Management Program* (March 29, 2019) and DA PAM 525-27, *Army Emergency Management Program* (September 20, 2012)
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

C.1.6.E

Task: Confirm Readiness to Respond

Evaluated Components: Off-post warning point staff or EOC staff

Expected Outcomes: Information about planned operations is available at off-post warning points or EOC; someone with authority is immediately available to decide PADs or implement pre-determined PAD and activate alert and notification systems promptly should the Army report a community emergency.

Steps

1. Receive the work plan from the Army and consider the impact to off-post response (e.g., Are there any conditions or circumstances in the community that would prevent or interfere with actions to protect the population in the event of an accident or incident at the chemical storage site?).
2. Confirm that someone with authority is immediately available to decide PADs or implement pre-determined PADs and activate alert and notification systems promptly.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- Jurisdiction CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

Outcome 2: Emergency Assessment

This outcome includes all tasks associated with identifying the hazard, classifying and providing notifications of the hazard and appropriate PARs to offsite agencies, and coordinating and conducting monitoring and sampling operations to further specify the hazard.

Table 9: Outcome 2 Evaluation Map

Installation Field	Installation EOC	State/County Field	State/County EOC
	A.2.1.E Collect Input for Hazard Analysis		
	A.2.2.E Make Hazard Assessments and Predictions		
	A.2.3.E Determine CENL and Off-post PAR		
	A.2.4.E Notify Off-post 24-hour Warning Points or EOCs		C.2.1.E Receive CENL and PAR from Installation EOC
	A.2.5.E Notify Government Agencies and Officials		
	A.2.6.E Report Events and Decisions to Headquarters		
A.2.7.F Set Up Monitoring and Sampling Equipment	A.2.8.E Coordinate Monitoring and Sampling Operations (On- and Off-post)		C.2.2.E Coordinate Response Phase Monitoring and Sampling
A.2.9.F Conduct Monitoring and Sampling Operations			

A.2.1.E

Task: Collect Input for Hazard Analysis

Evaluated Component: EOC staff

Expected Outcomes: Hazard analysts are able to receive, confirm, request, and analyze information about a reported chemical accident or incident (CAI) to support development of accurate and timely hazard assessments and predictions throughout the course of the event and to archive data for reference and subsequent use.

Steps

1. Receive and confirm initial reports about the CAI.
2. Request additional information from the CAI site to make an accurate initial hazard prediction.
3. Collect other information to characterize the CAI (e.g., off-site meteorological information and readings from air-monitoring devices).
4. Collect information about other hazards of concern (e.g., fire, explosives, other hazardous materials).
5. Continuously review collected data to support the hazard analysis. Request the additional information as required.
6. Continuously monitor meteorology changes or new information about the event to change or refine the hazard analysis.
7. Archive all data in formats that allow for quick retrieval and subsequent analysis, investigation, and official reports.

References

- DA Directive 2013-03, *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance*, ENCL1 (April 4, 2013)
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A.2.2.E

Task: Make Hazard Assessments and Predictions

Evaluated Component: EOC staff

Expected Outcomes: Throughout the event, hazard analysts are able to prepare hazard area plots showing risk areas and a predicted hazard risk envelope; identify populations at risk; prepare protective action options; provide monitoring guidance; and provide information on projected plume behavior.

Steps

1. Upon receipt of a report of a chemical event, a hazard analyst determines the area of the on-post and off-post predicted hazard area, based initially on the protective action zones the risk envelope affects. The analyst can use the daily work plan if parameters match the CAI.
2. An on-post hazard analyst recommends an appropriate Community Event Notification Level (CENL) and on-post and off-post protective action recommendations (PARs) to an official authorized to declare a CENL, issues an on-post PAD, and sends PARs to off-post warning points.
3. A hazard analyst supports field operations by identifying areas to monitor at the CAI site.
4. A hazard analyst predicts plume behavior (tail/tip times) to aid in PAD making.
5. A hazard analyst conducts new analyses in near real time to reflect changing conditions and CAI site mitigation efforts.
6. A hazard analyst conducts analyses to support PARs for when and how to end shelter-in-place for each emergency response zone, including the initial and any subsequent PARs and/or decisions the installation issues.
7. A hazard analyst conducts consequence management analyses to determine if other populations might become at risk, appropriate protection options, and areas to conduct monitoring operations to validate the hypothetical situation.
8. A hazard analyst confirms the validity and reliability of model outputs.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *CSEPP Shelter-In-Place Protective Action Guide Book* (May 2006)
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A.2.3.E

Task: Determine CENL and Off-post PAR

Evaluated Component: EOC staff/Incident Commander.

Expected Outcomes: Continuing throughout the CAI, the Incident Commander or designated command staff representative reviews hazard analyses, chooses an appropriate CENL, and decides the optimum PARs for at-risk populations off-post.

Steps

1. The Incident Commander or designated command staff representative reviews the hazard analysis, CENL, and off-post PAR and confirms that they are consistent with the information about the CAI and current meteorology.
2. The Incident Commander or designated command staff representative considers consequence management scenarios to determine their influence on the PAR for the off-post population.
3. The Incident Commander or designated command staff representative decides the PAR for the off-post area.
4. The Incident Commander declares the CENL and off-post PAR.
5. The Incident Commander or designated command staff representative adjusts or cancels the CENL and PAR as appropriate after considering new hazard analyses.
6. The Incident Commander or designated command staff representative decides when and how to end shelter-in-place for each emergency response zone impacted by the initial and any subsequent PARs.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *CSEPP Shelter-In-Place Protective Action Guide Book* (May 2006)
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A.2.4.E

Task: Notify Off-post 24-hour Warning Points or EOCs

Evaluated Component: EOC staff

Expected Outcomes: The installation EOC staff notifies off-post 24-hour warning points or EOCs of the initial CENL and PAR, any additional PARs, and subsequent changes to the CENL and PARs within prescribed time limits.

Steps

1. Make a “heads-up” call to the off-post 24-hour warning points or EOCs to alert them to the possibility that a CAI might have occurred, if the local agreement provides. (Note: This does not specifically satisfy CAI notification requirements, nor does it start the notification time clock.)
2. An authorized Army representative considers the advice of the hazard analyst, then reports the CENL and PARs to the appropriate off-post warning points within the prescribed time and provides any other descriptive information required by local agreements.
3. Answer appropriate questions with the best available information.
4. Confirm telephonic or radio notifications by faxing or electronically transmitting a copy of the notification information to the off-post 24-hour warning points and EOCs.
5. Provide model and analysis results to surrounding communities.
6. Repeat these steps for each change or cancellation of a CENL or PAR.
7. Contact the off-post EOCs or 24-hour warning points and notify them of the Incident Commander’s or designated Command Staff representative’s recommendation for when and how to end shelter-in-place for each emergency response zone the initial and any subsequent PARs affect.

References

- 40 CFR 300
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *CSEPP Shelter-In-Place Protective Action Guide Book* (May 2006)
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A.2.5.E

Task: Notify Government Agencies and Officials

Evaluated Component: Depot staff

Expected Outcomes: Throughout the event, depot staff fulfills Federal, State, and local notification requirements; the staff informs the Governor's office, local government officials, and local congressional offices about the CAI and significant changes to the situation before the media and the public.

Steps

1. Make initial and follow-up notifications to local, State, and Federal government agencies.
2. Contact the Governor's office and local congressional offices and inform them of the situation.
3. Notify local government officials, the Governor's office, and local congressional offices of significant changes to the situation and prior to news releases concerning the incident. In cases where health and safety reasons preclude prior notification of these off-post officials, the news release and notification of these off-post officials may occur simultaneously.

References

- 40 CFR 300
- AR 50-6: *Chemical Surety* (April 2018)
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A.2.6.E

Task: Report Events and Decisions to Headquarters

Evaluated Component: Depot/ EOC staff and Incident Commander

Expected Outcomes: Reports submitted to headquarters are complete, comprehensive, and on time.

Steps

1. EOC staff prepares reports for submission to headquarters.
2. The Incident Commander or designated representative reviews and approves reports before the staff submits them.
3. The staff sends reports by the prescribed mode (e.g., telephonically, electronically, email, or fax) in time to meet established deadlines.
4. Repeat steps as necessary to satisfy requirements for periodic situation reports.

References

- AR 50-6: *Chemical Surety* (July 2018)
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A.2.7.F

Task: Set Up Monitoring and Sampling Equipment

Evaluated Component: Monitoring and sampling team

Expected Outcomes: Monitoring and sampling equipment is operational and ready for deployment when needed; the team establishes reliable communication between field teams and hazard analysts.

Steps

1. Perform pre-operation checks of vehicles, equipment, and systems.
2. Inventory materials, supplies, and consumables to ensure that everything needed to support operations is available.
3. Bring all vehicles and equipment needed for field operations to operating status; calibrate the monitoring equipment.
4. Establish reliable communication with hazard analysts in order to coordinate monitoring and sampling operations.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A.2.8.E

Task: Coordinate Monitoring and Sampling Operations (On- and Off-post)

Evaluated Component: EOC staff

Expected Outcomes: The staff deploys monitoring and sampling teams safely to the correct locations to collect information that accurately characterizes the hazard area.

Steps

1. Develop a wide area monitoring plan that provides for sample chain-of-custody and independent confirmation of sample results and is consistent with hazard analysis results.
2. Coordinate with field locations and off-post jurisdictions to determine safe routes to monitoring locations.
3. Coordinate third-party observation of off-post monitoring teams.
4. Dispatch monitoring teams in support of on-post field operations. Provide dispatch instructions that include safe routes to each monitoring location.
5. Dispatch monitoring teams off post, as requested. Provide dispatch instructions that include safe routes to each monitoring location and access protocol to public and private property off-post.
6. Track the deployment of all monitoring teams.
7. Redeploy monitoring teams based on results of monitoring, and laboratory analysis or changes in priorities the Incident Commander makes.
8. Coordinate with off-post jurisdictions for the return of deployed monitoring assets.
9. Store monitoring results in a hazard assessment and prediction database.

References

- 40 CFR 300
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A.2.9.F

Task: Conduct Monitoring and Sampling Operations

Evaluated Component: Monitoring teams.

Expected Outcomes: Monitoring teams collect authentic, credible information about chemical agent hazards.

Steps

1. Proceed to designated monitoring locations by the designated safe route.
2. Ensure the team is at the correct monitoring point prior to starting operations.
3. Conduct monitoring operations.
4. Validate monitoring results in the field in accordance with monitoring protocols.

References

- 40 CFR 300
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

C.2.1.E

Task: Receive CENL and PAR from Installation EOC

Evaluated Component: 24-hour warning point staff or EOC staff

Expected Outcomes: Staff receives and verifies installation notification

Steps

1. Receive official notification information, CENL, PAR, and recommendation for when and how to end shelter-in-place for each emergency response zone during the initial and any subsequent PARs from the appropriate installation authority.
2. Verify the information, following established procedures.
3. Assess the notification; inform the Incident Commander /designee and other specified staff following established procedures.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *CSEPP Shelter-In-Place Protective Action Guide Book* (May 2006)
- FEMA CPG 101, version 2: *Developing and Maintaining State, Territorial, Tribal, and Local Government Emergency Plans* (November 2010)
- Jurisdiction CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

C.2.2.E

Task: Coordinate Response Phase Monitoring and Sampling

Evaluated Component: EOC staff

Expected Outcomes: Determine if the jurisdictions require response phase monitoring; coordinate the request and deployment of installation monitoring; determine if qualified observers will accompany installation monitoring teams; and assemble and brief any observers.

Steps

1. Review hazard analysis information the storage installation provides and expected future response activities to determine if the jurisdiction will require response phase monitoring.
2. According to established procedures and local agreements, coordinate with the installation EOC and make monitoring requests. At a minimum, identify locations where the team desires monitoring and determine the rationale for the monitoring.
3. With the installation, plan safe routes to and from the monitoring locations.
4. Arrange access to both public and private property as needed for monitoring teams.
5. Determine if the jurisdiction will send qualified observers to accompany monitoring teams.
6. Coordinate observer, monitoring team-meeting points as appropriate.
7. Assemble observer teams and equipment. Prior to their departure, brief observer teams on their roles and responsibilities according to plans, procedures, and local agreements.
8. Receive periodic reports from observer teams according to established plans and procedures.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- Jurisdiction CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

Outcome 3: Emergency Management

This outcome includes all top-level decision making, coordination, and direction and control of the response, including mobilization and operation of the EOC, and coordination at the management level of any activities involving logistical support.

Table 10: Outcome 3 Evaluation Map

Installation Field	Installation EOC	State/County Field	State/County EOC
			C.3.1.E Alert and Activate EOC Staff
	A.3.1.E Activate, Expand, and Operate the EOC		C.3.2.E Operate the EOC
	A.3.2.E Stand Up and Command the Initial Response Force (IRF)		
	A.3.3.E Perform Duties as the Federal On-scene Coordinator (FOSC)		
	A.3.4.E Direct and Control Distribution of Supplies and Equipment		
	A.3.5.E Request and Coordinate Additional Response Support		C.3.4.E Prepare, Sign, and Transmit Emergency Declaration

A.3.1.E

Task: Activate, Expand, and Operate the EOC

Evaluated Component: EOC staff and Incident Commander

Expected Outcomes: The staff quickly achieves EOC full operational status and maintains it for the duration of the response; the staff develops a common understanding of the status of current response operations and future operational plans and needs and maintains it for the duration of the response.

Steps

1. The Incident Commander or designated official activates or expands the installation EOC.
2. The officials notify the EOC staff of EOC activation or expansion and provide special instructions.
3. EOC staff promptly reports to the EOC.
4. The Incident Commander or designated official coordinates the exchange of information with off-post EOCs, higher Army Headquarters, and any other jurisdictions/organizations supporting the response to the CAI to develop a common understanding of the status of current response operations and future operational plans and needs.
5. The Incident Commander or designated official initially briefs the EOC staff on the status of CAIRA operations and other off-post response operations and provides subsequent briefs in accordance with established plans.
6. The staff posts and distributes information about on-post and off-post events and decisions within the EOC. It archives the information for subsequent analysis, investigation, or preparation of official reports.
7. The staff establishes and maintains uninterrupted EOC facility safety and security, considering threats from the CAI.
8. The staff confirms that primary and alternate EOC communications systems are operational. It maintains an uninterrupted communications capability for the duration of the incident. It immediately corrects communication system malfunctions.
9. The staff plans for 24-hour operations and publishes appropriate schedules.
10. The staff maintains continuous EOC operations during rest, meal breaks, and shift changes. It conducts shift transition briefings.

References

- AR 525-27 *Army Emergency Management Program* (March 29, 2019) and DA PAM 525-27, *Army Emergency Management Program* (September 20, 2012)
CSEPP Program Guidebook (2019)

- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A.3.2.E

Task: Stand Up and Command the Initial Response Force (IRF)

Evaluated Component: EOC staff and Incident Commander

Expected Outcomes: The staff establishes command and control for the response; it mobilizes appropriate response assets; the Army chain-of-command knows that the staff has activated IRF.

Steps

1. The installation commander or designated command representative stands up the IRF and assumes the role of the Incident Commander/FOSC.
2. IRF provides first response to the CAI until the exercise meets all Army obligations.
3. The Incident Commander/FOSC takes operational control of resources (e.g., personnel, facilities, equipment) that are not essential for installation operations.
4. The officials report IRF activation to all commands and agencies.

References

- 40 CFR 300
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A.3.3.E

Task: Perform Duties as the Federal On-scene Coordinator (FOSC)

Evaluated Component: Incident Commander

Expected Outcomes: The Incident Commander, as the FOSC, discharges all DoD obligations under 40 CFR 300.

Steps

1. Determine that response to the agent release requires a DoD FOSC and assume those responsibilities.
2. Make notifications of the assumption of FOSC duties to State and local governments, the Army chain of command, other Federal agencies, and the National Response Center (NRC).
3. Appoint a deputy FOSC.
4. Ensure that the system protects emergency worker health in compliance with 29 CFR 1910.120.
5. Coordinate the assistance Federal agencies provide to State and local governments.
6. Notify and regularly consult with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regional response team.
7. Satisfy all requirements in the National Contingency Plan (NCP) for collecting and reporting on events, decisions, responses, and costs pertaining to the chemical accident.
8. Ensure that officials keep public and private interests informed and that they consider their concerns throughout the response.
9. Fulfill duties of the FOSC until the exercise meets all DoD obligations. The national-level Incident Commander assumes the role and responsibilities of the FOSC.

References

- 29 CFR 1910.120: *Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response*
- 40 CFR 300
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A.3.4.E

Task: Direct and Control Distribution of Supplies and Equipment

Evaluated Component: EOC staff

Expected Outcomes: Sufficient supplies, equipment, and vehicles are available to control and mitigate the release and to perform related support tasks.

Steps

1. Dedicate available supplies, equipment, and vehicles to support release control and mitigation operations at the CAI site.
2. Verify that participants test, inspect, and repackage supplies and equipment for issue to response teams.
3. Monitor response operations and verify that participants issue supplies to responders on demand.
4. Maintain records to track supply and equipment usage rates and accurately account for costs associated with the response. Factor contamination losses for durable and nonexpendable supplies and equipment used at the CAI site when compiling usage rates.
5. Verify that motor pool or facility engineer personnel have equipment and vehicles identified for release control and mitigation operations prepared for use.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A.3.5.E

Task: Request and Coordinate Additional Response Support

Evaluated Component: EOC staff

Expected Outcomes: Identify shortfall in supplies, equipment, and personnel needed for response support; request additional needed items; and arrange for arrival and deployment of additional response support supplies, equipment, and personnel.

Steps

1. Solicit information about usage rates for supplies and equipment from the Forward Command Post and within the EOC.
2. Compare inventory of available supplies and equipment with known and projected requirements to support containment and mitigation operations. Identify shortfalls and priorities. Determine the most expedient sources for obtaining needed supplies and equipment.
3. Solicit information about the need for additional trained responders (augmentees to the IRF) above those available from installation resources. Determine shortfalls and priorities. Determine the most expedient sources for obtaining IRF augmentees.
4. Obtain IRF augmentees and emergency supplies and equipment from support installations, by direct coordination with other military installations, or through requests to the higher headquarters operations center.
5. Coordinate with the staff in off-post EOCs, as necessary, to facilitate movement of response augmentees, equipment, and supplies to the installation.
6. Arrange for the receipt and internal distribution of supplies and equipment to sustain response operations.
7. Arrange for the arrival, transportation, messing, and lodging of IRF augmentees. Assign augmentees to tasks and shifts.

References

- 40 CFR 300
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

C.3.1.E

Task: Alert and Activate EOC Staff

Evaluated Component: Senior leader or Designee and EOC staff

Expected Outcomes: The EOC is staffed to support the jurisdiction's response.

Steps

1. Based on CENL or other incident notification, the senior leader or designee determines whether to activate the EOC and to what level (e.g., Level 1, 2, 3 or 4 or partial or full, as described in the agency's plan).
2. Determine if plume direction restricts EOC staff routes to the EOC.
3. Recall required EOC staff using appropriate procedures and advise of route restrictions, if any.
4. Set up and ensure equipment is operating properly.
5. The Incident Commander or designated official initially briefs the EOC staff on the status of CAIRA operations and other off-post response operations and provides subsequent briefs in accordance with established plans.
6. Reviews plans and procedures appropriate for the CAI.
7. Make and document notifications to external partners and stakeholders.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- Jurisdiction CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

C.3.2.E

Task: Operate the EOC

Evaluated Component: EOC staff

Expected Outcomes: The EOC is operational and maintains its operational status for the duration of the response. The EOC develops situational awareness and a common operating picture for the duration of the response.

Steps

1. Maintain an uninterrupted capability for the duration of the response (ex., equipment and systems are operational; appropriate staffing level achieved and maintained, etc.)
2. The EOC coordinates the exchange of information with the installation, other off-post EOCs, and any other jurisdictions/organizations supporting the response to the CAI (including hospitals, schools). The EOC develops situational awareness and a common operating picture for the duration of the response.
3. Conduct an initial EOC briefing for incoming staff; provide regular EOC briefings for the duration of the response.
4. Provide command, control, coordination, and leadership of emergency response activities.
5. Maintain EOC security for the duration of the response.
6. Post information about on-post and off-post events and decisions in the EOC (ex., WebEOC, dry erase boards, posters, etc.). Archive information for subsequent analysis, investigation and preparation of official reports.
7. Based on resources available, provide prompt support to the installation or other jurisdictions (ex., emergency supplies, equipment and personnel), as requested.
8. Identify resource shortfalls (ex., in emergency supplies, equipment, and personnel) and request additional assistance as necessary. Once local resources are exhausted, consider emergency-declaration process.
9. Conduct shift change and transition briefings, as appropriate.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- Jurisdiction CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

C.3.4.E

Task: Prepare, Sign, and Transmit Emergency Declaration

Evaluated Component: Senior leader or designee and EOC staff

Expected Outcomes: Prepare, sign, and transmit local, State, and Tribal declarations of emergency to higher authority.

Steps

1. When situation warrants, prepare and sign local declarations of emergency.
2. Forward declaration to the Governor's office or other appropriate agency.
3. At the State level, the Governor determines if Federal assistance is necessary.
4. Governor forwards declaration to appropriate Federal authorities.
5. Prepare and sign the State declaration of emergency describing State and local efforts and resources that officials have or will use to alleviate the emergency and defining the type and extent of Federal aid required.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- Jurisdiction CSEPP Plan (Incident-Specific Plan), Local Emergency Operations Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

Outcome 4: Hazard Mitigation

This outcome, demonstrated exclusively on post, includes all activities related to reporting the event, fighting fires, preserving evidence and records of decisions, and controlling and mitigating the hazard. It does not include any activities at the incident site specifically associated with the *Survivor and Patient Care* outcome (Outcome 6).

Table 11: Outcome 4 Evaluation Map

Installation Field	Installation EOC	State/County Field	State/County EOC
A.4.1.F Make Immediate Chemical Area Incident (CAI) Reports			
A.4.2.F Conduct Firefighting Operations at the Chemical Area Incident (CAI) Site			
A.4.4.F Provide Direction and Control at the Chemical Area Incident (CAI) Site	A.4.3.E Direct and Control Field Response Operations		
A.4.6.F Preserve Evidence at the Chemical Area Incident (CAI) Site	A.4.5.E Direct and Coordinate Preservation of Evidence and Records of Decisions		
A.4.7.F Stage Response Teams			
A.4.8.F Operate a Personnel Decontamination Station (PDS)			
A.4.9.F Operate an Equipment Decontamination Station (EDS)			
A.4.10.F Conduct Agent Containment Operations			
A.4.11.F Mitigate the Effects of the Agent Release			

A.4.1.F

Task: Make Immediate Chemical Area Incident (CAI) Reports

Evaluated Component: Chemical workers, security forces, and facility personnel

Expected Outcomes: Participants make prompt and accurate reports from the CAI site.

Steps

1. Witnesses quickly obtain essential elements of information (EEI) that describe the incident:
 - a. Location and time of the event
 - b. Description and magnitude of the CAI (spill, fire, explosion)
 - c. Type and quantity of agent and/or munitions involved
2. Witnesses communicate the EEI available to them initially to the operations center. The report includes the names and locations of persons reporting the event.
3. Witnesses continue to obtain EEI concerning any changes to the initial conditions, number and extent of injuries, and circumstances at the CAI site. This includes deployment of Initial Entry Parties as soon as possible.
4. Witnesses communicate updates of EEI concerning the CAI as promptly and accurately as the initial report.

References

- DA Directive 2013-03, *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance*, ENCL1. (April 4, 2013)
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- Installation CAIRA Plan
- Installation Physical Security Plan and Guard Orders
- Memorandum, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, DAMO-SSD, January 19, 2006, Subject: *Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Support During Emergency Response Activities at US Army Chemical Materials Activity (CMA) Storage and Disposal Facilities*
- Operational SOPs

A.4.2.F

Task: Conduct Firefighting Operations at the Chemical Area Incident (CAI) Site

Evaluated Component: Installation firefighters

Expected Outcomes: Firefighters fight fires that do not involve explosives at the CAI site safely.

Steps

1. The senior firefighter present directs all firefighting activities.
2. Firefighters act to protect and equip themselves for their mission.
3. Firefighters and firefighting equipment deploy to the CAI site to suppress or extinguish fires and provide support to response operations.
4. Firefighters extinguish, control, or allow fires at the CAI site to burn out according to appropriate firefighting practices. They take care to avoid causing unnecessary migration of released agent or release of additional agent. They do not fight fires involving explosives.
5. The senior firefighter keeps the Field Operations Branch Chief and/or EOC staff informed of the status of firefighting operations.

References

- DA Pam 385-61: *Toxic Chemical Agent Safety Standards* (November 1, 2018)
- Installation CAIRA Plan
- Installation Firefighting Plan

A.4.3.E

Task: Direct and Control Field Response Operations

Evaluated Component: EOC Staff

Expected Outcomes: Participants direct, control, and coordinate activities of responders in the field to ensure maximum safety and efficiency.

Steps

1. Assist the Field Operations Branch Chief and staff in developing and implementing CAI plans and alternate plans to contain the release.
2. Monitor communication between responders and the Field Operations Branch Chief and receive reports regarding the status of containment operations. Make recommendations to the EOC Operations Branch Chief, the Field Operations Branch Chief, and the Operations Section Chief regarding adjustments to these operations based on the situation presented.
3. Direct dispatch of available additional responders if field operations are beyond the capabilities of responders at the CAI site.
4. Direct dispatch of specialized responders (e.g., firefighters, heavy equipment operators, and EOD technicians) if participants require such assets to support field operations.
5. Assist the Field Operations Branch Chief and staff in developing and implementing mitigation plans.

References

- Directive 2013-03, *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance* (April 4, 2013)
- Installation CAIRA Plan
- Installation SOPs for field operations
- 29 CFR 1910.120: *Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response*

A.4.4.F

Task: Provide Direction and Control at the Chemical Area Incident (CAI) Site

Evaluated Component: Senior Responder and Field Operations Branch Chief

Expected Outcomes: Participants properly coordinate activities of responders in the field to ensure maximum safety and efficiency of response operations.

Steps

1. The first qualified responder at the CAI site establishes initial expedient direction and control by:
 - a. Expediting the care and transportation of injured or exposed personnel;
 - b. Establishing an initial hazard area based on preliminary information or pre-established criteria and consultation with hazard analysts;
 - c. Selecting initial locations for Personnel Decontamination Station (PDS) and Equipment Decontamination Station (EDS) operations and staging areas on the upwind perimeter of the hazard area;
 - d. Collecting and assessing additional information about conditions at the CAI site;
 - e. Directing expedient containment and mitigation operations to the extent that they can perform these safely with available assets;
 - f. Organizing and directing the arrival of additional response teams; and
 - g. Keeping the EOC staff informed about field operations.
2. Participants set up a Field Command Post and operate it in a safe and convenient location.
3. The Field Operations Branch Chief assumes direction and control in the field as soon as he or she establishes communications with response teams and has enough EEI available to sustain this effort. The Field Operations Branch Chief:
 - a. Coordinates, directs, and controls response operations to assess, contain, and mitigate the release safely and efficiently;
 - b. Adjusts locations for PDS and EDS operations, staging areas, and other field operations according to conditions and circumstances at the CAI site;
 - c. Ensures personnel perform real-time, low-level monitoring at the PDS and EDS, certain staging areas, access control points (ACPs), and other places where procedures allow unprotected persons to be present at the perimeter of the predicted hazard area;
 - d. Adjusts the security cordon to accommodate revised hazard area predictions and operational needs in the field;
 - e. Requests and deploys additional equipment, personnel, and supplies; and
 - f. Keeps the Operations Section Chief informed about field operations.

References

- Installation CAIRA Plan
- 29 CFR 1910.120: *Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response*

A.4.5.E

Task: Direct and Coordinate Preservation of Evidence and Records of Decisions

Evaluated Component: EOC Staff

Expected Outcomes: Participants collect, secure, and preserve information about the CAI and the Army response.

Steps

1. The Security officer, the Legal Officer, the Safety Officer, and the Environmental Officer provide advice and recommendations to the Operations Section Chief regarding physical evidence to document and preserve at the CAI site and elsewhere.
2. The Operations Section Chief considers CAI site-preservation recommendations when directing and controlling containment and mitigation operations at the CAI site.
3. The Operations Section Chief directs that participants document conditions at the CAI site as thoroughly as the situation allows throughout the response, including through the collection of eyewitness statements, sketches, photographs, and audio and video recordings.
4. The Operations Section Chief confirms that participants collect and archive all handwritten notes; duty logs; status boards; equipment maintenance records; maps; media releases; communications logs, recordings, and transcripts; electronic files; and records of decisions and operations associated with the response as a permanent record for subsequent analysis, investigation, and official reports.

References

- DA, AR 385-10: *The Army Safety Program*, Rapid Action Revision (February 24, 2017)
- DA, Pam 385-40: *Army Accident Investigations and Reporting*, Rapid Action Revision (March 18, 2015)
- Installation CAIRA Plan

A.4.6.F

Task: Preserve Evidence at the Chemical Area Incident (CAI) Site

Evaluated Component: Field Operations Branch staff and field response teams

Expected Outcomes: Responders collect, secure, and preserve evidence from the CAI site and records of the Army field response.

Steps

1. Responders, to the greatest extent possible, avoid disturbing equipment, materials, and conditions at the CAI site other than as required to rescue patients; fight fires; render explosives safe; secure chemical material; and mitigate the release.
2. Responders document conditions at the CAI site as thoroughly as the situation allows throughout the response (including via sketches, eyewitness reports, written narratives, photographs, and audio or video recordings).
3. Responders document their decisions and response activities in a permanent record as soon as possible.
4. The Field Operations Branch staff collects and protects all information about the conditions at the CAI site and records of decisions and operations for subsequent analysis, investigation, and official reports.

References

- DA, AR 385-10: *The Army Safety Program*, Rapid Action Revision (February 24, 2017)
- Installation CAIRA Plan

A.4.7.F

Task: Stage Response Teams

Evaluated Component: Field Operations Branch staff and field response teams

Expected Outcomes: Officials make emergency responders available and deploy them properly for task assignments.

Steps

1. Security forces, fire and rescue teams, medical personnel, chemical workers, EOD technicians, and other emergency responders deploy promptly to appropriate staging areas.
2. Responders perform pre-operation checks and prepare personal protective equipment (PPE), vehicles, and equipment.
3. Field Operations Branch staff or immediate supervisors brief emergency responders on the status of response operations, provide safety directives, and assign tasks.
4. Responders adjust their readiness postures as field operations evolve by relocating to different staging areas or modifying the level of PPE worn.

References

- DA Pam 385-61: *Toxic Chemical Safety Standards* (November 1, 2018)
- Installation CAIRA Plan

A.4.8.F

Task: Operate a Personnel Decontamination Station (PDS)

Evaluated Component: Chemical workers at the PDS

Expected Outcomes: Officials determine personnel and PPE to be free from contamination before leaving the predicted hazard area; participant(s) package containers holding contaminated PPE or other contaminated materials properly for storage, treatment, or disposal. PDS personnel will ensure an up-to-date SOP is available and used on location.

Steps

1. Chemical workers set up the PDS to provide for safe and efficient operations within the contamination reduction area. Participants confirm that the location is free from contamination.
2. Chemical workers have sufficient personnel, materials, and supplies available to assist responders exiting from within the predicted hazard area and to sustain personnel decontamination operations for the duration of the response.
3. Chemical workers operate the PDS safely and efficiently.
4. All persons who exit from the predicted hazard area depart through the PDS.
5. Officials maintain permanent records of the name, time, decontamination method, post-decontamination monitoring results, and monitoring instruments used for all persons processed through the PDS.
6. Participants close and seal containers holding PPE and other contaminated material; they confirm them to be free from external contamination and mark them appropriately for storage, treatment, or disposal.
7. PDS supervisor reports the status of decontamination operations at regular intervals to the Field Operations Branch Chief.

References

- Installation CAIRA Plan

A.4.9.F

Task: Operate an Equipment Decontamination Station (EDS)

Evaluated Component: Chemical workers at the EDS

Expected Outcomes: Officials determine vehicles, supplies, material, tools, and equipment to be free from contamination before leaving the predicted hazard area; participant(s) package containers holding contaminated material properly for storage and disposal.

Steps

1. Chemical workers set up the EDS to provide for safe and efficient operations within the contamination reduction area. They confirm the location is free from contamination.
2. Chemical workers have sufficient personnel, materials, and supplies available to process vehicles, supplies, material, tools, and equipment from within the predicted hazard area and to sustain decontamination operations for the duration of the response.
3. Chemical workers operate the EDS safely and efficiently.
4. All vehicles, supplies, material, tools, and equipment removed from the predicted hazard area depart through the EDS.
5. Participants affix permanent and unique identifiers to all supplies, material, tools, equipment, and containers processed through the EDS.
6. Participants maintain permanent records of each vehicle and other objects and materials processed through the EDS. The record includes the identity, time, and decontamination method, and post decontamination monitoring results and the monitoring instrument used.
7. Participants mark all vehicles and other objects and materials permanently to show their decontamination status. They close and seal containers holding contaminated material, confirm them to be free from external contamination, and mark them appropriately for storage and disposal.
8. EDS supervisor reports the status of decontamination operations at regular intervals to the Field Operations Branch Chief.

References

- Installation CAIRA Plan

A.4.10.F

Task: Conduct Agent Containment Operations

Evaluated Component: Field Operations Branch staff and field response teams

Expected Outcomes: Participants limit the amount of agent released to the smallest possible quantity over the smallest possible area; they terminate the release promptly at its source as soon as they can perform this safely.

Steps

1. Field Operations Branch staff and response team leaders assess the situation and develop plans for containing the release.
2. Field Operations Branch Chief and/or Incident Commander approve work plans prior to beginning release control operations.
3. Responders properly don appropriate PPE before working in potentially hazardous environments.
4. Responders contain liquid agent spills by using methods or equipment that will obtain expedient results (e.g., closing or plugging containers, over packing leaking containers, covering the source container, or using absorbent or neutralizing materials).
5. Firefighters suppress vapor releases by using firefighting foam, hazardous-materials foam, or other vapor-barrier materials.
6. If the leak or spill is in a storage structure, responders close the door and install a filter unit on the rear vent.
7. If the incident damages munitions with explosive components or exposes them to impact or fire, EOD technicians render the munitions safe before the technicians move or package them. The Incident Commander approves alternate techniques if EOD technicians cannot safely render the munitions safe using standard procedures.
8. Response team leaders keep the Field Operations Branch Chief and EOC staff informed about containment operations.

References

- DA Pam 385-61: *Toxic Chemical Agent Safety Standards* (November 1, 2018)
- Memorandum, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, DAMO-SSD, January 19, 2006, Subject: Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Support During Emergency Response Activities at US Army Chemical Materials Activity (CMA) Storage and Disposal Facilities
- Installation CAIRA Plan

A.4.11.F

Task: Mitigate the Effects of the Agent Release

Evaluated Component: Field Operations Branch staff and field response teams

Expected Outcomes: Participants safely decontaminate, seal, or package contaminated materials and dispose of them safely and legally.

Steps

1. Response team leaders and Field Operations Branch staff assess the situation and develop plans for mitigating the effects of the release.
2. The Field Operations Branch Chief and/or the Incident Commander approve mitigation plans prior to beginning operations.
3. Response teams properly don appropriate PPE before proceeding to begin mitigation operations.
4. Response teams absorb, neutralize, or collect residual liquid agent and aerosol deposition.
5. Chemical workers collect and package contaminated tools and equipment, decontamination byproducts, materials, and soil. They process the items through the EDS for appropriate disposal.
6. If the release occurred in a storage structure, the workers thoroughly decontaminate or seal the structure.
7. Response teams continuously monitor all areas within the Contamination Reduction Area and sample for agent residue and hazardous decontamination byproducts.
8. Response teams record and archive monitoring and sampling results for response records.
9. Response team leaders keep the Field Operations Branch Chief and EOC staff informed about removal operations.
10. Response team members request additional personnel or equipment from the Field Operations Branch Chief or EOC staff, as needed.

References

- DA Pam 385-61: *Toxic Chemical Agent Safety Standards* (November 1, 2018)
- Installation CAIRA Plan

Outcome 5: Protection

This outcome includes all activities related to protecting on-post and off-post populations, including vulnerable populations, by making appropriate protective action decisions, activating alert and notification systems, disseminating protective action messages, providing access control and security, activating and operating reception centers and mass care shelters, and coordinating support services for affected populations.

Table 12: Outcome 5 Evaluation Map

Installation Field	Installation EOC	State/County Field	State/County EOC
	A.5.1.E Make On-post Protective Action Decisions (PADs)		C.5.1.E Make Off-post Protective Action Decisions
			C.5.2.E Select and Approve Protective Action Messages
	A.5.2.E Activate On-post Alert and Notification Systems		C.5.3.E Activate Off-post Alert and Notification Systems
A.5.4.F Evacuate and Secure the Predicted Hazard Area	A.5.3.E Direct and Control Protection of the Post Population	C.5.4.F Conduct Route Alerting	
A.5.5.F Control On-post Population Evacuation		C.5.6.F Establish Traffic and Access Control Points	C.5.5.E Direct and Control Activation of Access and Traffic Control Points
A.5.6.F Assemble, Screen, and Account for the On-post Population		C.5.8.F Implement a Protective Action for School(s) and/or Daycare Center(s)	C.5.7.E Issue a Protective Action for School(s) and/or Daycare Center(s)
A.5.7.F Provide Transportation for Evacuation		C.5.10.F Implement a Protective Action for Access and Functional Needs Population	C.5.9.E Issue a Protective Action for Access and Functional Needs Population
	A.5.8.E Coordinate Support Services for the Army Community	C.5.12.F Operate a Reception Center	C.5.11.E Activate a Reception Center
	A.5.9.E Coordinate Claims Services for the Affected Population	C.5.14.F Operate a Shelter	C.5.13.E Activate a Shelter

A.5.1.E

Task: Make On-post Protective Action Decisions (PADs)

Evaluated Component: EOC staff and Incident Commander

Expected Outcomes: Participants make optimum protective action decisions to protect the at-risk populations on post quickly; they make decisions to adjust or cancel PADs as conditions warrant.

Steps

1. Upon receipt of a report of a CAI, a hazard analyst determines:
 - a. The perimeter of the on-post predicted hazard area, considering current and predicted meteorology; hazard plume plots;
 - b. The potential for aerosol deposition;
 - c. The short-term exposure limit (STEL) risk envelope for chemical workers and unprotected emergency responders;
 - d. Potential explosives fragmentation hazards;
 - e. Preplanned locations for the PDS and EDS; and
 - f. The risk envelope for all at-risk post populations
2. A hazard analyst recommends on-post PADs to an Army official authorized to implement on-post PADs.
3. An authorized Army official considers the advice of the hazard analyst, then decides the appropriate PADs for the on-post population to include persons near the CAI site who are not essential to or associated with the response.
4. The Incident Commander assesses reports concerning the status of the protection of the at-risk population in the predicted hazard area and makes new or different PADs when reports indicate problems in implementation of protective actions.
5. Hazard analysts and the Incident Commander repeat the above steps when meteorological changes occur or new information about the event becomes available, thus adjusting or cancelling on-post PADs as appropriate. This includes recommending the relocation from shelters at times that minimize exposure to infiltrated vapors.

References

- 40 CFR 300
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *CSEPP Shelter-In-Place Protective Action Guide Book* (May 2006)
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A.5.2.E

Task: Activate On-post Alert and Notification Systems

Evaluated Component: EOC staff and Incident Commander

Expected Outcome: Officials instruct all persons initially in the on-post predicted hazard area on protective actions appropriate for their specific location (within the planned timeframe) of the PAD.

Steps

1. Prepare protective action messages to be broadcast over indoor and outdoor alert and notification systems. If a location other than the EOC activates these systems, EOC staff ensures the correct protective action messages are broadcast.
2. Activate indoor and outdoor alert and notification systems with sufficient lead time so that initial instructions are received within the planned timeframe.
3. Activate auxiliary warning systems and devices.
4. Confirm that the alert and notification systems functioned properly and broadcast the correct messages. Then immediately notify the Incident Commander of any failure of alert and notification systems or devices.
5. Note the EOC staff immediately activates backup notification systems to cover any area where alert and notification systems or devices failed. Backup systems include route alerting by security forces and radio and telephonic notification to selected facilities.
6. Note the Incident Commander determines the impact of delayed dissemination of protective action instructions and adjusts subsequent response actions accordingly.
7. Reactivate primary on-post indoor and outdoor warning systems with appropriate notification messages at least every 12 minutes for the first hour and every 20 minutes thereafter, as long as there is danger in the affected areas, unless the Incident Commander directs otherwise.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *CSEPP Shelter-In-Place Protective Action Guide Book* (May 12, 2006)
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A.5.3.E

Task: Direct and Control Protection of the Post Population

Evaluated Component: EOC staff and Incident Commander.

Expected Outcomes: Participants make arrangements to secure the on-post predicted hazard area and move the at-risk population to safe locations.

Steps

1. Review selected evacuation and relocation routes consistent with PADs. Identify situations that could cause traffic queues to form. Modify the evacuation and/or relocation routes to mitigate the effects of these conditions.
2. Select predetermined or identify ad hoc traffic control points consistent with PADs that support the selected evacuation and relocation routes. Identify locations for access control points that will prevent unauthorized people from entering the predicted hazard area. Determine which locations official will staff or barricade (not staffed).
3. Dispatch security forces to provide traffic and access control with appropriate vehicles, equipment, and materials to specified control points.
4. Coordinate on-post traffic and access control activities with off-post jurisdictions.
5. Direct the repositioning of traffic or access control points as PADs change.
6. Track the status of persons who took temporary shelter within the predicted hazard area and arrange their relocation at times that minimize exposure to infiltrating vapors.
7. Track the assembly of evacuees at predesignated locations to account for all the at-risk population. Direct actions to account for known or suspected missing persons and to treat potential agent-exposure patients arriving at assembly points.
8. Arrange transportation for at-risk personnel who lack the means to move to safe locations.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *CSEPP Shelter-In-Place Protective Action Guide Book* (May 12, 2006)
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A.5.4.F

Task: Evacuate and Secure the Predicted Hazard Area

Evaluated Component: Security forces, chemical workers, and facility personnel

Expected Outcomes: Participants remove nonessential personnel from the predicted hazard area and establish a security cordon and enforce it around this area.

Steps

1. Security guards and non-essential workers in the predicted hazard area properly don appropriate PPE and acknowledge alarms.
2. The Field Operations Branch Chief or the senior responder in the field promptly identifies the boundaries of the on-post predicted hazard area in consultation with hazard analysts in the EOC and security supervisors. The perimeter of the on-post predicted hazard area considers the Short-Term Exposure Limit risk envelope, potential explosives fragmentation hazard, the risk envelope, preplanned locations for the PDS and EDS, and locations for effective ACPs.
3. Security guards survey their areas of responsibility and direct the evacuation of nonessential personnel from within the predicted hazard area.
4. Security guards set up a security cordon around the predicted hazard area.
5. Supervisors ensure no guards position themselves inside the predicted hazard area unless they dress in appropriate PPE.
6. Security guards set up and operate ACPs for all responders entering or leaving the predicted hazard area, including at least one ACP near the PDS and the EDS.
7. Security guards maintain accountability of all responders within the security cordon.
8. Security supervisor reports the status of security operations at regular intervals to the Field Operations Branch Chief and EOC staff.
9. Security guards relocate promptly if circumstances warrant a change in the size or shape of the predicted hazard area, the location of the PDS and EDS, or security requirements.

References

- 40 CFR 300
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- Installation Guard Orders
- Installation Physical Security Plan
- Installation CAIRA Plan

A.5.5.F

Task: Control On-post Population Evacuation

Evaluated Component: Security forces

Expected Outcomes: Traffic control points and unstaffed barricades are in place outside of the predicted hazard area in time to expedite prompt and orderly evacuation from the predicted hazard area; the participants evacuate the at-risk post population safely and expeditiously.

Steps

1. Set up barricades and operate traffic control points outside of the predicted hazard area.
2. Conduct route alerting in select areas if requested by the Incident Commander.
3. Security forces make regular communications checks and report progress in evacuation activities to the EOC staff.
4. Direct evacuees to safe locations and expedite their movement. Officials give priority to emergency vehicles.
5. Report incidents of potential agent exposure among evacuees and arrange transport for at-risk persons who lack transportation.
6. Promptly relocate TCPs as needed. Participants might set up TCPs close to the incident site initially, then relocate them as the size and shape of the predicted hazard area changes over time.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A.5.6.F

Task: Assemble, Screen, and Account for the On-post Population

Evaluated Component: Supervisors and heads of families at assembly points

Expected Outcomes: Participants assemble the on-post population, account for it, and screen it for agent exposure; this population is ready to evacuate if officials direct.

Steps

1. Upon receipt of instructions to evacuate from the predicted hazard area, designated supervisors and heads of families open assembly points for their facility or area.
2. Supervisors and heads of families account for all personnel by name and category (i.e., employee, visitor, contractor, or resident).
3. Supervisors and heads of families attempt to locate and warn unaccounted-for persons. They give consideration to those who might have taken temporary shelter as a protective action. Participants will need to account for and screen them after ending temporary shelter.
4. Supervisors and heads of families report the status of personnel in their facility or area to the Evacuation Coordinator in the EOC.
5. Supervisors and heads of families screen personnel for potential agent exposure based on their location when the release occurred, their travel route to the assembly point, or if they are presenting symptoms of agent exposure. Participants make arrangements for treatment and transport of potential agent-exposure patients.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *CSEPP Shelter-In-Place Protective Action Guide Book* (May 2006)
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A.5.7.F

Task: Provide Transportation for Evacuation

Evaluated Component: Transportation of workers at assembly points

Expected Outcomes: Participants make sufficient transport vehicles and drivers available where and when needed to evacuate all or part of the on-post population to a safe location.

Steps

1. Individuals who have access to vehicles evacuate without assistance when directed.
2. Upon notification of evacuation requirements, designated evacuation drivers ensure that vehicles are serviceable and have sufficient fuel to support the mission prior to leaving for assembly points.
3. Drivers have or obtain maps and communications equipment to support their mission.
4. Drivers configure vehicles to accommodate special populations, if applicable.
5. Drivers form evacuation convoys at the assembly points.
6. Evacuees load on vehicles. A vehicle manifest (or some other positive means) accounts for the vehicles. Participants pass this information to the Evacuation Coordinator in the EOC.
7. Participants transport evacuees to appropriate safe locations, which might be off post.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A.5.8.E

Task: Coordinate Support Services for the Army Community

Evaluated Component: EOC staff

Expected Outcomes: Staff assesses the need and makes arrangements to provide the Army community and their families with counseling, spiritual support, and veterinary services.

Steps

1. Determine the need for and request augmentation for support services, including the following:
 - a. Clergy or counselors support from local community-based programs, support installations, or the AMC Chaplain Crisis Response Team.
 - b. Veterinary assets from supporting installations or AMC.
2. Provide appropriate information about the event and local circumstances to support requests and detail what resources people need.
3. Coordinate the arrival of and arrange for logistic support for requested staff:
 - a. Check-in and in-brief procedures—where and when they check in and who will brief them.
 - b. Provide workspace, billeting, and other support as needed.
4. Make arrangements to publicize the availability of support services for the on-post Army community and their families.
5. Inform the Incident Commander about support service activities and any problems that require extraordinary action or intervention.

References

- DA, AR 40-905: Veterinary Health Services (August 29, 2006)
- DA, AR 165-1, Army Chaplain Corps Activities (June 23, 2015)
- Installation CAIRA plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A.5.9.E

Task: Coordinate Claims Services for the Affected Population

Evaluated Component: EOC staff

Expected Outcomes: The staff assesses the need and makes arrangements to provide claims services to members of the on-post and off-post communities.

Steps

1. Determine the need for claims services and request claims service augmentation from Army legal staff at supporting installations and the Army Claims Service.
2. Provide appropriate information about the CAI and local circumstances to support the requests and detail what resources are needed.
3. Coordinate the arrival of and arrange logistic support for requested staff, including reception and briefing upon arrival and assignment of lodging and work space.
4. Make arrangements to publicize the availability of claims services to the off-post community and the Army community.
5. Inform the Incident Commander about claims service activities and any problems that require extraordinary action or intervention.

References

- AR 27-20: *Claims* (February 8, 2008)
- DA Pam 27-162: *Claims Procedures* (March 21, 2008)
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

C.5.1.E

Task: Make Off-post Protective Action Decision

Evaluated Component: Senior leader or designee and/or EOC Staff

Expected Outcome: Make a Protective Action Decision (PAD) quickly that is appropriate for the risk and adjust or cancel as conditions warrant. Ensure the PAD is disseminated to the appropriate individuals, agencies/organizations and jurisdictions.

Steps

1. Make a PAD that is appropriate for the risk and jurisdiction upon receipt of the Chemical Events Notification Level and Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) from the Army.
 - a. Consider senior leader or designees current and predicted meteorology, hazard plume plots, and the risk envelope for at-risk population(s).
 - b. Use a pre-existing PAD if analysis factors match predetermined criteria; otherwise, make a PAD based the senior leader or designee's judgment and experience.
2. Communicate with the senior leader or designee (by telephone or other electronic means) the PAD promptly and directly to the installation EOC, the Joint Information Center (when activated), and adjacent jurisdiction EOC(s), including State EOC potentially affected by the PAD (e.g., evacuees that officials send to shelter in an adjacent jurisdiction).
3. Assess the senior leader or designee in coordination with EOC staff information concerning the status at-risk population(s) and direct actions concerning delays in the implementation of protective actions.
4. The senior leader or designee may subsequently update the PAD based on new data or upon receipt of a new PAR from the installation. This includes recommending ventilation or exit shelter at times that minimize exposure to infiltrated vapors.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *CSEPP Shelter-In-Place Protective Action Guide Book* (May 2006)
- Local Emergency Operations Plan, Incident-Specific Plans, and supporting procedures and agreements

C.5.2.E

Task: Select and Approve Protective Action Messages

Evaluated Component: Senior leader or designee and/or EOC Staff

Expected Outcome: Select and approve the appropriate protective action message for dissemination to the at-risk population(s).

Steps

1. Select or modify pre-scripted protective action message or develop one appropriate for the Protective Action Decision, for dissemination to the at-risk population(s).
 - a. Ensure message addresses the needs of mobility, hearing and/or visually impaired, and non-English speaking persons and institutions as appropriate in the protective action message.
 - b. Ensure the appropriate authority approves the protective action message prior to dissemination.
 - c. Track the protective action message through a numbering system or other identifiable method.
2. Broadcast the protective action messages through the Emergency Alert System (EAS), Wireless Emergency Alerts and/or other broadcast media.
 - a. Arrange an EAS broadcast within 8 minutes of receiving the PAR.
 - b. Broadcast the time the PAR is received. Staff may broadcast the same or a similar message via Tone Alert or Weather Radios, messages on TARs and sirens, voice mail, text message, Advisor™ Alert Radios (AARs), and/or reverse -911 systems.
3. Staff provide copies of the protective action message to the installation EOC, the Joint Information Center, and adjacent jurisdiction EOCs, including the State EOC (SEOC).

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *CSEPP Shelter-In-Place Protective Action Guide Book* (May 2006)
- Operations Plan, Incident-Specific Plans, and supporting procedures and agreements

C.5.3.E

Task: Activate Off-post Alert and Notification Systems

Evaluated Component: Warning Point and/or EOC Staff

Expected Outcome: Alert and notify at-risk population(s) of protective actions appropriate for their specific location in a timely manner.

Steps

1. Activate indoor and outdoor alert and notification systems to disseminate the Protective Action Decision within 8 minutes of receiving the Protective Action Recommendation from the installation.
2. Activate auxiliary alert and notification systems (e.g., route alerting), as appropriate.
3. Confirm functionality of the alert and notification systems and broadcast of the correct protective action message.
4. Immediately notify the appropriate authorities of an alert and notification system failure.
 - a. Activate backup systems to augment where an alert and notification system failed.
 - b. Determine the impact of an alert and notification system failure and adjust subsequent response actions accordingly.
5. Reactivate indoor and outdoor alert and notification systems with the appropriate protective action messages at least every 12 minutes for the first hour and every 20 minutes thereafter for as long as there is danger in the predicated hazard area.
6. Provide the protective action message directly to critical facilities (e.g., medical centers, large businesses and recreational venues and transportation operators).

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *CSEPP Shelter-In-Place Protective Action Guide Book* (May 2006)
- Local Emergency Operations Plan, Incident-Specific Plans, and supporting procedures and agreements

C.5.4.F

Task: Conduct Route Alerting

Evaluated Component: EOC Staff and/or Firefighters and Law Enforcement Officials

Expected Outcome: Provide at-risk population(s) the appropriate protective action message.

Steps

1. Identify route alerting resources (e.g., personnel, vehicles, routes).
 - a. Conduct communications checks between route alerting personnel and the EOC.
 - b. Ensure each vehicle public address (PA) system is functional prior to conducting route alerting.
2. Provide route alerting personnel with maps and directions for their designated area.
3. Brief route alerting personnel on safe routes to and from the area, expected stay times and other hazard specific information.
4. Provide route alerting personnel with a copy of the protective action message to be broadcast over the vehicle PA system.
5. Ensure travel speed allows the public to hear the entire message while also completing the mission within the designated time.
6. Conduct communications checks and report status to the appropriate personnel (ex., supervisor, Incident Commander, Emergency Support Function 13 liaison, etc.) at regular intervals.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, Version 2, Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans* (November 2010)
- Local Emergency Operations Plan, Incident-Specific Plans, and supporting procedures and agreements

C.5.5.E

Task: Direct and Control Activation of Access and Traffic Control Points

Evaluated Component: EOC Staff and/or Public Works, Firefighters, and Law Enforcement Officials

Expected Outcome: Activate an access and traffic control point (ACP/TCP) to facilitate orderly evacuation (egress) and control access to the predicted hazard area (ingress).

Steps

1. Review predetermined evacuation and relocation routes.
 - a. Identify situations (e.g., tolls, railroad crossings, road construction, vehicle accidents, weather) that could cause traffic queues to form.
 - b. Modify evacuation/relocation routes to mitigate situational effects.
2. Identify the predetermined and/or ad hoc ACP/TCP to be activated.
3. Determine if location will be staffed (ACP/TCP) or not staffed (barricade).
4. Coordinate with the appropriate agency(ies)/organization(s) to block access to the predicted hazard area by rail, water and air.
5. Coordinate ACP/TCP activities (e.g., activation, establishment and demobilization) with the installation and adjacent jurisdiction(s).
6. Dispatch ACP/TCP resources (e.g., personnel, vehicle, equipment) to the designed location.
7. Coordinate with the appropriate agency(ies)/organizations(s) to change traffic lights at designated location to facilitate traffic movement.
8. Deploy an electronic signboard(s) and activate with the appropriate protective action message.
9. Dispatch tow trucks to the designated location to handle disabled vehicles and/or dispense of emergency supplies (e.g., gasoline).
10. Brief ACP/TCP staff resources on a modification to the evacuation/relocation route.
11. Provide continuous, 24-hour operation until requested to demobilize.
12. Conduct a shift change briefing to replace and/or augment staff.
13. Repeat steps to activate more than one ACP/TCP or complete simultaneously to activate multiple ACPs/TCPs at one time.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- Local Emergency Operations Plan, Incident-Specific Plans, and supporting procedures and agreements

C.5.6.F

Task: Establish Traffic and Access Control Points

Evaluated Component: Public Works, Firefighters and/or Law Enforcement Officials

Expected Outcome: Establish an access and traffic control point (ACP/TCP) in time to support an evacuation order, facilitate an orderly evacuation (egress) and control access to the predicted hazard area (ingress).

Steps

1. Stage personnel, vehicles, and equipment to support establishment of an ACP/TCP, if time allows.
2. Set up equipment, including a deployable electronic signboard(s) in the proper location(s) to facilitate an orderly evacuation and control access to the predicted hazard area.
3. Conduct communications checks and report status to the appropriate personnel (ex., supervisor, Incident Commander, Emergency Support Function 13 liaison) at regular intervals.
4. Provide emergency information and direct evacuees along the evacuation/relocation route.
5. Facilitate the movement of authorized personnel and emergency vehicles through the predicted hazard area.
6. Promptly relocate ACP/TCP, as directed.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- Local Emergency Operations Plan, Incident-Specific Plans, and supporting procedures and agreements

C.5.7.E

Task: Issue a Protective Action for School(s) and/or Daycare Center(s)

Evaluated Component: Senior leader or Designee and/or EOC Staff

Expected Outcome: In accordance with the Protective Action Decision, issue a protective action—shelter-in-place or evacuation—for school(s) and/or daycare center(s) and notify parents or guardians of reunification procedures.

Steps

1. Identify the at-risk school(s) and/or daycare center(s).
2. Contact at-risk school(s) and/or daycare center(s) and inform them of the protective action and inquire whether assistance is needed. If needed:
 - a. Compile and prioritize assistance.
 - b. Contact the appropriate resource provider(s) to obtain assistance.
 - c. Stage transportation resources or aid with implementing shelter-in-place measures.
3. Brief driver(s) on the predicted hazard area, emergency procedures and route(s), including pick-up and drop-off locations, as applicable.
4. Coordinate with ACP/TCP personnel to expedite movement of transportation resources to and from at-risk school(s) and/or daycare center(s).
5. Notify host school(s), daycare center(s), and/or reception center(s) to prepare to receive evacuees.
6. Promptly communicate any change in a protective action to the at-risk school(s) and/or daycare center(s).
7. Provide parents or guardians with protective action information, location of children and reunification procedures.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, Version 2, Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans* (November 2010)
- Local Emergency Operations Plan, Incident-Specific Plans, and supporting procedures and agreements

C.5.8.F

Task: Implement a Protective Action for School(s) and/or Daycare Center(s)

Evaluated Component: School Administrator and/or Daycare Center Operator

Expected Outcome: Implement a protective action—shelter-in-place or evacuation—for school and/or daycare center and maintain accountability of all faculty, staff and children.

Steps

1. Implement normal, expedient, or pressurized procedures if directed to shelter in place.
2. Identify transportation resource needs if directed to evacuate/relocate.
3. Brief driver(s) on the predicted hazard area, emergency procedures, and route(s), including pick-up and drop-off locations, applicable.
4. Assemble children and accompanying faculty and staff; board bus or other transportation resources and transport evacuees to the host school(s), daycare center(s), and/or reception center(s).
5. Establish and maintain communication with driver(s) for the duration of the evacuation/relocation.
6. Respond promptly to any change in a protective action.
7. Maintain accountability of faculty, staff, and children during shelter-in-place or evacuation.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *CSEPP Shelter-In-Place Protective Action Guide Book* (May 2006)
- *Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, Version 2, Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans* (November 2010)
- Local Emergency Operations Plan, Incident-Specific Plans, and supporting procedures and agreements

C.5.9.E

Task: Issue a Protective Action for Access and Functional Needs Population

Evaluated Component: Senior leader or Designee and/or EOC Staff

Expected Outcome: In accordance with the Protective Action Decision, issue a protective action—shelter-in-place or evacuation—for access and functional needs population.

Steps

1. Identify the at-risk access and functional needs population and/or facility(ies) of the affected area.
2. Contact at-risk access and functional needs population and/or facility(ies) and inform them of the protective action and inquire whether assistance is needed. If needed:
 - a. Compile and prioritize assistance.
 - b. Contact the appropriate resource provider(s) to obtain assistance.
 - c. Stage transportation resources or aid with implementing shelter-in-place measures.
3. Brief driver(s) on the predicted hazard area, emergency procedures, and route(s), including pick-up and drop-off locations, as applicable.
4. Coordinate with ACP/TCP personnel to expedite movement of transportation resources to and from at-risk access and functional needs population and/or facility(ies).
5. Inform transportation-dependent populations how to obtain transportation out of the predicted hazard area.
6. Notify host facility(ies) and/or reception center(s) to prepare to receive evacuees.
7. Promptly communicate any change in a protective action to the at-risk access and functional needs population and/or facility(ies).
8. Provide parents or guardians with protective action information, location of access and functional needs population and/or facility(ies), and reunification procedures.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, Version 2, Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans* (November 2010)
- Local Emergency Operations Plan, Incident-Specific Plans, and supporting procedures and agreements

C.5.10.F

Task: Implement a Protective Action for Access and Functional Needs Population

Evaluated Component: Service Provider (e.g., Operator and/or Transportation)

Expected Outcome: Implement a protective action—shelter-in-place or evacuation—for access and functional needs population and maintain accountability.

Steps

1. If directed to shelter in place, implement normal, expedient, or pressurized procedures.
2. If directed to evacuate or relocate, identify transportation resource needs.
3. Brief driver(s) on the predicted hazard area, emergency procedures and route(s), including pick-up and drop-off locations, as applicable.
4. Assemble access and functional needs population and accompanying staff; board bus or other transportation resources and transport all to the host facility(ies) and/or reception center(s).
5. Establish and maintain communication with driver(s) for the duration of the evacuation and/or relocation.
6. Respond promptly to any change in a protective action.
7. Maintain accountability of staff and access and functional needs population during shelter-in-place or evacuation and/or relocation.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *CSEPP Shelter-In-Place Protective Action Guide Book* (May 2006)
- *Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, Version 2, Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans* (November 2010)
- Local Emergency Operations Plan, Incident-Specific Plans, and supporting procedures and agreements

C.5.11.E

Task: Activate a Reception Center

Evaluated Component: Senior leader or Designee and/or EOC Staff

Expected Outcome: Activate a reception center and notify agency(ies) and/or organization(s) that support a reception center of the activation, as well as other facilities of the decision to activate and location. Solicit information on the operational status of the reception center and whether assistance is needed.

Steps

1. Identify the predetermined and/or ad hoc reception center to activate.
2. Notify the appropriate agency(ies) and/or organization(s) to activate a reception center.
3. Notify the appropriate agency(ies) and/or organization(s) that support a reception center (e.g., emergency medical services, law enforcement, public health) of activation and location.
4. Brief reception center manager and/or staff and supporting agency(ies) and/or organization(s) on the predicted hazard area, emergency procedures and routes, as applicable.
5. Coordinate with access and traffic control point personnel to expedite movement of reception center resources to the designated location.
6. Notify the installation EOC, Joint Information Center, and adjacent jurisdiction EOCs, including the State EOC, of the decision to activate a reception center and identify the location.
7. Solicit information on the operational status of the reception center and whether assistance is needed. If needed:
 - a. Compile and prioritize assistance; and
 - b. Contact the appropriate resource provider(s) to obtain assistance.
8. Repeat steps to activate more than one reception center or complete simultaneously to activate multiple reception centers at one time.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, Version 2, Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans* (November 2010)
- Local Emergency Operations Plan, Incident-Specific Plans, and supporting procedures and agreements

C.5.12.F

Task: Operate a Reception Center

Evaluated Component: Reception Center Manager/Staff

Expected Outcome: Notify the local Emergency Operations Center (EOC) of operational status and then provide status updates in accordance with established plans or as the situation changes. Provide continuous, 24-hour operation until requested to demobilize.

Steps

1. Set up a reception center in accordance with plans and procedures.
2. Notify local EOC when the reception center is operational; regularly update the EOC on the operational status of the reception center.
3. Register evacuees as they arrive at the reception center.
4. Assign evacuees to a shelter based upon their need and desire for shelter.
5. Provide assistive technology and communication assistance for people with disabilities and limited English proficiency.
6. Arrange for the care and handling of evacuee pets.
7. Provide continuous, 24-hour operation until requested to demobilize.
8. Conduct a shift change briefing to replace and/or augment staff.
9. Repeat steps to operate more than one reception center or complete simultaneously to operate multiple reception centers at one time.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, Version 2, Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans* (November 2010)
- Local Emergency Operations Plan, Incident-Specific Plans, and supporting procedures and agreements

C.5.13.E

Task: Activate a Shelter

Evaluated Component: Senior leader or Designee and/or EOC Staff

Expected Outcome: Activate a shelter and notify agency(ies) and/or organization(s) that support a shelter of the activation and other facilities of the decision to activate and the shelter location. Solicit information on the operational status of the shelter and whether assistance is needed.

Steps

1. Identify the predetermined and/or ad hoc shelter to activate.
2. Notify the appropriate agency(ies) and/or organization(s) to activate a shelter.
3. Notify the appropriate agency(ies) and/or /organization(s) that support a shelter (e.g., emergency medical services, law enforcement) of activation and shelter location.
4. Brief shelter manager/staff and supporting agency(ies) and/or organization(s) on the predicted hazard area, emergency procedures, and routes, as applicable.
5. Coordinate with access and traffic control point personnel to expedite movement of shelter resources to the designated location.
6. Notify the installation EOC, Joint Information Center, and adjacent jurisdiction EOCs, including the State EOC, of the decision to activate a shelter and identify the location.
7. Solicit information on the operational status of the shelter and whether assistance is needed. If needed:
 - a. Compile and prioritize assistance; and
 - b. Contact the appropriate resource provider(s) to obtain assistance.
8. Repeat steps to activate more than one shelter or complete simultaneously to activate multiple shelters at one time.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, Version 2, Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans* (November 2010)
- Local Emergency Operations Plan, Incident-Specific Plans, and supporting procedures and agreements

C.5.14.F

Task: Operate a Shelter

Evaluated Component: Shelter Manager/Staff

Expected Outcome: Notify the local EOC of operational status and then at regular intervals thereafter. Provide continuous, 24-hour operation and essential care services until requested to demobilize.

Steps

1. Set up a shelter in accordance with plans and procedures. Ensure shelter compliance with ADA, FEMA, and other applicable guidance.
2. Notify local EOC when the shelter is operational; regularly update the EOC on the operational status of the shelter.
3. Verify that evacuees registered at the reception center and were screened for contamination, if necessary.
4. Identify and address needs of those with access and functional needs, the mobility impaired, or medically dependent individuals.
5. Follow reunification procedures to ensure evacuees are reunited safely and as soon as the situation permits.
6. Arrange for the care and handling of evacuee pets.
7. Provide continuous, 24-hour operation until requested to demobilize.
8. Conduct a shift change briefing to replace and/or augment staff.
9. Repeat steps to operate more than one shelter or complete simultaneously to operate multiple shelters at one time.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, Version 2, Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans* (November 2010)
- Local Emergency Operations Plan, Incident-Specific Plans, and supporting procedures and agreements
- ADA, FEMA, and other applicable guidance

Outcome 6: Survivor and Patient Care

This outcome includes all activities related to treating on-post contaminated casualties at the accident site and installation; screening, treating, and decontaminating off-post patient survivors; patient transport; treatment at off-post medical facilities; patient tracking; and handling and tracking disposition of human remains.

Table 13: Outcome 6 Evaluation Map

Installation Field	Installation EOC	State/County Field	State/County EOC
		C.6.1.F Establish Incident Command and/or Join a Unified Command	
A.6.1.F Provide Immediate Emergency Aid at the Incident Site		C.6.2.F Communication—Medical Staff	C.6.1.E Communication—EOC/JIC Medical Representative
A.6.2.F Prepare Medical Treatment Facility to Receive Patients		C.6.3.F Prepare Medical Treatment Facility to Receive Patients	
A.6.3.F Provide Emergency Triage, Treatment, and Stabilization in the Field		C.6.4.F Pre-decontamination Triage	
A.6.4.F Make Survivor Status Reports	A.6.5.E Track the Location and Status of Survivors	C.6.5.F Decontamination and Post-decontamination Triage	
A.6.6.F Decontaminate Patients in the Field		C.6.6.F Transport Survivors/Patients to a Shelter or Medical Treatment Facility	
A.6.7.F Transport Patients to a Medical Treatment Facility		C.6.7.F Treat Patients at a Medical Treatment Facility	
A.6.8.F Treat Patients at a Medical Treatment Facility	A.6.9.E Notify Next of Kin	C.6.8.F Collect and Decontaminate Human Remains	C.6.9.E Track the Location of Survivors, Patients, and Fatalities
A.6.10.F Collect and Decontaminate Human Remains	A.6.11.E Coordinate Disposition of Human Remains		

A.6.1.F

Task: Provide Immediate Emergency Aid at the Incident Site

Evaluated Component: First responders other than medical professionals, e.g., chemical workers, security guards, and firefighters

Expected Outcomes: First responders save survivors from additional trauma injury and agent exposure at the incident site, accomplish appropriate lifesaving self-aid and first aid, and collect key information on patient history and begin treatment.

Steps

1. Survivors and coworkers perform immediate self-aid and buddy aid, continuing until medical response teams assume treatment. This includes the following:
 - a. Donning PPE, as appropriate.
 - b. Moving survivors from the immediate danger area.
 - c. Providing the airway, breathing, and circulation (ABC) of CPR; controlling blood loss, supporting fractures; and administering antidotes. Note that emergency treatment to save life or limb takes precedence over decontamination.
 - d. Removing gross contamination from the survivor's exposed skin and PPE.
2. Move survivors to a clean location and conduct expedient decontamination, continuing life support, and first aid treatment during movement.
3. Prepare survivors for immediate triage by the medical response team upon completion of decontamination procedures.
4. Survivors and nonmedical responders initiate a patient history, with particular attention given to the agent antidote regimen and decontamination processes accomplished.

References

- Installation CAIRA Plan
- Operational SOPs

A.6.2.F

Task: Prepare Medical Treatment Facility to Receive Patients

Evaluated Component: Medical treatment facility staff

Expected Outcomes: Staff prepares the medical treatment facility for arrival and treatment of patients.

Steps

1. Upon notification that an incident has occurred and patients might arrive, alert all services involved and mobilize the facility. Verify notification if not from the usual emergency communications channels.
2. Organize to respond using an Incident Command System.
3. If the environment might potentially contaminate incoming patients, implement the hazardous material plan for the facility:
 - a. Prepare decontamination and treatment areas.
 - b. Select PPE and prepare triage, security, and decontamination teams to receive patients.
4. Notify patient transports of any special approach or entrance to the medical treatment facility.
5. Receive patient information from the incident site and patient transports.
6. Make arrangements to control access to all entrances and exits.
7. Identify and isolate potentially contaminated patients that self-present to the medical treatment facility unannounced or present themselves outside of regular EMS channels.
8. Report the status of requests to receive patients and the state of preparedness to accommodate the requests to the patient tracking coordinator in the EOC.

References

- CSEPP Medical IPT, *Hospital CSEPP Medical Evaluation Guidance* (March 3, 2003)
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- Installation CAIRA Plan
- Medical treatment facility emergency response plan
- 29 CFR 1910.120: *Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response*
- 29 CFR 1910.134: *Respiratory Protection*
- 40 CFR 311: *Worker Protection*

A.6.3.F

Task: Provide Emergency Triage, Treatment, and Stabilization in the Field

Evaluated Component: Medical Response Team members

Expected Outcome: Team members stabilize the patient in the field before transport to a medical treatment facility.

Steps

1. Responders don appropriate PPE.
2. Begin triage procedures where survivors are available for assessment.
3. Collect information on patient history, treatment, and decontamination from survivors, coworkers, and nonmedical first responders.
4. Conduct primary patient assessment and perform additional expedient decontamination (if needed).
5. Address life-threatening issues. Note that emergency treatment to save life or limb takes precedence over decontamination.
6. Treat signs and symptoms. Continually assess the patient to ensure stability for transport.
7. Determine if patients should be transported to an on-post or off-post medical treatment facility.
8. Position the patient for thorough decontamination and transport to the medical treatment facility. Continue treatment while preparing the patient for decontamination and transport.
9. Obtain and document patient history, including triage, administration of agent antidote, decontamination, and other treatment provided.

References

- CSEPP Medical IPT, *Emergency Medical Service CSEPP Medical Evaluation Guidance* (March 3, 2003)
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A.6.4.F

Task: Make Survivor Status Reports

Evaluated Component: Chemical workers, security guards, firefighters, Medical Response Team members, and medical treatment facility staff

Expected Outcomes: Emergency responders and the medical treatment facility staff exchange information about the location and status of on-post survivors of injury or agent exposure and provide this information to the EOC staff.

Steps

1. Emergency responders provide regular reports from the field about the location and status (extent of injury, potential exposure and treatment provided) of all injured or exposed persons to the on-post medical treatment facility, the Field Operations Branch Chief, and the patient-tracking coordinator in the EOC. Reports describe any delay in care for survivors and a request or recommendation for assistance to remedy the delay.
2. Medical treatment facility staff provide periodic reports about the location and status (extent of injury, potential exposure and treatment provided) of all injured or exposed persons to the patient-tracking coordinator in the EOC. Reports include any delay in care for survivors and a request or recommendation for assistance to remedy the delay.

References

- Installation CAIRA Plan.

A.6.5.E

Task: Track the Location and Status of Survivors

Evaluated Component: EOC staff and Incident Commander

Expected Outcomes: Staff tracks on-post survivors of the incident as to their status and location, confirms their identities, and makes accurate information available to notify next-of-kin. Staff releases no survivor's identity or information improperly in reports or news releases and tracks and protects information about the location and status of the deceased with the same care and attention to detail.

Steps

1. Upon receipt, the staff documents on-post patient information to status boards in the EOC. Information includes location and status (e.g., extent of injury, potential exposure, and treatment provided), patients transported, and the deceased. Staff informs the Incident Commander promptly about any significant changes in patient status.
2. EOC staff periodically solicits updates on patient status from the field or from the medical treatment facility if that information was not already forthcoming.
3. EOC staff strictly follows patient confidentiality rules.
4. EOC staff identifies and reacts to any delays in patient care.
5. EOC staff coordinates with county and state health agencies and medical services to exchange information about the location and status of all installation personnel who were injured or potentially exposed.
6. EOC staff solicits information from county and State health agencies and medical services regarding the status of any survivors of the incident who were injured or potentially exposed off-post for inclusion in reports to higher headquarters.

References

- AR 360-1: *Army Public Affairs Program* (May 25, 2011)
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- DODI 6025.18, *Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information in DoD Health Care Programs* (March 13, 2019)
- Installation CAIRA Plan
- 45 CFR 160-164 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services regulations on healthcare information privacy)

A.6.6.F

Task: Decontaminate Patients in the Field

Evaluated Component: First responders and Medical Response Team members

Expected Outcome: Team members thoroughly decontaminate patients before transport to a medical treatment facility.

Steps

1. Prepare for decontamination and don PPE.
2. Remove all contamination from the patient:
 - a. Remove all the patient's clothing and belongings, place removed items in labeled bags, and properly secure removed items.
 - b. Decontaminate exposed wounds and eyes before intact skin. Cover wounds with waterproof dressing after decontamination. Decontaminate patient from head to toe, taking care not to introduce contaminants into open wounds.
 - c. Begin with the least aggressive decontamination methods, using soap and warm water. Limit mechanical and chemical irritation of the skin by washing exposed areas gently under a stream of water and scrubbing with a soft brush or surgical sponge.
3. Confirm that staff has removed contaminants to the level that they pose no hazard to the patient or responders.
4. Isolate the patient to prevent the spread of any remaining contaminants and prepare patient for transport to a medical treatment facility.
5. Identify level of decontamination in patient history and identify (i.e., tag) the patient as decontaminated.

References

- CSEPP Medical IPT, *Emergency Medical Service CSEPP Medical Evaluation Guidance* (March 3, 2003)
- Installation CAIRA Plan

A.6.7.F

Task: Transport Patients to a Medical Treatment Facility

Evaluated Component: Medical Response Team members and patient transport workers

Expected Outcomes:

The patient is taken to a medical treatment facility in time to prevent death or permanent incapacitation. Transport vehicles and PPE used by transport personnel are confirmed clean before they are returned to service.

Steps

1. Coordinate patient transport to the on-post medical treatment facility or for direct air or surface transport to an off-post medical treatment facility.
2. If the patient is transported directly to an off-post medical treatment facility, staff will coordinate for patient admission before arrival.
3. Prepare the transport vehicle.
4. Ensure that staff has decontaminated the patient to prevent cross-contamination prior to placing the patient in the transport vehicle.
5. If patient's contamination status was not determined to be free of contamination, don PPE.
6. Coordinate with EOC staff to ensure that patient transfer will occur via a safe route and that drivers expedite the trip through on-post and off-post TCPs and ACPs.
7. Transport patient to the designated medical treatment facility. Continue appropriate treatment during transfer and transport. Provide treatment and patient status updates to the receiving medical treatment facility.
8. Upon arrival at the medical treatment facility, park the transport vehicle in an area the facility designates. Patients should not be brought into the medical treatment facility until staff grants permission.

References

- CSEPP Medical IPT, *Emergency Medical Service CSEPP Medical Evaluation Guidance* (March 3, 2003)
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A.6.8.F

Task: Treat Patients at a Medical Treatment Facility

Evaluated Component: On-post medical treatment facility staff

Expected Outcomes: Staff gives patients appropriate medical treatment consistent with their injuries or extent of agent exposure, stabilizes the patient, and promptly transfers them to off-post medical treatment facilities.

Steps

1. Facility staff meet the transport vehicle upon arrival and begins triage procedures.
2. Staff obtains and reviews patient history. Assess patient's condition, paying special attention to the type and quantity of antidote administered and the method and extent of decontamination.
3. If patient comes directly from the hazard area and the staff has not previously decontaminated him or her, have the decontamination team perform gross and secondary decontamination in the designated area before allowing the patient to enter the treatment facility. Bag, seal, and label patient clothing and effects. Note on the patient history locations on the body where the staff finds contamination (if any). Initial patient survey and stabilization should occur simultaneously for these individuals.
4. If treatment required exceeds the treatment facility's capability, refer patient to an off-post medical treatment facility. Coordinate patient transfer with transport provider and receiving facility.
5. After staff moves the patient into the clean area of the facility, treat presenting signs and symptoms according to good medical practice.
6. Admit, transfer, or discharge patients.
7. Identify and isolate potentially contaminated patients who bring themselves to the treatment facility unannounced or present themselves outside of regular EMS channels.

References

- CSEPP Medical IPT, *Hospital CSEPP Medical Evaluation Guidance* (March 3, 2003)
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A.6.9.E

Task: Notify Next of Kin

Evaluated Component: EOC staff

Expected Outcomes: The next of kin of injured and exposed persons, including fatalities, are promptly notified and their immediate needs are supported. Information about survivors, deceased, or their next of kin are not reported or released unless authorized.

Steps

1. EOC staff determine if survivors or deceased are installation employees, residents, contractors, or visitors and if any are members of the Armed Forces.
2. An Army medical professional or a supervisor positively confirms the identity of patients from the installation before he or she notifies next of kin or releases news that identifies patients by name. This includes those who are deceased.
3. Staff strictly follows patient confidentiality rules.
4. If survivors or deceased are installation employees or residents, EOC staff determines identities of next of kin from official personnel or housing records.
5. EOC staff collects all information needed to contact next-of-kin.
6. The Incident Commander's representative (e.g., senior supervisor or human resource specialist trained in next-of-kin notification) contacts next of kin and provides essential information about the survivor or deceased, following established Army protocols.
7. For military personnel, the staff follows established Army protocols for next-of-kin notifications.
8. The survivor's or deceased's employer or sponsor makes notifications of next of kin of contractors or visitors. EOC staff tracks contractor and visitor next-of-kin notifications to ensure notifications have been accomplished and to ascertain any special circumstances to which the installation needs to respond.
9. Staff follows limitations on releasing the identity of survivors, deceased, and/or next of kin both prior to and following notification.

References

- AR 360-1: *Army Public Affairs Program*, May 25, 2011.
- DoD Directive 6025.LL-R, *DoD Health Information Privacy Regulation*, March 2003.
- Installation CAIRA Plan.
- 45 CFR 160-164 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services regulations on healthcare information privacy).

A.6.10.F

Task: Collect and Decontaminate Human Remains

Evaluated Component: Medical response team members

Expected Outcomes:

Human remains are treated with dignity and respect while being collected, decontaminated, and prepared for unrestricted final arrangements by next of kin.

Steps

1. Human remains are not moved until authorized by the Incident Commander or a designated representative, unless movement is required to prevent destruction of the body or to protect life, safety, or health.
2. A competent medical authority confirms that patients are deceased, confirms their identity, and reports the information to the EOC.
3. Human remains are tagged and moved to a decontamination site when movement is authorized.
4. Personal effects of the deceased are removed, monitored, decontaminated (if possible, without destruction), segregated by contamination status, and secured. Special provisions are made for personal effects that cannot be decontaminated without being destroyed.
5. If remains are identified as potentially contaminated, thoroughly decontaminate remains to ensure there is no hazard in handling. A record is made of methods used for decontamination and for confirming that decontamination is complete.
6. The remains are respectfully contained and properly stored pending arrangements for transfer to a mortuary or other appropriate facility.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *CSEPP Recovery Plan Workbook* (April 2003)
- DA Pam 638-2: *Procedures for the Care and Disposition of Remains and Disposition of Personal Effects* (June 23, 2015)
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A.6.11.E

Task: Coordinate Disposition of Human Remains

Evaluated Component: EOC staff

Expected Outcomes:

Assistance is provided to next of kin to claim the remains of the deceased. Ensure legal requirements for handling human remains are followed.

Steps

1. Receive reports of fatalities from field locations, record the information, and inform the Incident Commander, patient-tracking coordinator, human resources officer, and legal officer. Determine if deceased are installation employees, residents, contractors, or visitors.
2. Contact the coroner or medical examiner to determine if an investigation as to cause of death will be required, if the coroner or medical examiner will require custody of the remains, and if staff may move the remains. See next of kin notification (A.6.9.E).
3. Coordinate Army assistance to the coroner or medical examiner.
4. Track decontamination status and location of remains and personal effects.
5. Determine next-of-kin preferences for movement of remains to a mortuary or other appropriate facility. Assist next of kin in arranging transfer of remains and obtaining personal effects of the deceased.

References

- DA Pam 638-2: *Procedures for the Care and Disposition of Remains and Disposition of Personal Effects* (June 23, 2015)
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- CSEPP Recovery Plan Workbook (April 2003)
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

C.6.1.F

Task: Establish an Incident Command and/or Join a Unified Command

Evaluated Component: Incident Command, structure, staff, and function

Expected Outcomes: An ICS that is equal to the complexity and demands of an event will be established and used at field locations, such as decontamination sites.

Steps

1. Gather information necessary to assess the incident situation.
2. Determine incident objectives and strategy to achieve the objectives.
3. Establish immediate priorities, especially safety, welfare, and accountability, of all people involved in the incident.
4. Establish an Incident Command Post (ICP).
5. Establish, activate, monitor, and modify the ICS organization based upon developing incident.
6. Coordinate and communicate with key team members (e.g., State and local EOCs, Hospital Command Center).
7. Conduct the initial briefing with the Command and General Staff.
8. Confirm personnel exchange all relevant information during scheduled planning meetings or ad hoc, as necessary.
9. Develop and approve implementation of the written or oral Incident Action Plan.
10. Maintain situational awareness and inform command personnel, as appropriate.
11. Direct changes in personnel and resources based on the progression of an incident.
12. Manage incident operations.
13. Approve requests for additional resources and requests for release of resources.
14. Authorize release of information to news media or follow the established process for the jurisdiction (i.e., JIC).
15. Confirm staff completes all documentation created during the incident and disposition is appropriate.
16. Plan for demobilization and ensure demobilization procedures are followed.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- Jurisdiction CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures
- ICS 420-1, *U.S. Fire Administration/National Fire Academy Field Operations Guide (FOG)* (June 2016)

- *Incident Management Team Position Task Book*, FEMA (March 2007)
- *Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response*, OSHA, 29 CFR 1910.120(q)(3)(i)

C.6.2.F

Task: Communication—Medical Staff

Evaluated Component: Emergency medical services staff, medical treatment facility staff

Expected Outcomes: Communication occurs throughout the continuum of care, initially on-post and throughout the emergency management structure.

Steps

1. Receive initial notification and continual status reports using a bidirectional communication exchange.
2. Employ internal communications using redundant systems.
3. Maintain external communications with all engaged medical agencies and the Emergency Management Structures (i.e., JIC, JIS, and EOC)

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- DHHS (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC Recommendations for Civilian Communities near Chemical Weapons Depots: Guidelines for Medical Preparedness: Federal Register, June 27, 1995 (60 FR 33308); see also corrections at 60 FR 38564, July 27, 1995
- *Medical IPT Emergency Medical Service CSEPP Medical Evaluation Guidance* (March 3, 2003)
- Emergency Medical Service Standard Operating Procedure/Protocol
- FEMA CPG 101, version 2, *Developing and Maintaining State, Territorial, Tribal, and Local Government Emergency Plans* (November 2010)
- *Medical IPT Hospital CSEPP Medical Evaluation Guidance* (March 3, 2003)
- Jurisdiction CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures
- *Medical Treatment Facility Emergency Response Plan*
- Occupational Safety and Health Administration, *OSHA Best Practices for Hospital-Based First Receivers of Victims from Mass Casualty Incidents Involving the Release of Hazardous Substances* (January 2005)

C.6.1.E

Task: Communication—EOC/JIC Medical Representative

Evaluated Component: Medical representative in the jurisdictional EOC/JIC

Expected Outcomes: Communication occurs throughout the continuum of care, initially on-post and throughout the emergency management structure.

Steps

1. Transmit and receive continual status reports using a bidirectional communication exchange.
2. Employ redundant communication systems.
3. Maintain external communications with all engaged medical agencies.

References

- *Emergency Medical Service CSEPP Medical Evaluation Guidance* (March 3, 2003)
- FEMA CPG 101, version 2, *Developing and Maintaining State, Territorial, Tribal, and Local Government Emergency Plans* (November 2010)
- *Hospital CSEPP Medical Evaluation Guidance* (March 3, 2003)
- Jurisdiction CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

C.6.3.F

Task: Prepare Medical Treatment Facility to Receive Patients

Evaluated Component: Medical treatment facility staff

Expected Outcomes: The medical treatment facility prepares for the arrival and treatment of patients.

Steps

1. Verify that authorized hospital personnel sign the Exercise Regulatory Compliance Document.
2. Verify updated emergency management plans are in place.
3. Receive notification that an incident has occurred and patients are coming to the facility. If notification comes from other than the usual emergency communications channels, verify the notification.
4. For those individuals donning PPE, staff ensures a roster of trained and medically cleared personnel will be accessible.
5. Organize response using an Incident Command System.
6. Notify all services involved in the plan and mobilize the emergency department.
7. If incoming patients are potentially contaminated or exposed to a chemical agent, implement the hazardous material plan for the facility:
 - a. Prepare decontamination and treatment areas.
 - b. Select PPE and prepare triage, security, and decontamination teams to receive patients.
8. Notify patient transport agencies of any special approach or entrance to the medical facility.
9. Receive initial and follow-up patient information from the incident site and patient transport agencies.
10. Make arrangements to control access to all entrances and exits.
11. Identify and isolate potentially contaminated patients that self-present to the medical treatment facility unannounced or present themselves outside of regular EMS channels.
12. Report medical treatment facilities' preparedness status and their capacity to receive patients to the local EMS coordinator.

References

- CSEPP Medical IPT, *Hospital CSEPP Medical Evaluation Guidance* (March 3, 2003)
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)

- Installation CAIRA Plan
- Memorandum of Agreements among installation medical assets, community transport agencies, and community medical treatment facilities
- 29 CFR 1910.120: *Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response*
- 29 CFR 1910.134: *Respiratory Protection*
- 40 CFR 311: *Worker Protection*

C.6.4.F

Task: Pre-decontamination Triage

Evaluated Component: Decontamination Team

Expected Outcomes: Patients are assessed and triaged for appropriate medical treatment and decontamination.

Steps

1. Establish and set up triage location according to local plans and procedures, paying special attention to contamination control and access control measures.
2. Conduct triage of survivors/patients by determining:
 - a. If they present signs and symptoms of chemical agent exposure;
 - b. If they have been evacuated from the predicted hazard area;
 - c. Time of departure from the predicted hazard area (to determine if they have traveled through the plume); and
 - d. If they request decontamination, even though they have not or are not likely to have been exposed.
3. Properly don PPE to protect from danger due to contamination, blood borne pathogens, bodily fluids, etc.
4. Commence triage procedures according to established procedures.
5. Conduct primary patient. Assign highest priorities to life-threatening issues (airway, antidote, breathing, circulation [AABC]) and decontamination. Except for administration of antidotes, perform invasive procedures only in uncontaminated areas.
6. Conduct secondary patient assessment and establish patient history.
7. Coordinate transportation of patients to a medical treatment facility.
8. Treat presenting signs and symptoms.
9. Reassess patient(s) continuously for possible latent physiological effects of agent exposure.
10. Delay non-life-threatening measures until patient is decontaminated.
11. Prepare patient for transport to medical facility.
12. Provide patient-tracking information in accordance with established protocols and procedures.

References

- *CSEPP Medical IPT Emergency Medical Service CSEPP Medical Evaluation Guidance* (March 3, 2003)

- *CSEPP Medical IPT, Hospital CSEPP Medical Evaluation Guidance* (March 3, 2003)
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *FEMA CPG 101, version 2, Developing and Maintaining State, Territorial, Tribal, and Local Government Emergency Plans* (November 2010)
- Jurisdiction CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures
- *Medical Resource Guide*
- 29 CFR 1910.120: *Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response*
- 29 CFR 1910.134: *Respiratory Protection*
- 40 CFR 311: *Worker Protection*

C.6.5.F

Task: Decontamination and Post-decontamination Triage

Evaluated Component: Decontamination teams and medical treatment facility staff

Expected Outcomes: Personnel properly decontaminate and triage all individuals suspected of contamination.

Steps

1. Establish decontamination area(s) according to local plans and procedures. Pay attention to contamination control measures and availability of continuous water supply, fuel, and electricity.
2. Don correct PPE before starting operations.
3. Separate survivors and/or patients by gender, if sufficient decontamination resources are available, ensuring privacy.
4. Identify and secure personal property (automobiles, etc.). Inform survivors about how to collect their property when officials authorize return to the area.
5. Identify and implement provisions for decontamination of access and functional needs population (e.g., pediatric, hearing impaired, those with service animals, and those requiring assistance for mobility).
6. Direct survivors to remove clothing and belongings. Decontamination teams place removed items in bags, label bags, and secure removed items according to established procedures.
7. Tag, decontaminate, verify cleanliness, and return eyeglasses to individuals.
8. Decontaminate survivors and/or patients using currently accepted standards of care and practice, including appropriate wound decontamination.
9. Provide decontaminated persons with clean and dry clothing. Identify (i.e., tag) survivors and/or patients as decontaminated in accordance with local procedures.
10. If decontaminated survivors and/or patients require medical evaluation, direct them to supporting emergency medical assets for treatment and transport to a medical treatment facility.
11. Triage and reassess individuals following decontamination for signs and symptoms of agent exposure and decontaminate again if needed.
12. Arrange to transport decontaminated individuals to a shelter or medical treatment facility.
13. Assure continuous, 24-hour operations. Provide a transition or situational briefing to later shift personnel before they begin work.
14. Continue survivor and/or patient tracking.
15. Demonstrate responder decontamination and doffing technique.

References

- *CSEPP Medical IPT Emergency Medical Service CSEPP Medical Evaluation Guidance* (March 3, 2003)
- *CSEPP Medical IPT Hospital CSEPP Medical Evaluation Guidance* (March 3, 2003)
- *Medical Resource Guide* (May 9, 2012)
- Jurisdiction CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures
- Occupational Safety and Health Administration, *OSHA Best Practices for Hospital-Based First Receivers of Victims from Mass Casualty Incidents Involving the Release of Hazardous Substances* (January 2005)
- 29 CFR 1910.120: *Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response*
- 29 CFR 1910.134: *Respiratory Protection*
- 40 CFR 311: *Worker Protection*

C.6.6.F

Task: Transport Survivors/Patients to a Shelter or Medical Treatment Facility

Evaluated Component: Emergency medical services personnel or transport entity personnel

Expected Outcomes: Personnel safely transport survivors/patients to an appropriate facility.

Steps

1. Confirm survivors and/or patients have indications they are decontaminated and have appropriate banding or markings as per local protocol.
2. Transport survivors and/or patients to appropriate facilities using appropriate transport resources.
3. Confirm proper survivor and/or patient supervision en route to shelter or medical treatment facility.
4. Initiate or continue medical treatment per local protocol.
5. Identify antidote administration per local protocol.
6. Communicate patient status with receiving medical treatment facility or shelter per local procedure.

References

- CSEPP Medical IPT, *Emergency Medical Service CSEPP Medical Evaluation Guidance* (March 3, 2003)
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- FEMA CPG 101, version 2, *Developing and Maintaining State, Territorial, Tribal, and Local Government Emergency Plans* (November 2010)
- Jurisdiction CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures
- 29 CFR 1910.1030: *Blood borne Pathogens*

C.6.7.F

Task: Treat Patients at a Medical Treatment Facility

Evaluated Component: Medical treatment facility staff

Expected Outcomes: Patients are provided appropriate medical treatment consistent with injuries, illness, and extent of exposure.

Steps

1. Meet the ambulance or transport vehicle upon arrival and begin triage procedures.
2. Obtain and review patient history. Assess the patient's condition, paying special attention to the type and quantity of antidote administered to the method and extent of decontamination.
3. Identify, isolate, and decontaminate patients that arrive unannounced or from outside the EMS system. Perform gross and secondary decontamination in the designated area before the patient is allowed to enter the treatment facility. Bag, seal, and label patient clothing and effects. Initial patient survey and stabilization should occur simultaneously for these individuals.
4. After the patient is moved into the clean area of the facility, treat presenting signs and symptoms in accordance with good medical practice.
5. If treatment required exceeds the treatment facility's capability, refer patient to an appropriate medical treatment facility following all applicable regulatory requirements. Coordinate patient transfer with the accepting facility and transport agency.
6. Admit, transfer, or discharge patients
7. Provide patient tracking and facility bed availability information to the EOC and/or the Emergency Management Agency.

References

- *CSEPP Medical IPT, Hospital CSEPP Medical Evaluation Guidance* (March 3, 2003)
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *FEMA CPG 101, version 2, Developing and Maintaining State, Territorial, Tribal, and Local Government Emergency Plans* (November 2010)
- Jurisdiction CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures
- 29 CFR 1910.120: *Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response*
- 29 CFR 1910.134: *Respiratory Protection*
- 29 CFR 1910.1030: *Blood borne Pathogens*

- 40 CFR 311: *Worker Protection*
- 42 U.S. Code Section 1395dd: *Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA)*, Washington, D.C.

C.6.8.F

Task: Collect and Decontaminate Human Remains

Evaluated Component: Emergency medical service providers and medical treatment facility staff

Expected Outcomes: Staff treats human remains with dignity and respect at all times.

Steps

1. Locate fatalities and provide reports to the EOC.
2. Human remains are not moved until authorized by the Incident Commander, emergency services coordinator, senior leader, or designated representatives unless movement is required to prevent destruction of the body or to protect life, safety, or health.
3. In accordance with appropriate State law, confirm the patient is deceased, confirm the patient's identity if possible, and report this information to the EOC.
4. Tag human remains and move them to a decontamination site when movement is authorized.
5. Remove, monitor, segregate by contamination status, and secure personal effects. Make special provisions for personal effects that cannot be decontaminated.
6. If remains are identified as potentially contaminated, thoroughly decontaminate the remains to ensure no hazard exists in handling. Make a record of methods used for decontamination and for confirming that decontamination is complete.
7. Respectfully contain and properly store human remains pending arrangements for transfer to a mortuary or other appropriate facility according to recommendations from the local medical examiner.
8. Using patient-tracking procedures, report location and status of the remains to the EOC or Emergency Management System.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *CSEPP Recovery Plan Workbook* (April 2003)
- *FEMA CPG 101, version 2, Developing and Maintaining State, Territorial, Tribal, and Local Government Emergency Plans* (November 2010)
- Jurisdiction CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures
- 29 CFR 1910.120: *Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response*
- 29 CFR 1910.134: *Respiratory Protection*
- 29 CFR 1910.1030: *Blood-borne Pathogen*
- 40 CFR 311: *Worker Protection*

C.6.9.E

Task: Track the Location of Survivors, Patients, and Fatalities

Evaluated Component: EOC Staff or EMA Staff

Expected Outcomes:

Accurate survivor, patient, and fatality information is collected; accurate medical treatment facility bed availability information is obtained and legal requirements for handling remains are followed.

Steps

1. Receive medical treatment facility bed availability information and its ability to receive patients.
2. Receive initial and follow-up reports of survivors, patients, and fatalities from field locations, including the following information:
 - a. Numbers of ill, injured, exposed, or deceased persons
 - b. Locations
 - c. Severity of illness
 - d. Decontamination status
3. Record information and inform the Incident Commander, emergency services coordinator, senior leader, or designated representative per local plans.
4. Coordinate Army assistance for installation survivors, patients, and fatalities if applicable.
5. Contact the coroner or medical examiner to determine if the cause of death requires an investigation, if the coroner or medical examiner will require custody of the remains, and if staff can move remains in accordance with State law.

References

- *CSEPP Emergency Medical Service CSEPP Medical Evaluation Guidance* (March 3, 2003)
- *CSEPP Hospital CSEPP Medical Evaluation Guidance* (March 3, 2003)
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *CSEPP Recovery Plan Workbook* (April 2003)
- *Emergency Medical Service Standard Operating Procedure/Protocol*
- FEMA CPG 101, version 2, *Developing and Maintaining State, Territorial, Tribal, and Local Government Emergency Plans* (November 2010)
- Jurisdiction CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures
- Medical Treatment Facility Emergency Response Plan

CSEPP Exercise PPE Regulatory Compliance Document⁴

Please list employees who will participate in CSEPP _____ Community Exercise on (month, day, year) _____.

Each employer is responsible for the safety and health of employees and for providing a safe and healthful workplace for employees. Employers are required to protect employees from anticipated hazards associated with response and recovery operations that employees are likely to conduct.

Signature on this document certifies compliance with all applicable elements, including those of the following:

- 29 CFR 1910.120 (OSHA Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response Standard)
- 29 CFR 1910.134 (OSHA Respiratory Protection Standard)
- 40 CFR 311 (EPA's Parallel Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response Standard)

OR

- Comparable OSHA-approved State Plan regulatory requirements.

Name _____ Title _____

Signature _____ Date _____

⁴ This document applies specifically to persons wearing chemical PPE and respiratory protection.

Outcome 7: Emergency Public Information

This outcome includes all tasks related to dissemination of public health and safety information following initial alert and notification. It includes operation of a Joint Information System, dissemination of information to the media from individual EOCs, staffing and operation of a JIC, and dissemination of information to the media and the public from the JIC.

Table 14: Outcome 7 Evaluation Map

Installation EOC	Installation JIC	State/County EOC	State/County JIC
A/C.7.1.E/J Operate a Joint Information System (JIS)			
A/C.7.3.E/J Disseminate Public Health and Safety Information to the Media		A/C.7.31.E/J Disseminate Public Health and Safety Information to the Media	
A.7.2.E Inform Headquarters Public Affairs Offices			
	A/C.7.2.J Activate and Operate a Joint Information Center (JIC)		A/C.7.2.J Activate and Operate a Joint Information Center (JIC)
	A/C.7.3.J Disseminate Public Health and Safety Information to the Media	C.7.3.E Disseminate Public Health and Safety Information to the Media	A/C.7.3.J Disseminate Public Health and Safety Information to the Media
	A/C.7.4.J Disseminate Public Health and Safety Information Directly to the Public	C.7.4.E Disseminate Public Health and Safety Information Directly to the Public.	A/C.7.4.J Disseminate Public Health and Safety Information Directly to the Public

A/C.7.1.E/J

Tasks: Operate a Joint Information System (JIS)

Evaluated Component: EOC staff and JIC staff

Expected Outcomes: JIC staff and staffs in each jurisdiction EOC and response facility have the latest pertinent information about the event, the response, the situation status, and associated public health and safety information from all other jurisdiction EOCs and response facilities.

Steps

1. Staff reports every response action or situation change within any jurisdiction or response facility that affects any other jurisdiction or response facility and coordinates with the affected jurisdiction or facility. This includes EOCs, schools, reception centers, shelters, hospitals, the JIC, those with access and functional needs, those with limited English proficiency, and Federal response and recovery centers.
2. JIC staff sends information copies of media releases to jurisdiction EOCs and other response facilities according to established plans and procedures.
3. Public Information Officers (PIOs) in jurisdiction EOCs and the JIC monitor the flow of information among the jurisdiction EOCs and response facilities to ensure overall consistency in the public health and safety message. Officials organize JIC staff to support this effort.
4. PIOs in jurisdiction EOCs and the JIC take immediate action with senior officials and/or the media to remedy any instance when public health and safety messages are incomplete or are in conflict.
5. JIC staff communicates directly with named points of contact in all jurisdiction EOCs and response facilities to support operation of the JIS.

References

- 40 CFR 300
- Community JIC/JIS Plan
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- Jurisdiction CAIRA/CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A.7.2.E

Task: Inform Headquarters Public Affairs Offices

Evaluated Component: EOC staff

Expected Outcomes: Army Public Affairs Office (PAO) staffs at all levels have the latest confirmed information about the event, the response, and associated public health and safety information; they are able to advise subordinate commands and the installation about higher headquarters public affairs policy with respect to the event, to respond credibly at the headquarters level to media inquiries should they occur, and to deploy public affairs augmentation to the installation and the JIC as needed

Steps

1. The Army Incident Command PAO reports initial information about the chemical event and the Army response to headquarters' PAOs as soon as possible.
2. The PAO updates headquarters' PAOs promptly when new information about the event and the response (both on-post and off-post) becomes available.
3. The PAO sends copies of Army and off-post media releases to headquarters' PAOs.
4. The PAO informs headquarters' PAOs about trends in media broadcasts and published stories.
5. The PAO implements advice from headquarters' PAOs concerning Army public affairs response to the event.
6. The PAO coordinates deployment and use of Public Affairs augmentation.

References

- AR 360-1: *The Army Public Affairs Program* (May 25, 2011)
- Installation CAIRA Plan

A/C.7.2.J

Task: Activate and Operate a Joint Information Center (JIC)

Evaluated Component: JIC staff

Expected Outcomes: Officials make the JIC operational as soon as possible; this facility then operates continuously with sufficient trained staff, space, equipment, and other capabilities to provide the single best source of information about the event, response by all jurisdictions, and associated public health and safety issues.

Steps

1. Authorized officials direct the activation of the JIC, as appropriate.
2. Officials assign PAOs/PIOs and staff to the JIC according to availability and response priorities.
3. Staff deploys promptly to the JIC. Staff includes professional PAOs, PIOs, spokespersons, and/or representatives from affected jurisdictions.
4. JIC staff opens the JIC facility, establishes security, makes equipment ready for use, and establishes reliable communications with EOCs, other organizations, and facilities. JIC staff arranges space for a media work area, news conferences, and media briefings.
5. JIC staff issues a media release announcing location, purpose, and time the JIC becomes operational (open for business).
6. JIC staff announces time and place for news conferences and media briefings in sufficient time to permit media coverage.
7. JIC staff maintains a record of JIC operations.
8. JIC staff expands as necessary to support continuous uninterrupted operations. Calls to staff to support the expanded JIC include information about safe routes and instructions on shift assignments.
9. JIC staff coordinates arrival and logistics support for the PAO/PIO and augmented support staff and integrates them into JIC operations.

References

- 40 CFR 300
- Community JIC/JIS Plan
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- Jurisdiction CAIRA/CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

Task: Disseminate Public Health and Safety Information to the Media

Evaluated Component: EOC staff and JIC staff

Expected Outcomes: Media and residents have current information about the event, response, and associated public health and safety instructions; information provided is in a format that the public can easily convey and understand; information provides subject matter experts and leadership who can provide competent, credible information; staff identifies rumors, speculation, and misinformation circulating in the media or in the public domain quickly and corrects information.

Steps

1. JIC staff and EOC PIOs gather information about the event, response, and related public health and safety information. Information sources include reports obtained through the JIS; alert and notification system messages, including WEA and IPAWS messages; and media releases disseminated by individual jurisdictions.
2. JIC staff prepares media releases to provide the public with updated or new public health and safety information. These releases describe the JIC as a contact for public health and safety inquiries other than requests for emergency assistance. (Emergency assistance calls go to 9-1-1.) These media releases also identify other public assistance contacts that the staff has established for use during the emergency, such as the American Red Cross or claims offices.
3. JIC staff and EOC PIOs coordinate content of media releases and obtain appropriate approvals prior to dissemination.
4. JIC staff and EOC PIOs disseminate media releases on behalf of all jurisdictions represented in the JIC/JIS.
5. JIC staff and EOC PIOs provide timely, clear, and accurate replies to media inquiries and maintain a record of responses to media inquiries.
6. JIC staff and EOC PIOs monitor traditional media stories and social media for clarity and accuracy.
7. JIC staff and EOC PIOs contact media or produce media releases to amplify, clarify, or correct information that media broadcast or published.
8. JIC staff coordinates with jurisdiction and organization staffs to obtain participation by senior officials and subject matter experts in news conferences and briefings and to arrange suitable times and places for these presentations.
9. JIC staff and EOC PIOs assist Army, State, and local officials and subject matter experts to prepare to meet the media by assuring that they have the most current information and will cover topics of greatest concern during presentations.
10. JIC staff operates joint news conferences and media interviews with officials and subject matter experts. JIC staff will moderate and/or oversee all news conferences

and media interviews to ensure that these presentations are effective and that JIC staff follows up on any new issues or questions generated during the presentations.

References

- 40 CFR 300
- Community JIC/JIS Plan
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *CSEPP Public Affairs Planning Guidance Compendium Workbook*

A/C.7.4.E/J

Task: Disseminate Public Health and Safety Information Directly to the Public

Evaluated Component: EOC staff and Joint Information Center (JIC) staff

Expected Outcomes: The JIC is a credible contact for the public to call for health and safety information; staff refers requests for emergency assistance promptly to the proper jurisdiction.

Steps

1. JIC staff establishes a knowledgeable public call-taker team to respond to inquiries from the public concerning health and safety.
2. JIC staff and EOC PIOs establish a social media monitoring and response capability.
3. Officials keep the social media monitoring and public call-taker team informed in near-real time on latest protective action decisions, emergency alert and notification messages, media releases, and other time-critical information needed to provide credible responses to inquiries.
4. The JIC public call-taker team responds to all public requests for health and safety information promptly and provides correct information. Staff processes public requests for assistance that it cannot support to an appropriate authority and tracks the request until resolved by the appropriate authority. The JIC public call-taker team documents all public inquiry calls and the responses it gave
5. JIC staff and EOC PIOs monitor social media inquiries and contents of calls from the public for trends and issues.
6. JIC staff and EOC PIOs take initiatives to amplify, clarify, or correct emergency alert and notification messages, including WEA and IPAWS messages, and media releases immediately, based on trends and issues it notes in calls from the public.
7. JIC staff disseminates emergency information to those with limited English proficiency.

References

- 40 CFR 300
- Community JIC/JIS Plan
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *Public Affairs Guidebook, second edition* (2014)
- Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
- Executive Order 13166

Outcome 8: Remediation and Recovery

This Outcome includes all tasks associated with the immediate post-emergency period to about 48 hours after the event. Officials intend them to dovetail with existing response-phase Evaluations Guides in Outcomes 1–7. See Appendix F for additional discussion of CSEPP remediation and recovery evaluation.

Evaluation Guides for this Outcome emphasize EOC activities rather than field play for two reasons: First, many field activities are essentially similar to response-phase functions. Second, based on past practice, officials usually exercise the recovery in a tabletop format.

Because many remediation and recovery operations are extensions of response-phase activities, each Evaluation Guide in this Outcome contains a list of related response-phase tasks. For example, remediation and recovery-phase Task C.8.1.E “Limit Access to Restricted Areas” shows as related to response-phase Task C.5.5.E “Direct and Control Activation of Access and Traffic Control Points” and C.5.6.F “Establish Traffic and Access Control Points” because access management is a follow-on to establishing access control.

Table 15: Outcome 8 Evaluation Map

Installation	State/County
	C.8.1.E Limit Access to Restricted Areas
A/C.8.1.E Make Recovery-phase Protective Action Decisions	
	C.8.2.E Make and Implement Ingestion Pathway Protective Action Decisions
	C.8.3.E Arrange Post-emergency Medical Screening
A.8.1.E Initiate Environmental Remediation	C.8.4.E Arrange Temporary Shelter for Evacuees
A.8.2.E Initiate Accident Investigation	C.8.5.E Secure Disaster Assistance for Affected Communities
A/C.8.2.E Coordinate Recovery-phase Monitoring and Sampling	
A/C.8.3.E/J Provide Recovery Information to the Media and the Public	
A.8.3.E Provide Support Services to the Army Community	
A/C.8.4.E Provide Claims Services to the Affected Population	
A/C.8.5.E Implement Unrestricted Re-entry	

A.8.1.E

Task: Initiate Environmental Remediation

Evaluated Component: EOC staff and Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) staff

Expected Outcomes: Staffs initiate procedures for environmental assessment and cleanup in compliance with environmental requirements.

Steps

1. The FOSC receives legal and technical advice with respect to fulfilling environmental remediation requirements.
2. The FOSC identifies cognizant local, State, and/or Federal environmental enforcement agencies under CERCLA and RCRA and makes initial contact to discuss environmental assessment and remediation.
3. The FOSC ensures that field operations at the CAI site include proper procedures for environmental protection (e.g., containment of runoff and containerization of waste with proper labeling).
4. The FOSC begins the process of assembling an administrative record of the response. The record includes the results of monitoring and sample analysis and actions taken to secure and decontaminate the CAI site.

Related Response-Phase Tasks

- A.2.8.E Coordinate Monitoring and Sampling Operations (On- and Off-post)
- A.3.3.E Perform Duties as the Federal On-scene Coordinator (FOSC)
- A.4.3.E Direct and Control Field Response Operations
- A.4.10.F Conduct Agent Containment Operations
- A.4.11.F Mitigate the Effects of the Agent Release

References

- 40 CFR 300
- AR 200-1: *Environmental Protection and Enhancement* (December 13, 2007)
- *CSEPP Recovery Plan Workbook* (April 2003)
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A.8.2.E

Task: Initiate Accident Investigation

Evaluated Component: EOC staff

Expected Outcomes: Staff preserves evidence and initiates a collateral investigation to determine causation, assess liability, and prevent similar occurrences in the future.

Steps

1. Determine whether the collateral investigation will be formal or informal (as defined in AR 15-6) and appoint an investigating officer with a supporting team of advisors.
2. Note the scope of the investigation includes responsibility for the event, effectiveness of emergency response operations, extent of agent contamination, and extent of injuries and property damage.
3. Collect and preserve information regarding the event and the emergency response, including photographs and videotape of the CAI site and the response, narrative accounts from witnesses, weather information, work plans and activity logs, EOC audio tapes, computer files, paper and electronic messages and notes, teardown analysis of equipment, PPE issues, dispersion-modeling results, monitoring and sample analysis results, medical records and lab results, and other relevant data.
4. Establish a filing and data-management system for information collected and begin assembling applicable procedures, plans, regulations, and guides.
5. Maintain coordination among collateral investigation and safety and claims investigations.
6. Coordinate with off-post authorities (local, State, and Federal) regarding any investigations they are conducting.
7. Develop appropriate investigation reports.

Related Response-Phase Tasks

- A.4.5.E Direct and Coordinate Preservation of Evidence and Records of Decisions

References

- AR 15-6: *Procedure for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers* (April 1, 2016)
- AR 50-6: *Chemical Surety* (April 16, 2018)
- DA, AR 385-10: *The Army Safety Program, Rapid Action Revision* (February 24, 2017)
- CSEPP *Accident Investigation Guide* (May 1, 1997)
- DA Pam 27-162: *Claims Procedures* (March 21, 2008)

- DA, Pam 385-40: *Army Accident Investigations and Reporting, Rapid Action Revision* (March 18, 2015)
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A.8.3.E

Task: Provide Support Services to the Army Community

Evaluated Component: EOC staff, plus Army counseling and support staff and veterinary staff, if participating

Expected Outcomes: Staffs offer members of the Army community, including families, counseling, spiritual support, and veterinary services.

Steps

1. Determine the need for and request augmentation for support services, including the following:
 - a. Clergy or counselor support from local community-based programs, support installations, or the AMC Chaplain Crisis Response Team
 - b. Veterinary assets from supporting installations or AMC
2. Provide appropriate information about the event and local circumstances to support requests and detail what resources are needed.
3. Coordinate arrival of and arrange logistic support for requested staff:
 - a. Check-in and in-brief procedures—where and when they check in and who will brief them
 - b. Workspace, billeting, and other support as needed
4. Make arrangements to publicize the availability of support services.
5. Note: Army counseling and support staff provide counseling and religious support to the Army community in coordination with other social service organizations.
6. Note: Army veterinarian services personnel provide medical treatment or euthanasia for on-post livestock, companion animals, and wildlife using appropriate veterinary practices. Coordinate with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and other Federal agencies if endangered species are involved. Provide advice to State and local agriculture or veterinary officials.
7. Keep the Incident Commander informed of support service activities and any problems that require extraordinary action or intervention.

Related Response-Phase Tasks

- A.5.8.E Coordinate Support Services for the Army Community

References

- DA, AR 40-905: *Veterinary Health Services* (August 29, 2006)
- DA, AR 165-1, *Army Chaplain Corps Activities* (June 23, 2015)
- Installation CAIRA Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A/C.8.1.E

Task: Make Recovery-phase Protective Action Decisions

Evaluated Component: On-post and off-post EOC staff and Incident Commander and staff

Expected Outcomes: Designated officials make appropriate and timely protective action decisions.

Steps

1. Obtain information and recommendations from the installation based on computer modeling of the release.
2. Obtain results of on-post and off-post monitoring and sampling. Consider measures such as use of split samples to ensure confidence in analytical results.
3. Consider the possibility of additional hazards response and cleanup operations at the CAI site.
4. Make appropriate and timely decisions regarding areas or particular facilities that initially sheltered: shelter exit and ventilation and/or relocation to a safe area, based on residual risk and other relevant factors.
5. Make appropriate and timely decisions regarding unrestricted re-entry to areas that initially evacuated or subsequently relocated, based on residual risk and other relevant factors.
6. Make appropriate and timely decisions regarding schools, daycare centers, medical facilities, and individuals with access and functional needs in the affected area.
7. Communicate protective action decision and action through PAO/PIO channels
8. Determine when staff may reopen restricted areas of the post and work on suspended operations may resume.

Related Response-Phase Tasks

- A.2.3.E Determine CENL and Off-post PARs
- A.5.1.E Make On-post Protective Action Decisions
- C.5.1.E Make Off-post Protective Action Decisions

References

- 40 CFR 300.
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *CSEPP Recovery Plan Workbook* (April 2003)
- *CSEPP Shelter-in-Place Protective Action Guide Book* (May 12, 2006)
- Jurisdiction CAIRA/CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A/C.8.2.E

Task: Coordinate Recovery-phase Monitoring and Sampling

Evaluated Component: EOC staff.

Expected Outcomes: Staff establishes requirements and priorities, secures resources, and performs interagency coordination for recovery phase monitoring and sampling.

Steps

1. Determine monitoring and sampling needs to support decisions to allow unrestricted re-entry and lift ingestion pathway measures. Coordinate to develop a monitoring and sampling plan that will provide the information needed within a reasonable timeframe.
2. Coordinate with the Army and other analytical facilities as required to secure monitoring, sampling, and analytical resources to implement the monitoring and sampling plan.
3. If State or local observers accompany Army monitoring and sampling teams, make necessary staff assignments and ensure that officials take precautions against the agent hazard. Army and off-post authorities coordinate monitoring and sampling team rendezvous.
4. Coordinate Army and local law enforcement agencies to ensure monitoring and sampling teams have access to public and private property as needed. If law enforcement personnel accompany Army monitoring and sampling teams, make necessary staff assignments and ensure that appropriate precautions are taken against agent hazard.
5. Establish communications protocol for reporting of monitoring and sampling results.
6. Estimate how long it will take to receive results on the entire area affected, considering the area set for sampling, sampling density, and analytical resources available to process samples.
7. Keep stakeholders informed of the progress of monitoring and sampling efforts, how long such efforts will take, and results officials have obtained so far.
8. Establish a protocol for archiving data, decisions, and actions for subsequent analysis, investigations, and reports.

Related Response-Phase Tasks

- A.2.8.E Coordinate Monitoring and Sampling Operations (On- and Off-post)
- C.2.2.E Coordinate Response Phase Monitoring and Sampling

References

- 40 CFR 300

- *CSEPP Off-post Monitoring Integrated Product Team Report* (January 1999)
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- Jurisdiction CAIRA/CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A/C.8.3.E/J

Task: Provide Recovery Information to the Media and the Public

Evaluated Component: EOC staff and JIC staff

Expected Outcomes: Staffs provide information in a timely and complete fashion to the media and the public regarding residual hazards; protective actions; resources, care and services available to the public; and cleanup, remediation, and claims procedures.

Steps

1. Public-information staff gathers information about the recovery.
2. JIC staff coordinates with public-information staff of all organizations involved in the recovery effort.
3. The JIC/JIS will expand, as appropriate, to include agencies/experts in areas such as environmental remediation, claims, and social services.
4. Public-information staff provides recovery information to the public via such methods as news releases, media briefings, social media, and interviews.
5. JIC staff develops a JIC staffing-resource plan for the response, invoking the Emergency Management Assistance Compact if necessary and anticipating the influx of potential public affairs resources and material from the State and/or Federal government.

Related Response-Phase Tasks

- A/C.7.1.E/J Operate a Joint Information System
- C.7.1.E Disseminate Public Health and Safety Information to the Media
- A/C.7.2.J Activate and Operate a Joint Information Center (JIC)
- A/C.7.3.J Disseminate Public Health and Safety Information to the Media
- A/C.7.4.J Disseminate Public Health and Safety Information Directly to the Public

References

- 40 CFR 300
- Community JIC/JIS Plan
- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *Public Affairs Guidebook, second edition (2014)*, Section 3-4
- *CSEPP Recovery Plan Workbook* (April 2003), Section 2.9
- Jurisdiction CAIRA/CSEPP Plan supporting agreements and procedures

A/C.8.4.E

Task: Provide Claims Services to the Affected Population

Evaluated Component: EOC staff, plus Army legal staff, if participating

Expected Outcomes: Staff makes claims services available to on-post and off-post affected populations.

Steps

1. Determine the need for and request augmentation for Army legal staff from supporting organizations and the Army Claims Service.
2. Provide appropriate information about the event and local circumstances to support requests and detail what resources are needed.
3. Coordinate arrival of and arrange logistic support for requested staff:
 - a. Check-in and in-brief procedures—where and when they check in and who will brief them
 - b. Workspace, billeting, and other support as needed
4. Make arrangements to publicize the availability of claims services support for both on-post and off-post populations affected by the event.
5. Note: Army legal staff take claims from persons who allege that they have suffered losses as a result of the event.
6. Keep the Incident Commander informed about claims services support activities and any problems that require extraordinary action or intervention.

Related Response-Phase Tasks

- A.5.9.E Coordinate Claims Services for the Affected Population.

References

- 40 CFR 300
- AR 27-20: *Claims* (February 8, 2008)
- *CSEPP Accident Investigation Guide* (May 1, 1997)
- *CSEPP Recovery Plan Workbook* (April 2003)
- DA Pam 27-162: *Claims Procedures* (March 2008)
- Jurisdiction CAIRA/CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

A/C.8.5.E

Task: Implement Unrestricted Re-entry

Evaluated Component: EOC staff

Expected Outcomes: Staff makes decisions to allow unrestricted re-entry to formerly restricted zones and provides direction to implement these decisions in a safe and timely manner.

Steps

1. As areas are determined to be safe for unrestricted re-entry, formulate new borders for the restricted zone based on familiar landmarks and boundaries.
2. Adjust traffic and access control points based on the new boundaries.
3. Develop and disseminate public instructions to allow unrestricted re-entry and describe the new boundaries.

Related Response-Phase Tasks

- A.5.3.E Direct and Control Protection of the Post Population
- C.5.5.E Direct and Control Activation of Access and Traffic Control Points
- C.5.6.F Establish Traffic and Access Control Points
- C.7.1.E Disseminate Public Health and Safety Information to the Media
- A/C.7.3.J Disseminate Public Health and Safety Information to the Media

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *CSEPP Recovery Plan Workbook* (April 2003)
- Jurisdiction CAIRA/CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

C.8.1.E

Task: Limit Access to Restricted Areas

Evaluated Component: EOC staff

Expected Outcomes: Staff directs emergency workers to access restricted areas off-post in a controlled and safe way to perform vital missions, such as rescue, monitoring, or infrastructure assessment and repair.

Steps

1. Set policies regarding approval of emergency missions in the restricted areas to allow essential functions to be performed while minimizing risk to emergency workers. Assign responsibility for operational management of controlled access.
2. Direct establishment and staffing of semi-permanent checkpoints for controlled access.
3. Establish procedures for restricted re-entry, including login and logout, stay-time limits, use of PPE, buddy system, rescue standby, and medical standby as required.
4. Secure communications resources as needed to ensure that teams entering a restricted area can communicate with a base outside the area.
5. Arrange for monitoring as needed to establish safe paths, accompany entry teams, or otherwise support safe re-entry to the restricted area.
6. Set policies as needed regarding the public's access to the restricted area (e.g., to care for or retrieve animals, shut down critical plant operations, secure business records, or perform other errands).
7. Keep the PIO informed of the progress of missions performed in the restricted area and policies regarding access to the restricted area.
8. Keep operations managers and decision makers informed of the progress of missions performed in the restricted area.

Related Response-Phase Tasks

- C.5.5.E Direct and Control Activation of Access and Traffic Control Points
- C.5.6.F Establish Traffic and Access Control Points

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- CSEPP Recovery Plan Workbook (April 2003)
- Jurisdiction CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

C.8.2.E

Task: Make and Implement Ingestion Pathway Protective Action Decisions

Evaluated Component: EOC staff and Incident Commander and staff

Expected Outcomes: Staff makes decisions to protect the public from exposure to chemical agent via ingestion and to maintain the market value of products from nearby unaffected areas.

Steps

1. Identify possible chemical agent ingestion pathways such as water intakes, farms, and food processing and distribution facilities in the affected area.
2. Determine appropriate emergency and preventive control actions to prevent ingestion of agent (e.g., water-intake shutoff, food embargo).
3. Coordinate decision making among appropriate authorities and technical agencies, including State and local chief executives and local, State, and Federal agricultural, food safety, and public health agencies.
4. Determine appropriate measures to implement ingestion pathway PADs and identify resources to implement them.
5. Secure alternate water or food supplies as needed for affected persons.
6. Issue appropriate instructions and information to the public.
7. Embargo products from potentially affected areas as needed. Coordinate with law enforcement, transportation companies, and agricultural marketers to implement embargo decisions.
8. Coordinate with local farm co-ops, agricultural producer's associations, marketing organizations, and other organizations as appropriate to develop measures to address reputation damage.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *CSEPP Recovery Plan Workbook* (April 2003)
- Jurisdiction CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

C.8.3.E

Task: Arrange Post-emergency Medical Screening

Evaluated Component: EOC staff

Expected Outcomes: Staff makes arrangements for area hospitals and clinics to provide medical screening for persons the emergency affects.

Steps

1. Develop system and arrange for resources to screen large numbers of persons.
2. Determine criteria for prioritizing screening, for example, residence or employment within a zone subject to protective actions.
3. Arrange for transportation of persons to and from relocation centers, as needed.
4. Ensure that officials keep a record of each person screened, whether or not the person requires any further treatment
5. Publicize availability of screening through public information releases and by contacting organizations' operating mass care facilities.
6. Prepare for the ongoing possibility of exposure to emergency or remediation workers.

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- CSEPP Recovery Plan Workbook (April 2003)
- Jurisdiction CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

C.8.4.E

Task: Arrange Temporary Shelter for Evacuees

Evaluated Component: EOC staff

Expected Outcomes: Staff makes arrangements for appropriate shelter for evacuees the emergency will displace for more than a day or two.

Steps

1. Determine the approximate number of on-post and off-post residents the emergency may displace from their regular residences for more than a day or two. Estimate the number who will require longer-term temporary shelter.
2. Assess whether already open emergency shelters will serve as longer-term temporary shelters.
3. Assess whether the longer-term temporary shelter meets the needs of all population groups, including persons with access and functional needs.
4. Arrange for additional, appropriate longer-term temporary shelters as needed based on the above assessments. Coordinate with the American Red Cross and other relief organizations as appropriate.
5. Coordinate with social service organizations and school districts to ensure continuity of services for displaced persons. Because of the disruption of ordinary routines, displaced persons may need social assistance such as transportation, child care, meals on wheels, or other services.
6. Arrange for security at longer-term temporary shelters.
7. Arrange for care and shelter as needed for companion animals.
8. Publicize the availability of assistance through public information announcements.
9. Maintain record of expenses.

Related Response-Phase Tasks:

- C.5.13.E Activate a Shelter

References

- *CSEPP Program Guidebook* (2019)
- *CSEPP Recovery Plan Workbook* (April 2003)
- Jurisdiction CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

C.8.5.E

Task: Secure Disaster Assistance for Affected Communities

Evaluated Component: EOC staff

Expected Outcomes: Staff begins administrative procedures for securing compensation to those the emergency affects, including members of the public, medical facilities, businesses, and units of government.

Steps

1. Note off-post officials work with Army officials to secure compensation to evacuees for evacuation expenses and set up a mechanism for distributing this compensation.
2. Work with Army and FEMA officials to establish a Disaster Recovery Center (DRC) or other mechanism to process requests for individual assistance.
3. Begin the process of evaluating losses to State and local government, including response and recovery costs, damage to facilities, and losses because of decreased tax revenue.
4. Inform the public about the requirement to document their losses and availability of the DRC (or other mechanism) for receiving claims and requests for assistance.

Related Response-Phase Tasks

- A.3.5.E Request and Coordinate Additional Response Support
- C.3.4.E Prepare, Sign, and Transmit Emergency Declaration
- A.5.9.E Coordinate Claims Services for the Affected Population

References

- *CSEPP Recovery Plan Workbook* (April 2003)
- Jurisdiction CSEPP Plan and supporting agreements and procedures

Appendix D: Alignment of Emergency Response Outcomes with National Preparedness Goal, Core Capabilities

Alignment Overview

The *National Preparedness Goal* defines what it means for the whole community to be prepared for all types of disasters and emergencies. The goal itself is succinct: “A secure and resilient nation with the capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.” These risks include events such as natural disasters, disease pandemics, chemical spills and other human-caused hazards, terrorist attacks, and cyber-attacks.

In addition to defining the goal, the *National Preparedness Goal* describes 32 activities, called core capabilities, which address the greatest risks to the nation. The *National Preparedness Goal* organizes the core capabilities into the five mission areas—prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery—based on where they most logically fit.

These capabilities are referenced in many national preparedness efforts and are intended to assist everyone who has a role in achieving elements within the goal. As such, the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program has aligned the *CSEPP Exercise Implementation Guidance* (2019) Emergency Response Outcomes (EROs) to the core capabilities; the alignment is illustrated on the ERO–Core Capabilities Map explained in the next section.

Recognizing that preparedness is a shared responsibility—not just the responsibility of the government—the intended audience for this alignment document is the whole community because preparedness efforts involve and affect the whole community. The *National Preparedness System* outlines an organized process for everyone in the whole community to move forward with their preparedness activities and achieve the *National Preparedness Goal*. The alignment depicts how the whole community can validate its capabilities to identify gaps in plans, continue to build and sustain capabilities, as well as progress toward meeting preparedness goals.

ERO-Core Capabilities Map Explanation and Instructions

The following ERO–Core Capabilities Map links each Exercise Evaluation Guide (EEG) to one or more core capability.

Specifically, along the left side of the summary and subsequent ERO pages, the mission areas and associated core capabilities are listed and color-coded for clarity. For example, the common mission area and planning, public information and warning, and operational coordination core capabilities are shaded in purple, indicating that these core capabilities are associated with the common mission area. (With the exception of the common mission area, the color scheme follows that which is used in the *2016 National*

Preparedness Report). Along the top of the summary and subsequent pages the EROs and EEGs are listed, an “X” denotes the ERO and EEG associated with one or more of the core capabilities.








Table 16: Alignment of Emergency Response Outcomes with Core Capabilities by Mission Areas

Alignment of Emergency Response Outcomes with Core Capabilities by Mission Areas										
Core Capabilities			CSEPP Emergency Response Outcomes (ERO)							
			ERO 1	ERO 2	ERO 3	ERO 4	ERO 5	ERO 6	ERO 7	ERO 8
Mission Areas	Common	Planning	X		X		X			X
		Public Information and Warning	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
		Operational Coordination	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
	Prevention	Intelligence and Information Sharing		X	X		X			
		Interdiction and Disruption								
		Screening, Search, and Detection		X						
		Forensics and Attributions				X				
	Protection	Intelligence and Information Sharing		X	X		X			
		Interdiction and Disruption								
		Screening, Search, and Detection								
		Access Control and Identity Verification								X
		Cybersecurity								
		Physical Protective Measures	X				X			
		Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities	X							
		Supply Chain Integrity and Security								
	Mitigation	Community Resilience	X							
		Long-term Vulnerability Reduction								
		Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment								
		Threat and Hazards Identification		X			X			
	Response	Infrastructure Systems	X							
		Critical Transportation	X				X	X		
		Environmental Response/Health and Safety	X	X		X	X	X		X
		Fatality Management Services						X		
		Fire Management and Suppression				X				
		Logistics and Supply Chain Management	X		X					X
		Mass Care Services					X			X
		Mass Search and Rescue Operations				X				
		On-scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement					X			
		Operational Communications	X	X	X		X	X	X	
		Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services						X		
		Situational Assessment	X	X	X	X	X			
	Recovery	Infrastructure Systems								
		Economic Recovery								X
		Health and Social Services					X			
		Housing								X
		Natural and Cultural Resources								

Alignment of Emergency Response Outcomes with Core Capabilities and Community Lifelines

There are a number of inputs that should shape the exercise design: threat and hazard assessment, preparedness review; desired capabilities, and gap analysis, to name a few. Because one of the major purposes to exercise is to build, assess, and validate capabilities, CSEPP Emergency Response Outcomes (EROs) should align to the *National Preparedness Goal's* 32 core capabilities. Similarly, these response outcomes should align with and support assessing capabilities associated with the National Response Framework's Community Lifelines⁵ to ensure the exercises provide the desired data.

Table 17: Alignment of Emergency Response Outcomes with Core Capabilities and Community Lifelines

		LIFELINES							
CORE CAPABILITIES									
MISSION AREA	COMMON	Planning	ERO 1	ERO 1	ERO 1	ERO 1	ERO 1	ERO 1	
		Public Information and Warning	ERO 7	ERO 7	ERO 7	ERO 7	ERO 7	ERO 7	
		Operational Coordination	ERO 2, 3, 5	ERO 5	ERO 5	ERO 5	ERO 2, 3, 5, 6	ERO 5	ERO 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
	RESPONSE	Infrastructure Systems	ERO 1	ERO 1	ERO 1	ERO 1	ERO 1	ERO 1	ERO 1
		Critical Transportation					ERO 5	ERO 2, 3, 4, 5	
		Environmental Response/Health and Safety	ERO 2, 5		ERO 6				ERO 2, 4, 6
		Fatality Mgt Services	ERO 6		ERO 6				
		Fire Mgt and Suppression	ERO 5						
		Logistics and Supply Chain Mgt		ERO 5					
		Mass Care Services		ERO 5					
		Mass Search and Rescue Ops	ERO 5						
		On-scene Security, Protection, and LE	ERO 3, 4, 5						
		Operational Communications					ERO 3, 5, 7		
		Public Health, Healthcare, and EMS	ERO 6		ERO 6				
		Situational Awareness							
	RECOVERY	Infrastructure Systems	ERO 8	ERO 8	ERO 8	ERO 8	ERO 8	ERO 8	ERO 8
		Economic Recovery							
Health and Social Services									
Housing									
Natural and Cultural Resources									

ERO 1
Preparedness

ERO 2
Emergency Assessment

ERO 3
Emergency Management

ERO 4
Hazard Mitigation

ERO 5
Protection

ERO 6
Survivor and Patient Care

ERO 7
Emergency Public Information

ERO 8
Remediation and Recovery

Alignment of Emergency Response Outcomes with Emergency Support Functions

Many emergency operations centers (EOCs) are organized using the 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). This could challenge evaluator teams in their understanding of

⁵ Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2019. *Community Lifelines Implementation Toolkit*. Accessed online October 3, 2019. https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1550596598262-99b1671f270c18c934294a449bcca3ce/Tab1b.CommunityLifelinesResponseToolkit_508.pdf

participant (player) locations and functions, and lack of understanding of the ERO/ESF relationship may hinder the evaluator's ability to observe those tasks that fall within a specific ERO. This appendix was created to assist EOC evaluation teams in understanding how ESFs fit within each of the eight EROs and to aid EOC lead evaluators in making team assignments (see Figure 16).



Figure 16: CSEPP Emergency Response Outcome (ERO) to Emergency Support Function (ESF) Linkages

Appendix E: Public Information Planning for CSEPP Exercises

Purpose

The purpose of the public information plan is to provide guidance and procedures for real-world media and public information activities related to Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) exercises. The exercise provides real-world media an opportunity to understand the capabilities and effectiveness of emergency public information systems, plans, procedures, facilities, and personnel. The team should attempt to interest real-world media in the exercise and allow them controlled access to exercise play.

Goals

The goals of the public information plan are:

- Development of a site-specific, real-world media plan to ensure that participants coordinate, integrate, and control real-world media interactions in the exercise to minimize their effect on exercise play; and
- To afford real-world media the opportunity to observe the exercise to understand that local, State, and Federal governments, through a comprehensive exercise program, have an organized means of responding to and recovering from a chemical accident or incident (CAI).

Objectives

Real-world media coverage of CSEPP exercises provide the opportunity for the CSEPP community to do the following:

- Build trust in the community by demonstrating that CSEPP partners have plans and procedures that are used to respond to a CAI.
- Increase awareness of the public living in the vicinity of chemical weapons stockpiles of the risk the stockpile poses (including discussion of the reduced risk because of successful demilitarization efforts).
- Increase awareness in the community that CSEPP partners have alert and notification systems in place and the systems are tested regularly.
- Demonstrate to residents through positive real-world media coverage that protective actions are in place to keep residents safe from a chemical accident.
- Demonstrate the ability to disseminate information to the public in the event of a CAI.
- Demonstrate that a high degree of cooperation exists among all responding organizations in the dissemination of life-saving information to the public through real-world media and other channels.

- Inform the public about government and volunteer response capabilities in the event of a CAI.
- Generate interest in individual and family emergency preparedness activities as they relate to a CAI and to learn proper responses.
- Provide participating organizations and volunteers with public recognition for their serious commitment to multi-hazard preparedness by local, State, Federal, and volunteer agencies.
- Educate real-world media, local officials, and the general public on the critical role they have in a community's disaster response and recovery.

Guidelines for Response to Real-World Media Interest

- The Exercise Planning Team will closely coordinate all real-world media exercise activities and include them as a part of the exercise plan. The Exercise Co-Directors will approve variations to the coordinated activities in the exercise plan.
- The Exercise Planning Team is responsible for real-world media coordination.
- Multimedia public information activities will encourage real-world media exercise involvement aimed at various target groups. These activities may include news releases, formal briefings, displays, and guided tours. Attachment E-1 (page E-5) lists a variety of potential activities that may be adapted to each exercise event.
- Specific strategy and timing for each activity depend upon a variety of local conditions (e.g., number and level of real-world media and public interest and number of visitors, etc.). Attachment E-2 (page E-23) provides suggested timelines for publicity activities.
- All contact with real-world media should be through the appropriate public affairs officers (PAOs) or public information officers (PIOs). The planning team should provide PAOs/PIOs' telephone numbers to all persons involved in the exercise.
- Real-world media representatives should be informed that they should not question players, controllers, or evaluators or interrupt exercise play in any way. In addition, the planning team should brief all exercise staffs, players, controllers, and evaluators on how to contact real-world media and handle queries from them. The Exercise Co-Directors must approve any variations in this procedure in advance.
- As with any exercise, the purpose is to demonstrate the use of CSEPP-provided equipment, communications, and response capabilities and to determine where improvements in coordination and capability are necessary. The planning team should discourage real-world media from viewing the exercise as an "exam" with a specific grade. Put simply, if the planning team finds opportunities for improvement, the exercise will be a success.
- All organizations should be prepared to respond to real-world media interest in the exercise and make provisions to meet the needs of real-world media outside of exercise play. This requires providing staff, materials, and facilities to respond to real-world media interest without affecting exercise play and with only the minimal

involvement of exercise participants, including public information exercise players (see Attachment E-3 beginning on page E-25).

- In coordination with the Exercise Planning Team, the team may allow real-world media-controlled access to the exercise environment for photographic purposes and to determine for themselves the extent of realism the team is demonstrating. The team will accomplish this through escorted tours of the exercise area or an area set aside that allows real-world media to view the exercise but limits interaction with exercise participants. Before the planning team takes real-world media on post, real-world media must complete post-security procedures prior to the day of the exercise. Areas to consider for visits or tours include the following:
 - Joint Information Center (JIC)
 - County Emergency Operating Center (EOC)
 - Installation EOC
 - Traffic control point (TCP) and access control point (ACP)
 - Reception center or shelter
 - Decontamination site
 - Hospitals
- PIOs from other CSEPP communities, because of their knowledge and experience, can serve as real-world media escorts if local PIOs are not available.
- Technical experts not playing in the exercise should be available at various exercise locations to assist real-world media escorts in addressing inquiries.
- Real-world media will not attend mock media news conferences, briefings, interviews, or any other mock media activities or interactions with the players.
- The planning team should make every effort to gauge the potential level of real-world media interest and allocate personnel and resources necessary to meet the needs of the real-world media.
- The Exercise Planning Team should prepare real-world media kits. See Attachment E-3 (page E-25) to this plan for suggested real-world media kit materials.
- Organizations should designate a location for real-world media activities, such as briefings and interviews. This location will be separate from but in close proximity to exercise play. This will allow for real-world media to view the exercise as well as to receive briefings and interviews without interrupting the exercise.

Pre-Exercise, Real-World Media Release

The on-post PAO and host off-post jurisdiction staffs should jointly prepare a news release or media advisory announcing time, date, location, purpose, and general scope of the exercise. The news release also should include supplementary details on the exercise, planning, exercise preparations, participants, and facilities of interest. Other participating organizations will coordinate the news release prior to issuing it. The planning team should reach an agreement on who issues the initial news release or media advisory. The

team should distribute it to real-world media at a date and time it agrees upon prior to the exercise and make it available, along with other materials, during the exercise.

Attachment E-1: Recommended Public Information Activities

Pre-Exercise

The following elements are to be developed before the exercise:

- **Extent-of-Play Agreement:** The JIC/Joint Information System (JIS) trusted agent will identify conditions that the planning team will use to develop, conduct, control, and evaluate the CSEPP Community Exercise, as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Exercise Co-Director and jurisdiction public information community agrees. The “Expected Level of Conduct Participation” section of extent of play agreements (XPAs) addresses planning for real-world media. See Appendix B: CSEPP Guide for Exercise Extent of Play Agreements for an example of the JIC/JIS XPA agreement.
- **Master Scenario Event List (MSEL):** The MSEL includes protocols based on individual injects to support and drive exercise play. The MSEL contains specific information regarding time the expected action is to occur, the method of delivery (e.g., telephone, radio, social media), the scripted event the player is to react to (i.e., the event synopsis), and any applicable special instructions needed to demonstrate the expected action. The MSEL identifies core capabilities for demonstration.
- **Social Media Plan:** The Social Media plan portion of the Exercise Plan (ExPlan) must consider both player and controller/evaluator requirements. See an example of the social media plan on page E-9.
- **Real-World Media Plan:** The planning team may provide the media an opportunity to meet with key personnel at exercise locations; such activities should be included in the real-world media plan. This plan should be designed to ensure minimal impact to the conduct of the exercise. See an example of the public information plan on page E-7.
- **Real-World Media Advisory:** The planning team should send a news advisory with background materials designed to heighten interest of the exercise to local real-world media. The team should invite real-world media to cover the exercise and set briefing and tour times specifically tailored for real-world media. See an example of the real-world media advisory on page E-13.
- **News Release:** The planning team should develop and send out a news release that announces the CSEPP exercise and details expected activities and times and dates they will occur. The team should follow up with phone calls 2 days later to encourage support and coverage. See an example of the news release on page E-15.
- **Itinerary:** The planning team should develop an itinerary for real-world media and observers and will coordinate this itinerary with the jurisdictions so that it is aware of anticipated visits and activities. The planning team will publish this itinerary in the ExPlan and provide it to the Lead Evaluator/Controller at each location. See an example of the media tour itinerary on page E-19.
- **Pre-Exercise Briefings:** A detailed briefing should be provided the day before or on the morning of the exercise for real-world media. This briefing will provide

guidelines for interaction with players, scenario overview, tour details, and media kits and answer specific questions.

During Exercise

The following occurs during the exercise:

- **Tours and Briefings:** A well-organized tour and briefing program should be scheduled with skilled and informed briefers and tour guides. Tours should include critical areas (as identified in the Guidelines for Response to Real-World Media Interest section) such as EOCs and the JIC. Consider any site that is visually interesting. Officials should coordinate these activities with the Exercise Planning Team.

Post-Exercise

The following should be developed after the exercise:

- **Post-Exercise News Release:** This news release should be considered as an opportunity to acknowledge support, hard work, and dedication of responders, volunteers, and public officials.

Example of a Public Information Plan

Highlighted text in this example indicates which information the jurisdiction should update. This plan is included in the ExPlan, and all appropriate jurisdictions should be oriented to it.

Goal

The goal of this public affairs plan is to provide the media with information and photo opportunities during XXX Community CSEPP Exercise 201X, to be held on Month Date, Year. Keeping the media informed on CSEPP activities will help ensure that the public receives positive information and education regarding the combined efforts of Federal, State, county, and Department of the Army response relative to a chemical accident or incident at XXX/BGAD.

The media advisory and exercise news release the joint members of the XXX community issue will contain points of contact for the exercise at XXX/BGAD; the State of XXX; XXX County, and FEMA Region XXX. Public information and public affairs officers may make follow-up calls to media representatives to ensure receipt of the news release and determine the planned media coverage of the event.

Pre-Exercise

The FEMA PIO will work with exercise trusted agents and fellow PIO/PAOs to identify media opportunities and a guided real-world media tour itinerary. The planning team will recruit a real-world media escort team to guide the tour and respond to media queries on the day of the exercise.

The PIOs/PAOs will prepare a media advisory, news release, and media packets by to support the annual CSEPP exercise.

PIOs/PAOs will create additional awareness for the media, public and fellow response partners by periodically mentioning the upcoming exercise on their social media sites during (insert month).

- (insert date): Two weeks prior to the exercise, the planning team will distribute a media advisory describing the event and coverage opportunities. Planning team members will ask the media to make prior arrangements for covering the event.
- (insert date): The county PIO and depot PAO will distribute a media release about the exercise in time to allow for publication on (insert date). The news release will inform the media and public about the basics of the exercise, including who, what, why, when, how, and where.
- (insert date): The assigned PIO/PAO will re-release the media advisory about the exercise and follow up with telephone calls to the media to confirm real-world media tour participation and address any questions from the media.

Prior to the exercise, PIOs/PAO will respond to queries. During this time, they will continue to use their available social media sites to encourage the public to prepare (exercise) along with their emergency responders.

Public Affairs During the Exercise

The planning team will ask news media representatives to register and obtain badges at a time and location to be determined. They will then proceed for visits in accordance with the scheduled itinerary for the media previously decided. Representatives of the previously mentioned exercise public affairs staff will escort them at all times during coverage of the exercise.

The planning team must make prior arrangements for any planned visits to emergency operations centers. The planning team should coordinate arrangements for separate media interviews with the other jurisdictions. The planning team will require media personnel who desire to participate to do the following:

- Attend briefings and go on tours pre-arranged for them.
- Have escorts at all times within the “exercise area.”
- Not interact with the exercise players during the exercise.
- Wear a distinct prominently displayed identifying badge.
- Have the planning team direct all real-world media contacts to the supporting real-world media escort team.
- The real-world media escort team, representing the XXX CSEPP community, Army, and FEMA, will be responsible for answering all real-world media queries as well as coordinating media activities.

Post-Exercise Public Affairs

XXX Community PIOs/PAOs and other appropriate officials will be available after the exercise to answer questions from the media.

The planning team will release the final exercise report approximately 60 days after the exercise. It may release the final report to the media upon request. It will communicate media requests for copies of the report and coordinate them between the XXX Community PIOs/PAOs. The organization recommends that it provide a news release outlining the report's conclusions in addition to the report.

Example of a Social Media Plan

This example of a social media plan covers how social media will be employed during the **XXX** CSEPP Community Exercise **(insert year)**, to be held **(insert date)**, and can be used as a template for developing a social media plan specific to a given exercise. The goal of the social media plan is to provide players, controllers, and evaluators with information on how social media tools will be used as part of emergency public information play.

Social Media Play

All social media play occurs in a safe, controlled environment. Exercise-specific accounts using real-world social media tools (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, Hootsuite) have been created. To make sure exercise communications remain secure, these accounts are closed and protected so that posts are only visible to approved participants.

Exercise accounts serve as stand-ins for social media sites that agencies own and operate in the real world. During the exercise, players will use the accounts in the same way they would in an actual event, i.e., to share information, gather intelligence, engage with the public, etc. This allows for practices and procedures to be tested in a realistic environment, with the goal of identifying what works well and what changes may be necessary.

Simulated social media messages will also be generated and disseminated during the exercise by the Simulation Cell (SimCell) and mock media controllers to reflect what the public and media would be saying during an actual emergency. Some messages are pre-scripted by the Exercise Planning Team to drive play and are injected by the SimCell at pre-determined times. Other messages are written in real time based on how the exercise play is unfolding and in response to player actions.

The following social media accounts will be used during the **XXX** Chemical Depot exercise in 2019:

- Mock media:
 - “Chuck Exercise Taylor” posts on Facebook represent news reports and questions from Mock Media reporters.
 - “Exercise Training Network” (@ExerciseNews) posts on Twitter represent news reports and questions from Mock Media reporters.
- SimCell:
 - Posts (concerns, questions and situational reports) from citizens or businesses within the community will be simulated using the following:
 - Facebook: “Bill Simcell” and “Katie Simcell”
 - Twitter: “@SimcellPublic” and “@PublicSimcell”.
- Players: Players listed in Table 18 have the ability to monitor and simulate official posts and responses using the accounts listed.

Table 18: Exercise Players (Example)

Player/Agency	Facebook	Twitter	Blog
American Red Cross	ARC Helper	@XXXARCEX	
ARES/RACES and the XXX City County Health Department	Mary JIC XXX	@XXXJicEx3	
CMA HQ	CMA Edgewood	@CMAHQExercise	
National Weather Service	Paul JIC XXX	@XXXJicEx2	
XXX Animal Services	Annie Mal Helper	@XXXAnimalEX	
XXX JIC	XXX Exercise JIC	@XXXEXJIC	XXXEmergency.info
XXX Chemical Depot	XXX CMA	@XXXArmyExercise	
XXX City Fire and/or the JIS Strike Team PIO supporting Incident Command for the off-post Flood scenario	Peter JIC XXX	@XXXJicEX1	
State of XXX	XXX EX	XXXEmergencyEX	XXXEmergencyExercise.s.blogspot.com

Players listed in Table 19 will monitor for situational awareness but are not expected to send messages or respond to inquiries using the accounts listed.

Table 19: Exercise Players Not Sending or Receiving Messages (Example)

Player/Agency	Facebook	Twitter	Blog
XXX State Patrol	Amy Observe	@ExObservation2	
XXX Medical Center	Andy Observe	@ExObservation3	

- Observers
 - Evaluators and other exercise control staff will be able to monitor exercise social media play using pre-assigned Facebook and Twitter accounts. They should observe only and not attempt to engage with players. Accounts available for assignment by exercise control include the following:
 - Facebook: Adam Observe, Jack Observe, and Jill Observe
 - Twitter: @EXObservation4, @EXObservation5 and @EXObservation6

Prior to the Exercise

FEMA Region XXX and mock media representatives worked directly with players during the planning phase, either one-on-one or as part of a scheduled community training, to establish secure exercise accounts and link them with those of other participants. Additional pre-exercise technical assistance was also available, including conducting drills to practice social media play.

Prior to the exercise, players will do the following:

- Create agency or organization EXERCISE accounts on Facebook and Twitter (and other social media sites if desired). The use of exercise-specific social media accounts is important because they:
 - Provide an opportunity to practice using real social media platforms in a controlled environment;
 - Avoid confusing existing followers with exercise information on already-established official accounts; and
 - Allow players to learn how to use these platforms more effectively in real emergencies.
- It is critical that emergency public information come from official, credible sources. Players should not use personal accounts because, in an actual emergency, social media followers will question whether accurate and official information is being disseminated.
- It is important to identify who within the agency or organization will be responsible for posting exercise-related emergency public information to Facebook and Twitter and who will be responsible for monitoring and responding to social media accounts used by other exercise participants.
- Using agency or organization EXERCISE accounts, players should request to be Facebook friends with Bill Simcell, Katie Simcell, and Chuck Exercise Taylor and to follow @ PublicSimcell, @SimcellPublic, and @ExerciseNews on Twitter.
- Using agency or organization exercise accounts, players should request to be Facebook friends and Twitter followers with other EXERCISE partners.

During the Exercise

- Players should login to their EXERCISE social media accounts at the start of the exercise and regularly monitor active sites throughout the incident period, responding as they would in a real event (e.g., answering questions, correcting misinformation, addressing rumors, etc.).
- Players should post exercise-related emergency public information to their EXERCISE Facebook and Twitter accounts as they would in a real event.
- Players should monitor all other exercise-related social media accounts and engage with them as they would in a real-world event.

This page intentionally left blank.

Example of a Media Advisory for the Exercise

This example is from the 2017 Pueblo Chemical Depot exercise. Highlighted text indicates which information the jurisdiction should update for the site, the exercise, and the year.



COLORADO

**Division of Homeland Security
& Emergency Management**

Department of Public Safety

Media Advisory – Not for Release

Contact: Pueblo Chemical Depot
Office of Public Affairs
(719) 549-4118 or 549-4135
Date: **Insert Date**

MEDIA OPPORTUNITY ADVISORY

WHAT: Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) Exercise
Nearly 2,000 people from more than 30 local, state, and federal agencies will take part in the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) annual exercise on **Insert Date**. This large drill will test participants' response capability and ability to coordinate their responses to multiple incidents. The exercise scenario will involve a simulated chemical incident at Pueblo Chemical Depot and a second non-related hazardous materials emergency within Pueblo County requiring the activation of various Emergency Operations Centers, the Pueblo Community Joint Information Center, and decontamination and treatment facilities.

One media representative and one camera support person from each news organization are invited to observe the exercise activities listed below. Each location will have a subject matter expert on hand for interview requests.

WHEN: **Insert Date**

Opportunity #1

8:15 a.m.—Pueblo Chemical Depot Operations Center: Observe as Operations Center staff receive notification and coordinate response to a simulated chemical incident.
NOTE: You will need a government-issued picture ID (e.g., state driver's license), vehicle registration, and proof of insurance.

Location: **Insert Location**

Opportunity #2

10 a.m.—Pueblo Community Joint Information Center:

Observe how an activated Joint Information Center operates during emergency situation. See how information is gathered and disseminated to the media and the public during a crisis situation.

Location: **Insert Location**

Opportunity #3

11 a.m.—Incident Command/Decontamination Site

Observe actions at the incident command post for the non-related hazardous materials emergency within Pueblo County. Watch as emergency responders and medical personnel decontaminate people and animals. *Location:* **Insert Location** *NOTE:* Media should park in the **Insert Location**.

WHERE: **Insert Location**

RSVP

REQUIRED: Access to each site requires a media escort so please contact the Public Affairs Office at the **Insert Location and Contact Number** not later than **noon** on **Insert Date** to RSVP and for additional details.

Example of a News Release for the Exercise

This example is from the 2017 Pueblo Chemical Depot exercise. Highlighted text indicates which information the jurisdiction should update for the site, the exercise, and the year.



COLORADO

**Division of Homeland Security
& Emergency Management**

Department of Public Safety

NEWS RELEASE

For immediate release

Date: **Insert Date**

Contact: **Insert Point of Contact Name, Agency, and Phone Number**

Community Agencies Test Emergency Preparedness at **Insert Date Exercise**

PUEBLO, CO —Numerous Pueblo County agencies and organizations will demonstrate emergency response to a simulated major incident during the annual Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) exercise scheduled for **Insert Date**. The exercise is expected to start at approximately **Insert Time** a.m. and conclude in the early afternoon. This annual event has been designed to test participants' response capabilities to two simulated emergencies and to have that response effort federally evaluated.

Nearly 2,000 people from the American Red Cross, Center for Disabilities, Colorado Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, First Student, local hospitals, Pueblo Animal Services, Pueblo Behavioral Health Response Team, Pueblo City Schools, Pueblo City Transit, Pueblo School District 70, the Pueblo Chemical Depot, Transportation Technology Center Inc., and more than a dozen first-response agencies in Pueblo County will participate.

The exercise scenario will involve a simulated chemical incident at the U.S. Army Pueblo Chemical Depot and a second non-related emergency within Pueblo County requiring the activation of various Emergency Operations Centers, the Pueblo Community Joint Information Center and decontamination and treatment facilities.

Two of Pueblo's public warning capabilities will also be tested during the exercise. Twenty outdoor warning sirens located in the emergency zones surrounding the Pueblo Chemical Depot will be tested as part of the exercise. A test message will sound during the exercise for nearly 1,600 tone alert radios, which provide warning for people who are indoors.

The public may see exercise-related activity at several locations within the city of Pueblo. The responders may be dressed in full protective equipment and mock accident patients will receive realistic looking injury make-up called moulage. Emergency equipment and vehicles will be deployed to various sites to include locations along Eagleridge Boulevard, including the area near Texas Roadhouse, Downtown and all three Pueblo hospitals.

Pueblo County Sheriff's Office Emergency Services Bureau Chief, **Insert Name**, said there has been a lot of planning and preparing throughout the past year by many local response agencies for this exercise. "This exercise is a great opportunity for various agencies to work together and coordinate emergency responses to multiple incidents at one time. This gives us the opportunity to test emergency response plans and procedures and make any changes, if necessary."

For more information on CSEPP or the exercise, contact **Insert Point of Contact Name, agency, and Phone Number.**

MEDIA OPPORTUNITY (Not for Publication)

One media representative and one camera support person from each news organization are invited to observe one or both of the exercise activities listed below to include:

Opportunity #1

8:30 a.m.—XXX Depot Operations Center: Observe as Operations Center staff receive notification and coordinate response to a simulated chemical incident. NOTE: You will need a government issued picture ID (e.g., state driver's license), vehicle registration and proof of insurance.

Location: Insert Location

Opportunity #2

10 a.m.—Pueblo Community Joint Information Center: Observe how an activated Joint Information Center operates during an emergency situation. See how information is gathered and disseminated to the media and the public during a crisis situation.

Location: Insert Location

Opportunity #3

11 a.m.—Incident Command/Decontamination Site

Observe actions at the incident command post for the non-related hazardous materials emergency within Pueblo County. Watch as emergency responders and medical personnel decontaminate people and animals. *Location:* Insert Location. NOTE: Parking available along Insert Location.

Access to each site requires an RSVP and media escort so please contact Insert Point of Contact Name, Agency, and Phone Number not later than Insert Time on Insert Date to RSVP.

###

This page intentionally left blank.

Example of a Real-World Media Tour for the Exercise

This example is from the **Insert Year XXX** Chemical Depot exercise. Highlighted text indicates which information the jurisdiction should update for the site, the exercise, and the year.

XXX Depot CSEPP Community Exercise Insert Date **Real-World Media Itinerary** **Insert Date**

Escorts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Name, U.S. Army Real-World Media Escort (XXX) XXX-XXXX ▪ Name, Off-post Real-World Media Escort (XXX) XXX-XXXX
Itinerary – Wednesday, May 3	
Opportunity #1	
U.S. Army XXX Chemical Depot Operations Center: See where it all begins	
8:15	Media should meet at the front gate of XXX Chemical Depot (PCD). Insert Location , Gate phone – (XXX) XXX-XXXX not published. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ There will be a list of media members who RSVP'd at the Front Gate ▪ Media will be allowed to drive onto the depot and park near the Operations Center, where they will be met by pre-designated public information personnel
8:30–9:00	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Distribute media packets, brief media on exercise, what they will observe and the interview opportunity, requirement to review video/photos prior to departure and any operational security concerns that may exist, i.e. security cameras. ▪ Position media in designated area in the XXX Operation Center. ▪ Observe initial notification of an accident occurring on post and the activities happening at the onset of the event.
9:15–9:30	Media will leave the Depot Operation Center <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Depot security staff will review video and photos ▪ Depart the Depot
Opportunity #2	
Pueblo Community Joint Information Center	
10:00–10:45	Meet Media in the front lobby of the Insert Location . Front Desk phone: (XXX) XXX-XXXX <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Media escorts discuss role and function of the JIC. ▪ Take media into the JIC, set up equipment and allow them to film operations.
10:45–11:00	Depart the JIC
Opportunity #3	
Field Site for Off Post Scenario/Decontamination Stations	
11:00–11:30	Meet Media at the Field Site located in the Insert Location , <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Media can film any action at the site ▪ Decontamination of humans or animals (if still ongoing).

NOTE: [Name] will go to the Field Site at the conclusion of the VIP tour in the event any real-world media bypass the Joint Information Center and go straight to Field Site.

Media RSVP (as of 4/27/2017)					
Media	Name of Media Rep	Cell	Depot OC	JIC	Field Site
XXX TV	TBD	TBD	X	?	?
XXX TV	TBD	TBD	X	?	X
XXX TV	TBD	TBD	X	?	X
XXX TV	TBD	TBD	X	?	?
News paper	TBD	TBD	?	X	X

Before the Exercise

- **Insert Date:** A media advisory outlining opportunities for real world observers to observe exercise activities will be distributed by the XXX Depot Public Affairs Specialist [Name], who will be the point of contact for RSVPs.
- **Insert Date:** The exercise news release intended to create public awareness of exercise activities they may see or hear on exercise day will be emailed by the XXX /CSEPP PIO.
- **Insert Date:** The XXX Depot Public Affairs Specialist will conduct follow-up calls to media who are likely to attend but who have not yet RSVP'd. A list of RSVPs will be provided to the FEMA Region XXX CSEPP PIO.
- **Insert Date:** The XXX Depot Public Affairs Specialist will prepare real-world media packets and deliver them to the exercise control staff (i.e., DETech Office) at the [Insert Location].
- **Insert Date:** "Heads up" copies of the media advisory, final itinerary, list of RSVPs, and exercise news release will be emailed to Real-world Media Escorts by the FEMA CSEPP PIO.
- **Insert Date:** The XXX /CSEPP PIO will distribute a second news release, highlighting exercise activities that the public might see or hear on exercise day. CSEPP PIOs will amplify this message on their social media accounts.
- **Insert Date:** Real-world Media Escorts will attend the exercise plenary briefing at the [Insert Location] where they will be introduced to all exercise evaluators/controllers, receive their informational packets, itineraries, RSVP list, scenario information, exercise communications plan, maps, media packets, etc. They will conduct site visits to familiarize themselves with the specific venues and coordinate any final logistical details. Any changes or concerns discovered during the site visits will be communicated to the FEMA CSEPP PIO and Exercise Co-Directors.

During the Exercise

Escorts will meet real-world media representatives at designated times and locations. It is recommended that business cards be collected from the media. Escorts will then proceed in accordance with the scheduled itinerary.

Media personnel who desire to participate will be required to be escorted at all times within the “Exercise area” and not interact with exercise players during the exercise. All real-world media contacts will be directed to the supporting Real-world Media Escort Team. The Real-world Media Escort Team, representing the **XXX** CSEPP community, Army, and FEMA, will be responsible for answering all real-world media queries as well as coordinating media activities.

After the Exercise

Media escorts will provide the FEMA CSEPP PIO a list of media who participated in exercise observation activities and a synopsis of their questions and anticipated stories (angle, positive/negative etc.) and any logistical observations to assist in planning for next year’s exercise. FEMA CEPP PIO will share this information with the exercise Co-Directors.

The **XXX** /CSEPP PIO will collect and distribute copies of any exercise related media coverage to the **Insert State** CSEPP PIOs/PAOs and the Exercise Co-Directors.

XXX Community PIOs/PAOs and other appropriate officials will be available after the exercise to answer questions from the media.

The final exercise report will be released approximately 60 days after the exercise. The final report may be released to the media upon request. Media requests for copies of the report will be communicated and coordinated between the **Insert State** CSEPP PIOs/PAOs.

This page intentionally left blank.

Attachment E-2: Suggested Timelines for Public Information – Support to CSEPP Exercise

Recommend Number of Days Before or After Exercise

ED-270	Complete draft XPA and review others.
ED-180	Develop site-specific CSEPP public information plan for real-world media participation in exercises.
ED-90	Attend and participate in MSEL review
ED-60	Provide copy of draft real-world media tour itinerary to Co-Directors to allow coordination with VIP Tour itinerary.
ED-45	CSEPP Community PAOs/PIOs meet to finalize preparations and planning for real-world media. Determine needs and order materials for real-world media kits and briefings. Meet with exercise planners and arrange interviews and identify technical experts, spokespersons, and tour guides.
ED-30	Finalize and send real-world media advisory, which should explain the purpose of the exercise and encourage real-world media assistance in heightening public awareness.
	Finalize arrangements for briefers, spokespersons, tour guides, etc.
ED-7	Finalize real-world media kits and briefings.
	Send news release and follow up.
ED-2	Contact local real-world media points of contacts, such as assignment or managing editors and beat reporters, and provide information for real-world media to use in scheduling.
	Confirm arrangements for public information management and tour escorts.
ED-1	As appropriate, contact real-world media, encourage their coverage of the exercise, and schedule real-world media briefings
ED	Distribute real-world media kits, coordinate interviews, and escort real-world media through tour sites.
ED+1	Develop and distribute post-exercise news release.

This page intentionally left blank.

Attachment E-3: Real-World Media Kits

A real-world media kit may include the following material, and the organization should package it appropriately:

- A copy of the news release/media advisory that explains the exercise, date, schedule of events, and extent of exercise play
 - The Exercise Planning Team should previously coordinate this news release.
- Names, position titles, and brief biographies of spokespersons other than escorts
 - If, for example, a county or school official is the spokesperson, contact information should be included in the media kit.
- Background materials on the organizations involved in the exercise
- Charts, graphs, and visual displays, as appropriate, showing lines of communication, maps of exercise area, real-world media starting point, etc.
- Background materials on the stored chemical agents
- Appropriate fact sheets and brochures
- Expected timeline for the exercise

This page intentionally left blank.

Appendix F: Background and Overview of CSEPP Remediation and Recovery Outcome Evaluation

Introduction

The Remediation and Recovery Outcome (Outcome 8) includes activities that officials would typically perform during the immediate post-emergency period to about 48 hours after a chemical event. This Outcome and the Exercise Evaluation Guides (EEGs) should dovetail with existing response-phase Outcomes. This Outcome draws from the *CSEPP Recovery Plan Workbook* (July 2008) and other sources, including lessons learned from prior Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) recovery tabletop exercises. In general, the Remediation and Recovery Outcome focuses on actions that staff does not perform or performs very differently during response. For example, the Remediation and Recovery Outcome does not include a field task or associated EEG on monitoring and sampling. Although monitoring and sampling operations would likely be ongoing during recovery, the field EEG is essentially similar to what the staff would perform during the response phase.

CSEPP practice has been to exercise remediation and recovery in a tabletop format, and participants base the Outcome 8 EEGs on that assumption. Participants design tasks and steps for evaluation at a facility where multiple organizations coordinate and plan activities. There are no tasks or steps designed for evaluation of field play.

Participants may base the scenario on a preceding response-phase exercise, or participants may develop the scenario separately for the tabletop, but the exercise should include the sort of information that participants would expect to be available during the period the recovery exercise represents; i.e., roughly 6–48 hours after the initial event. To support tabletop exercise play, the scenario should include realistic situations that challenge participants as they plan for recovery activities.

Remediation and recovery operations are extensions of response-phase tasks; therefore, each task in this outcome includes references to related (antecedent) response-phase tasks.

Assumptions for All Events and Severe Events

The setting for a recovery exercise is a situation in which a chemical event has taken place, participants have completed initial responses, and they consider the situation at the scene of the event stable. The following assumptions, excerpted from the *CSEPP Recovery Plan Workbook*, are also relevant for recovery exercise planning:

Assumptions for All Events

The following assumptions apply to any chemical stockpile emergency that involves the off-post community, whether or not officials confirm any actual release of chemical agent:

- If officials have any area at risk of chemical agent exposure or have restricted access to an area, there will be pressure to reopen it so that people may return to their homes and businesses.
- Once officials issue protective actions of any kind, the population near the facility will want reassurance that the area is safe.
- Recovering from medical, social, psychological, and economic impacts of the event will take much longer than the physical process of recovery.
- News media and senior leaders at the State and Federal levels will subject recovery operations and decisions to intense scrutiny.

Assumptions for Severe Events

For severe events in which there is a significant release of chemical agent and a possibility that it went off-post, officials can anticipate that there will be uncertainty as to the nature and extent of any residual hazard. Officials will likely initiate protective actions based on assumptions as to the amount of agent released (e.g., the maximum credible event [MCE]), combined with computer modeling of its dispersal and initial monitoring results at or near the release site. The process of determining whether there is any residual hazard will likely take a few days to a few weeks and involve numerous federal, state, and local organizations. If investigation at the scene of the event reveals no releases, officials might reduce that period. If investigation or monitoring indicates a possibility of aerosol deposition, officials might increase that period.

In such an event, off-post officials would have a number of concerns relating to monitoring, sampling, hazard assessment, protective actions, and public information during the recovery period, specifically including concern for the following:

- **Residual agent vapor:** Weather carries the agent vapor that an accident releases downwind and dissipates it soon after the release is controlled, except possibly within buildings where vapors might linger for some additional short period. Materials inside of buildings may possibly absorb agent vapors if vapor concentrations are extremely high, which may occur close to the site of the release, and pose a temporary residual hazard even though a hazard no longer exists outdoors.
- **Unprotected people remaining in the restricted area:** It is likely that some persons will have remained in the area at risk regardless of protective action instructions officials gave them. These persons might require help in relocating.
- **Vulnerable populations in pressurized shelters:** Vulnerable populations might need outside assistance to resolve health and safety issues at their location before they are free to exit the shelter.
- **Additional releases:** In some scenarios, a slight possibility for additional releases over time may exist, for example, as technicians handle damaged munitions as part of site cleanup.
- **Other hazards the chemical event causes:** The chemical event may cause secondary hazards in the affected area. For example, rapid evacuation of the

population might leave some industrial facilities or critical infrastructures vulnerable to loss or damage that, in turn, could pose a health and safety threat. Traffic accidents on evacuation routes in the hazard area might create situations that necessitate a response in potentially hazardous areas to save lives.

- **Other hazards not caused by the chemical event:** Disasters such as earthquakes or tornados might cause or contribute to a chemical event, create separate response requirements, and complicate the chemical event response.
- **Those who evacuated from areas that were never at risk:** Because of conservative assumptions that officials build into the protective action decision-making process, it is likely that many people will have evacuated from areas that were never dangerous. Providing care and shelter for these evacuees until they return home will strain resources.
- **Aerosol deposition:** Under some circumstances, a chemical agent would disperse as an aerosol (i.e., as very small droplets) and subsequently deposit itself as contamination on downwind surfaces off-post. Studies have shown that this is unlikely, and that, if it did occur, it would be limited to a small area near the installation. An unusual combination of factors is needed to make aerosol deposition a health risk beyond the installation boundary, such as detonation of a number of explosively configured munitions filled with persistent agent (i.e., VX or mustard) combined with a fire hot enough to cause the munitions to detonate and carry the aerosols well above ground level in a heated plume. In addition, the situation needs the right atmospheric conditions to transport the aerosol significant distances for the droplets to be deposited beyond the installation boundary.

Task-specific Background and Assumptions

This section provides background and assumptions associated with each Remediation and Recovery Outcome task to assist in planning a recovery exercise and selecting EEGs.

Initiate Environmental Remediation

The Installation Commander is the Army Incident Commander. The Installation Commander may also be the On-Scene Coordinator (OSC), or may appoint a qualified OSC, as defined by Army regulations and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (40 CFR 300). The OSC position may transition to another Army officer as officials bring in national-level resources.

Local, State, and/or Federal environmental protection authorities monitor and approve the cleanup after an event involving significant release of chemical agent. The process could be lengthy, depending on the circumstances of the event and the area affected. However, initial planning and coordination for this process should begin within the time frame depicted at a recovery exercise.

Initiate Accident Investigation

Following a chemical event, officials expect that the Army will launch one or more investigations, including a collateral investigation (conducted according to investigative procedures outlined in Army Regulation [AR] 15-6), a safety investigation, and a claims

investigation. This task focuses on organization of these investigations, preserving evidence, and coordination between investigations. Any event leading to protective actions off-post would also likely trigger investigations by off-post authorities.

Manage Limited Access to Restricted Areas

Once officials have evacuated an area, they expect that the area (or some part of it) will remain restricted until officials can adequately verify that re-entry is safe. During that time, officials may consider it necessary for emergency workers to enter the area to perform monitoring and sampling and likely other purposes as well. Officials may deem it necessary to escort previously sheltered people or people who did not evacuate from the area or conduct firefighting or law-enforcement operations. Officials might also decide it is necessary to enter the area to sustain critical infrastructure operations, such as moving U.S. mail or performing utility maintenance or repair.

In addition, officials may desire to allow access to the restricted area by members of the public to perform urgent errands (e.g., to care for or retrieve animals, shut down critical plant operations, or secure business records).

Officials should establish a procedure for such access to ensure that persons take appropriate precautions for the anticipated hazard and that there is accountability for persons allowed into the restricted area.

Make and Implement Ingestion Pathway Protective Action Decisions

During a severe chemical event, chemical agent might contaminate food or water supplies off-post and pose a danger to public health through ingestion. The primary purpose of ingestion-pathway protection is to identify and control potential hazards to public health through the ingestion pathway. A secondary purpose is to assure the integrity of food supplies and allow residents to sell or consume uncontaminated products. Officials may impose a site-specific embargo of potentially affected food supplies to protect the public from potentially contaminated products and to protect the market share of products from nearby, unaffected areas.

Officials consider ingestion exposure a hazard mainly through the direct ingestion of items on which the environment has deposited an agent in the form of aerosol droplets. It is also possible that foods stored in the open in areas subject to heavy concentrations of agent vapor for long periods would absorb harmful amounts of an agent.

Officials consider ingestion exposure through contamination of drinking water supplies highly unlikely, due to dilution by large volumes of water and the tendency of the agents to break down in water (i.e., hydrolyze). However, officials may desire some sampling and analysis of drinking water to confirm that it is safe.

In addition to local officials, a number of agencies and organizations may have a role in this process, including State and Federal public health, food safety, and agricultural agencies, as well as agricultural and food marketing organizations at the local, State, and national levels.

Arrange Post Emergency Medical Screening

In the wake of a chemical event, officials anticipate that many people will worry about effects on their health. After terrorists attacked the Tokyo subway system using nerve agent in 1995, hundreds of people sought medical attention at nearby hospitals. Officials characterized most of them as “the worried well”—i.e., agent exposure did not affect them but they were concerned that it had. It is therefore prudent for officials to prepare for a large number of people spontaneously seeking medical examination and care.

In addition, officials may desire, from both a public health and a public relations standpoint, to offer medical screening to those who may be worried but have not acted on their concern.

A response-phase exercise typically demonstrates technical aspects of caring for agent-exposure patients. This recovery-phase outcome focuses on organizational aspects of dealing with potentially large numbers of patients, including issues of resource allocation and priorities and preservation of patient records, which officials may later find valuable for investigations and resolution of claims.

Secure Disaster Assistance for Affected Communities

Three primary mechanisms exist for providing financial assistance to persons and businesses a chemical event affects: the Army claims process; disaster assistance under the Stafford Act; and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Any or all of these might come into play after a chemical event, and all would involve a lengthy process of months to years to complete. However, coordination and planning for these processes could begin within the immediate post-emergency period.

This task covers arrangements to provide disaster assistance authorized under the Stafford Act and CERCLA; another task addresses Army claims services. Part of the task involves organizational and administrative aspects of setting up a Disaster Recovery Center, including facilities and staffing, and publicizing availability of services to the public. Another part of the task involves determining or beginning the process to determine how officials fund assistance, what they will fund, and who officials will deem eligible for assistance.

Arrange Temporary Shelter for Evacuees

Response-phase outcomes address opening of emergency shelters. During the immediate post-emergency period, as more information becomes available as to the nature of the emergency, officials should review the status of the emergency shelters and whether they serve the needs of the displaced public until they open the area for unrestricted re-entry.

In most scenarios, a need for long displacement times will not be necessary since officials do not expect the hazard to persist. Officials expect that they will probably allow unrestricted re-entry after perhaps a few days of monitoring to confirm safety. However, during that time, an additional need for shelters may occur as problems with initial arrangements of displaced persons may arise. For example, those staying at hotels may

find the cost prohibitive, and those staying with friends or relatives may need to relocate. In addition, officials should review whether emergency shelter facilities are meeting the needs of all displaced persons, including individuals with access and functional needs.

If the scenario involves the possibility of a longer-term displacement (i.e., more than a few days), officials deem it appropriate to begin planning for a transition to temporary housing as opposed to a shelter. The time required for laboratory analysis of samples taken from a potentially affected area may affect displacement times.

Coordinate Recovery-Phase Monitoring and Sampling

Monitoring and sampling during recovery focus on gathering data to support decisions to allow re-entry to areas previously evacuated, and, for some scenarios, decisions relating to ingestion-pathway protection. In scenarios involving vapor release only, officials will direct monitoring and sampling to verify the absence of any residual hazard. In addition, spot needs may occur for monitoring to support entry by emergency teams into restricted areas to perform specific missions.

During the early stages of the recovery period, officials anticipate that the Army will call upon various agencies (e.g., U.S. Department of Defense headquarters, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, civil support teams, etc.) and contract resources to increase the rate at which it can gather monitoring data and samples. Community officials will work with the Army to coordinate arrangements for observers and/or law enforcement personnel to accompany Army teams. At the same time, Army and CSEPP community as well as other technical staff will try to determine how much data will be needed to support protective action decisions (i.e., develop a monitoring plan).

Officials might perform sample analysis partly onsite and partly at remote laboratories. Officials would need coordination regarding sample transportation and tracking.

Preservation of monitoring and sampling data is important for accident investigation and for evaluation of claims.

Make Recovery-Phase Protective Action Decisions

Protective-action decisions during recovery are the responsibility of local or State chief executives (for off-post communities) and the installation commander (for on-post). During recovery, officials anticipate that off-post officials will make decisions after consultation with emergency staff, technical experts, and other decision makers.

Officials expect that the main protective-action decisions during the recovery period would involve opening of previously restricted areas to unrestricted re-entry. The EEG for the recovery phase monitoring and sampling task is mainly concerned with gathering data to support this decision. It may be possible to reopen restricted areas in stages as more information becomes available. For example, as “ground truth” information becomes available about the amount of chemical agent released, officials may reduce the predicted hazard area, allowing re-entry to some areas previously evacuated.

Reopening schools and other special facilities may involve both the local chief executive and other officials who are specifically responsible for those facilities (e.g., school district superintendent or hospital administrator).

Officials expect that other officials will terminate any shelter-in-place instruction for the general public prior to the recovery period. However, it is possible that, at the beginning of a recovery exercise, there may be particular facilities, equipped as pressurized shelters, in which sheltering is ongoing. If so, then release of persons from these shelters becomes an additional recovery-phase protective-action decision.

A separate EEG covers decision making regarding ingestion-pathway hazards that involve multiple considerations and agencies. Furthermore, only certain types of scenarios give rise to ingestion-pathway concerns.

Implement Unrestricted Re-entry

Once officials make the decision to allow unrestricted access to a previously restricted area, the process of implementing that decision requires some coordination. Components of the implementation process include developing new boundaries (if re-entry proceeds in stages), adjusting traffic and access control points accordingly, and conveying this information to the public.

Provide Recovery Information to the Media and the Public

Although officials associate the majority of the public-instruction aspect of public information with the response phase, they anticipate that media and public interest in the event will continue to be intense during the first part of recovery. Media presence will likely continue increasing for at least the first 24–48 hours after the event as additional media personnel arrive.

For the purpose of exercise demonstrations, officials will carry out many aspects of the public-information function in the same way during the first part of recovery as they did during the emergency response phase. However, the content of the information will change over time as operations focus more on monitoring, hazard and damage assessment, re-entry, and cleanup. In addition, focus will increase on providing assistance to persons and communities the emergency affects. For example, people will need information and instructions for filing claims, including the important step of keeping records that document such claims. To address these topics and convey meaningful information to the public, subject matter experts in those fields should assist spokespersons.

Exercise of public information during re-entry is also important in the sense that many aspects of the recovery effort have a public-information component. For example, once officials set up a center to process claims and requests for disaster assistance, officials must publicize its location and tell the public when they can go there. Similarly, officials should publicize availability of medical screening for the affected community. Participation by public-information staff allows for more realistic demonstration of these functions and the coordination necessary for successful recovery management.

Provide Support Services to the Army Community

The Army traditionally provides certain support services for the Army community (e.g., active-duty military, employees, and families), specifically social and spiritual counseling and veterinary services. Recovery staff should be aware of these services and have or obtain points of contact to obtain additional (i.e., augmenting) resources. Officials will need to arrange to support augmenting staff; i.e., temporary workspace, billeting, etc. Officials should invite area chaplains and veterinarians to participate and discuss particular services they expect to provide and any special equipment or arrangements that they need after a chemical stockpile event.

Provide Claims Services to the Affected Population

After a chemical event, officials expect that affected individuals, businesses, units of government, and other organizations will seek compensation for damages incurred. The Army has a well-developed system for processing claims, including forms, procedures, regulations, and guidance documents. The Army Claims Service is the primary organization for administering the claims process. The law limits the Army Claims Service to paying claims that the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Military Tort Claims Act, or the Military Personnel and Civilian Employees Claims Act authorizes. See the *CSEPP Recovery Plan Workbook* (July 2008) for further information about these authorities and what claims the government will pay.

This task has elements in common with the Secure Disaster Assistance Task and the Provide Support Services Task in that recovery staffs need to coordinate with outside Army components and other organizations, provide workspace and other support, and publicize the availability of the service. In addition, this task shares with the Disaster Assistance Task the element of determining eligibility for compensation. This task differs from the Support Services Task in that officials offer claims services to both on-post and off-post populations. Officials should invite area claims offices to participate and discuss the particular services they expect to provide and any special equipment or arrangements they need after a chemical stockpile event.

Appendix G: After-Action Report/Improvement Plan Processes

This appendix provides guidance for preparing the After-Action Report (AAR). Authors will use the format and processes specified by the Co-Directors for the scope and content in each Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) exercise report. Exercise Co-Directors must include the basic contents, but they may modify the format and include additional information that will be of use to the jurisdictions involved.

The AAR will contain an executive summary, the scenario, the timeline, a community analysis, jurisdictional analyses, and improvement plans (as needed to address findings). The report may also contain appendices (see guidelines below).

Community Analysis

The Community Analysis is a report Emergency Response Outcome lead evaluators write and organize for the entire community describing that community's response to the exercise scenario. Authors identify and discuss systemic community problems. The directive defines issues that rise to a level that has an impact on the community as a whole.

Jurisdictional Analyses

Jurisdictional analyses are detailed reports describing the jurisdiction's response to the exercise scenario. Jurisdiction Lead Evaluators write an analysis that encompass all of the EROs evaluated in a particular jurisdiction during the exercise. The author identifies and discusses jurisdictional issues. The author should make recommendations for correcting identified problems in the jurisdictional write-ups. The jurisdictional analysis should describe, document, and relate any strengths, observations, or findings to a specific reference (as applicable). For each strength, observation, or finding cited, the author should provide a short title; a discussion that substantiates what occurred; and a reference to a plan, policy, or guidance provision. For each finding and observation, the author should provide a recommendation to address the issue.

The jurisdictional analyses will be in the following order.

1. The Army installation
2. Immediate response zone (IRZ) county(ies) where the Army installation is located
3. Any additional IRZ counties
4. Protective action zone (PAZ) counties (in alphabetical order)
5. The State or Commonwealth
6. The Joint Information System/Joint Information Center and any other jurisdiction

Findings and Improvement Plans

This section should include the following:

- A brief listing, in table format, of findings by jurisdiction
 - Jurisdictions develop IPs in table format. The installation and off-post jurisdictions may use a different format. Sample table formats are illustrated below (Table 20 and Table 21). This compilation of IPs will serve as the basic tracking document. The initial date is noted and remains until jurisdictions clear the findings. Jurisdictions will note if there was no demonstration in an activity in subsequent years (i.e., 2013, 2014, etc.).
 - Note: The author will assign a number to each finding for identification purposes throughout the report. The author will number the finding as in this example:
 - **XX 19.4.1**
 - “XX” is a two-letter identification of the jurisdiction to which the finding applies
 - “19” is the last two digits of the calendar year of the exercise
 - “4” is the outcome designation (1–8) in which the author reports the finding
 - “.1” is the sequence number for finding under the outcome

Example of an Improvement Plan Format for the Army Installation

Finding Requiring Corrective Action AD 07.2.1

Subject: On-Post Release from SIP

Discussion: After analyzing concentration information in WebPuff™ and conferring with CMA Headquarters, the Smith Chemical Depot Hazard Analysis Officer correctly recommended to the OC Coordinator that personnel exit the Change House but keep their masks on at 1815. Since the predicted concentrations inside of the Change House exceeded the 15-minute mask limit at 1815 the decision to have personnel exit the Change House was a good one. The OC Coordinator then essentially issued a PAD for personnel to exit the Change House and directed the Director of Operations to carry out the PAD. For unknown reasons, personnel did not exit SIP in a timely manner, rather personnel remained in the Change House until 1939 (as noted in the EOC logs).

Additionally, at 1959, after negative RTAP readings taken from outside the Change House were obtained, personnel who exited the structure doffed their masks and went back into the Change House. Personnel should have remained outside of the building until RTAP readings, taken from inside the Change House, verified that the concentrations inside were at an acceptable level. Model predictions using data that were available at that time would have indicated that the concentrations inside the Change House at 1959 could have exceeded the 15- minute mask limit of 50xSTEL. The delay in executing the PAD to exit the Change House resulted in workers unnecessarily violating the guidelines on mask usage (i.e., remaining below 50 STEL). In addition, the subsequent reentry without masks resulted in potential agent exposures to workers.

Reference: CSEPP Planning Guidance Master, “CSEPP Planning Guidance”, April 21, 2006, pages 23-24, Shelter-in-Place.

Recommendation: Procedures should be put in place so that when a PAD to exit a shelter is made, it is executed in a timely manner. Additionally, monitoring should be done before personnel reenter a building that may have chemical agent vapor inside.

Table 20: Action Plans for Abel Chemical Depot (AD)

Finding Number	Name	Primary Organization and Action Officer	Date Due/Completed
AD 07.2.1	On-Post Release from SIP	John Doe	July 16, 2007

Corrective Action: SCD Command and Control personnel will consult safety and hazard plotters to address the need for monitoring shelter-in-place (SIP) sites prior to re-entry of site. Personnel will be trained in proper SIP and re-entry procedures and will verify this by making it an objective for future CAIRA exercises.

Areas Needing Improvement: Training and Procedures

Table 21: Example of an Improvement Plan Format for an Off-post Jurisdiction

Finding Title and Number	Recommendations	Corrective Action Description	Capability Elements	Primary Responsible Agency	POC and Contact Info.	Start Date	Completion Date
1. Finding and Number	1.1 Insert Recommendation 1	1.1.1 Insert Corrective Action 1	Planning	State X EMA	EMA Director	Dec. 1, 2019	Sep. 1, 2020
		1.1.2 Insert Corrective Action 2	Planning	State X EMA	EMA Director	Dec. 1, 2019	Feb. 1, 2020
	1.2. Insert Recommendation 2	1.2.1 Insert Corrective Action 1	Training	County X	EMA Director	Dec. 1, 2019	Jan. 1, 2020
		1.2.2 Insert Corrective Action 2	Systems/ Equipment	County X	EMA Director	Dec. 1, 2019	Mar. 15, 2020
2. Finding and Number	2.1 Insert Recommendation 1	2.1.1 Insert Corrective Action 1	Planning	City X	Fire Chief	Dec. 1, 2019	Jan. 15, 2020
		2.1.2 Insert Corrective Action 2	Systems/ Equipment	Hospital X	EMA Director	Dec. 1, 2019	Jan. 1, 2020

Appendices:

Appendices may include the following:

- **Community Readiness Profile:** The profile represents the Benchmark or capability-readiness assessment the CSEPP community made, prepared at least 45 days before the exercise and incorporated into the Exercise Plan (ExPlan) and the final AAR.
- **Annual Exercise Recaps:** Recaps are short reviews of the previous exercise. The CSEPP community will prepare them at least 45 days before the exercise and incorporate them into the ExPlan and final AAR.
- **Acronyms and Abbreviations:** This list should include all acronyms and abbreviations used in the AAR/IP.
- **Distribution:** This list should include all recipients of the report, including their addresses and the number and format of reports provided. The authors will distribute a limited number of printed final AAR/IPs, distribute the majority of final AAR/IPs in an electronic format, and post the final AAR/IP on the CSEPP Portal.

This page intentionally left blank.

Appendix H: CSEPP Exercise Program Glossary

After-Action Meeting (AAM): As soon as possible after completion of the draft After Action Report/Improvement Plan (AAR/IP), the Exercise Co-Directors and trusted agents should conduct an AAM to present, discuss, and refine the draft AAR and develop Improvement Plans. This meeting is a chance to present the AAR/IP to participating jurisdictions and/or organizations to solicit feedback and make necessary changes. Officials should generate a list of corrective actions that identify what officials will do to address recommendations, who (what agency or person) is responsible, and the timeframe for implementation.

After-Action Report/Improvement Plan (AAR/IP): The main product of the Evaluation and Improvement Planning process is the AAR/IP. The AAR/IP captures observations of an exercise and makes recommendations for post-exercise improvements. Officials distribute the draft AAR to jurisdictional participants for review approximately 7 days after exercise conduct. The final AAR/IP is an outcome of the AAM, and officials should disseminate it to participants no more than 60 days after exercise conduct.

Community Readiness Profile: The community prepares a self-assessment tool of its capabilities prior to an exercise. It provides the community's status in each Benchmark area and capability ratings in those areas. Moreover, it provides the evaluation team with information on the community's ability to meet the CSEPP Benchmarks.

Community Timeline: This term refers to the integrated chronological record of times and actions all jurisdictions perform during exercise play.

Concept and Objectives (C&O) Meeting: A C&O Meeting is the formal beginning of the exercise planning process. It is held to identify the scope and objectives of the exercise. For less complex exercises and for organizations with limited resources, the C&O Meeting can be conducted in conjunction with the IPM.

Controller/Evaluator Debrief: This is a general term for the process of compiling observations about the exercise from evaluators, developing an exercise timeline, analyzing observations first by jurisdiction and then by Emergency Response Outcome, identifying issues, developing corrective action recommendations, and drafting the AAR/IP.

Controller and Evaluator Handbook (C/E Handbook): The C/E Handbook is an exercise overview and instructional manual for controllers and evaluators. A supplement to the *Exercise Plan (ExPlan)*, it contains more detailed information about the scenario and describes controllers' and evaluators' roles and responsibilities. Because the C/E Handbook contains information on the scenario and exercise administration, officials should distribute it only to those individuals specifically designated as controllers or evaluators (Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program [HSEEP] Guidance).

CSEPP Community: This term refers to the combined area of one military installation, its surrounding local jurisdictions, and the state agencies involved in executing CSEPP for that area.

CSEPP Jurisdiction: This term refers to the smallest area of geography within which officials may exercise political authority with regards to CSEPP (e.g., a county or a city).

Emergency Assessment Outcome: This outcome includes all tasks associated with identifying the hazard, classifying and providing notifications of the hazard and appropriate protective action recommendations (PARs) to offsite agencies, and coordinating and conducting monitoring and sampling operations to further specify the hazard.

Emergency Management Outcome: This outcome includes all top-level decision making, coordination, and direction and control of the response, including mobilization and operation of the EOC, and coordination at the management level of any activities involving logistical support.

Emergency Public Information Outcome: This outcome includes all tasks related to dissemination of public health and safety information following the initial alert and notification. It includes operation of a Joint Information System (JIS), dissemination of information to the media from individual Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), staffing and operation of a Joint Information Center (JIC), and dissemination of information to the media and the public from the JIC.

Emergency Response Outcome (ERO) Analysis: This portion of the Post Exercise Analysis results in a picture of the community's ability to achieve outcomes.

ERO Leads: Selected exercise evaluators reconfigure from their jurisdictional teams or other exercise assignment into eight Outcome Analysis teams. An Outcome Analysis team leader compiles information from jurisdictional analyses related to the outcome and works with the team members and, as needed, persons from other teams to compile findings, strengths, and observations for the outcome.

Evaluated Component: This term refers to the individual, team, or group of staff that performs a task.

Exercise Co-Director: Exercise Co-Directors consist of one Army Co-Director and one FEMA Co-Director who oversee all exercise functions during exercise planning, conduct, and evaluation and oversees completion of the AAR/IP. Exercise Co-Directors oversee and remain in contact with controllers and evaluators; debrief controllers and evaluators following the exercise; and oversee setup and cleanup of exercise and positioning of controllers and evaluators.

Exercise Evaluation Guide (EEG): This term refers to data-collection and evaluation guide exercise evaluators use. The CSEPP Exercise Implementation Guidance specifies a

series of Emergency Response Outcomes within each of which is listed a set of tasks/EEGs. Each EEG includes the task name, the expected outcome from the task, the evaluated component, a breakdown of the task into specific steps, and a set of references.

Exercise Plan (ExPlan): An ExPlan is a general information document that helps operations-based exercises run smoothly by providing participants with a synopsis of the exercise. It is published and distributed to the participating organizations following development of most of the critical elements of the exercise. In addition to addressing exercise objectives and scope, an ExPlan assigns activities and responsibilities for exercise planning, conduct, and evaluation. The ExPlan is intended to be seen by the exercise players and observers—therefore, it does not contain detailed scenario information that may reduce the realism of the exercise.

Expected Outcome: This term refers to the end-state of emergency response after completion of a particular task. The outcome of one task may become an input for another task at this location or elsewhere on- or off-post. Officials base evaluating performance of a task on comparing what actually occurred with what officials expected to occur, an analysis of the difference, and its impact for the response.

Final Planning Meeting (FPM): The FPM is the final forum for the Exercise Planning Team to review the process and procedures for exercise conduct, final drafts of all exercise materials, and all logistical requirements. Officials should make no major changes to either the design or the scope of the exercise nor to any supporting documentation at the FPM. The FPM ensures officials have arranged all logistical requirements, have identified and resolved all outstanding issues, and are ready to distribute all exercise products.

Finding: A finding indicates a significant weakness in protection for chemical workers, the public, or the environment that warrants a formal improvement plan to remedy. A finding usually, but not necessarily, involves deviation from applicable laws, regulations, policies, standards, plans, or other written requirements. Findings are most often life-safety issues. A recurring observation may become a finding when the jurisdiction has not corrected the observation. However, deviation from written requirements or plans need not constitute a finding if officials judge the related outcome demonstrated during the exercise satisfactory. The Exercise Co-Directors determine whether a deviation is significant enough and the outcome lacking enough for them to report the observation as a finding.

Full-scale Exercise (FSE): An FSE is a multi-agency, multijurisdictional, multidiscipline exercise involving functional (e.g., Joint Field Office, EOC) and “boots-on-the-ground” response (e.g., firefighters decontaminating mock patients). An FSE provides a comprehensive evaluation of a community’s emergency response system. The FSE involves mobilization of emergency service and response agencies, activation of communications centers and emergency facilities such as emergency operations centers (EOCs) and command posts, and field play.

Functional Exercise (FE): Functional exercises are designed to validate and evaluate capabilities, multiple functions and/or sub-functions, or interdependent groups of functions. FEs are typically focused on exercising plans, policies, procedures, and staff members involved in management, direction, command, and control functions. In FEs, events are projected through an exercise scenario with event updates that drive activity at the management level. An FE is conducted in a realistic, real-time environment; however, movement of personnel and equipment is usually simulated.

Hazard Mitigation Outcome: This outcome, demonstrated exclusively on post, includes all activities related to reporting the event, fighting fires, preserving evidence and records of decisions, and controlling and mitigating the hazard. It does not include any activities at the incident site specifically associated with the *Patient Care* outcome.

Initiating Event: The initiating event is the chemical accident/incident (CAI). This CAI must be within the Chemical Materials Activity (CMA) accident-planning base and may include events meeting the definition of Maximum Credible Event. CMA policy/guidance defines Maximum Credible Events as the probability of the event occurring once in a 10,000-year period.

Initial Planning Meeting (IPM): The IPM marks the beginning of the exercise development phase. An IPM's purpose is to determine exercise scope by gathering input from the Exercise Planning Team; design requirements and conditions (e.g., assumptions and artificialities); objectives; extent of play; and scenario variables (e.g., time, location, hazard selection). The IPM is also used to develop exercise documentation by obtaining the planning team's input on exercise location, schedule, duration, and other relevant details.

Integrated Performance Evaluation (IPE): This term refers to a team approach to exercise evaluation that focuses on analyzing data on response tasks to assess the ability to achieve Emergency Response Outcomes according to accepted general program standards as well as specific plans, procedures, and expectations. The primary purpose of the IPE is to determine the capability of the site to respond or perform specific emergency response functions and to enhance training of responders.

Jurisdiction: This term refers to the defined area under which legal authority falls in CSEPP planning, exercises, and CAI response. CSEPP jurisdictions include FEMA Region, State/Commonwealth, Counties, and Army Installations.

Jurisdictional Team: The team of evaluators assigned to a jurisdiction to observe the exercise and collect data. The team observes the exercise, prepares a jurisdictional timeline, and develops a jurisdictional report.

Midterm Planning Meeting (MPM): Officials use the MPM to discuss exercise organization and staffing concepts; scenario and timeline development; extent of play agreements; and scheduling, logistics, and administrative requirements. It is also a session to review draft documentation (e.g., scenario, *ExPlan*, *C/E Handbook*, MSEL).

(Note: Officials can hold a MSEL Meeting in conjunction with or separate from the MPM to review the scenario timeline for the exercise.)

Master Scenario Events List (MSEL): The MSEL is a chronological timeline of expected actions and scripted events that *controllers* inject into exercise play to generate or prompt *player* activity. It ensures necessary events happen so that the exercise meets all *objectives*. The MSEL links simulation to action, enhances exercise experience for players, and reflects an incident or activity meant to prompt *players* to action. Each MSEL record contains a designated *scenario* time; an *event* synopsis; the name of the *controller* responsible for delivering the inject; and, if applicable, special delivery instructions, the *task* and *objective* the exercise demonstrates, the expected action, the intended player, and a note-taking section.

Observation: An observation is a response or action that, in the judgment of the evaluator, officials could improve, or displays unusual initiative or commendable performance. In other words, an observation can be a criticism or a compliment. While an observation does not require an IP similar to a finding, the community IPT should work to improve those actions as necessary. It is the responsibility of each community IPT to develop the appropriate format to address each observation.

Outcome (or *Emergency Response Outcome*): The end-state of emergency preparedness after officials complete the response tasks. The outcome of one task may become an input for another task at this location or elsewhere on- or off-post. Each ERO is an aspect of the overall protection of chemical workers, the public, and the environment.

Outcome Evaluation Map: This term refers to a tabular depiction of the flow of tasks within an Emergency Response Outcome summarizing their relationships. Officials arrange tasks by performance location and list them in the approximate chronological order. Each cell in the table represents a *task* that corresponds with an Exercise Evaluation Guide.

Patient Care Outcome: This outcome includes all activities related to treating patients of trauma injury or agent exposure, to include screening, decontaminating, and transporting them to off-post medical facilities; caring for them in medical treatment facilities, tracking their location and status, and handling and tracking the disposition of human remains.

Player Handout: A player handout is a one- to two-page document, usually handed out the morning of an operations-based exercise that provides a quick reference for exercise players on safety procedures, logistical considerations, exercise schedule, and other essential information.

Post Exercise Analysis: This term refers to the process that evaluators use to determine what did and did not occur and why. The analysis provides answers to such questions as: what happened, what was supposed to happen, why was there a difference, what was the impact, and what should officials learn? The analysis also contains recommendations for

corrections. The information used to conduct the analysis comes from evaluator observations, exercise documentation, the jurisdictional timeline, and other information that becomes available at the evaluators' debriefing and subsequent meetings with the players or other evaluators.

Preparedness Outcome: Within the limits of the CSEPP program, this outcome encompasses tasks associated with preparedness to respond to a chemical accident or incident at an Army chemical storage site. This includes maintaining coordinated emergency plans, participating in an active exercise program, conducting comprehensive training programs, maintaining active public outreach and education programs, and ensuring the readiness of the emergency response physical infrastructure (e.g., facilities, vehicles, equipment, supplies, and alert and notification systems). This outcome also includes the Army's daily consideration for the impact of ongoing operations on preparedness and the exchange of information between the Army and off-post jurisdictions concerning these operations.

Protection Outcome: This includes all activities related to protecting on-post and off-post populations, including vulnerable populations, by making appropriate protective action decisions, activating alert and notification systems, disseminating protective action messages, providing access control and security, activating and operating reception centers and mass care shelters, and coordinating support services for affected populations.

Remediation and Recovery Outcome: This outcome includes actions taken during the immediate post-emergency period, out to about 48 hours after the event. Many of the tasks in this outcome are continuations of efforts that the response phase would initiate. "Remediation" refers to efforts to clean up any residual hazard and address environmental damage from the event. "Recovery" refers to the process of addressing the human impact of the event and eventually restoring the community to a normal or near-normal state.

Safety Controller (Safety Officer): The safety controller has the responsibility for monitoring exercise safety during exercise setup, conduct, and cleanup. All exercise *evaluators* and *controllers* assist the safety controller by reporting any safety concerns. The safety controller should not be confused with the safety officer, whom the Incident Commander identifies during exercise play.

Scenario: For the purpose of this document, the authors define the scenario as the on-post initiating event and all supplemental events the planning team creates.

Simulation Cell (SimCell): This term refers to the exercise "control hub"—a central location where exercise controllers work. Controllers track exercise events, inject information or simulated events into the exercise, and serve as a substitute for agencies and personnel not playing in the exercise. For example, a SimCell controller may pretend he or she is a member of the media calling in a question or may play the role of a Congressional office, taking a notification call from an exercise player. SimCell

controllers actively manage the flow of exercise events in coordination with controllers in the field, Lead Controllers, and the Exercise Co-Directors.

Situation Manual (SitMan): The SitMan is a handbook officials provide to all participants in discussion-based exercises, particularly tabletop exercises (TTXs). The SitMan provides background information on the exercise scope, schedule, and objectives. It also presents the scenario narrative that will drive participant discussions during the exercise. (Note: The SitMan should mirror the exercise briefing, support the scenario narrative, and allow participants to read along while watching events unfold)

Step: This term refers to specific actions responders perform or decide or decisions that, in aggregate, produce the expected outcomes of the task.

Strength: A strength is a peer-validated technique, procedure, and/or solution that proves successful and solidly grounds participants in actual experience in operations, training, and exercises. Officials maintain and/or sustain a strength. Exercise Co-Directors will determine whether a described capability warrants reporting as a strength in the report.

Tabletop Exercise (TTX): Officials intend TTXs to stimulate discussion of various issues regarding a hypothetical situation. Officials can use them to assess plans, policies, and procedures or to assess types of systems they need to guide the prevention of, response to, or recovery from a defined incident. During a TTX, senior staff, senior leaders, or other key personnel meet in an informal setting to discuss simulated situations. Officials typically aim TTXs at facilitating understanding of concepts, identifying strengths and shortfalls, and/or achieving a change in attitude. Officials encourage participants to discuss issues in depth and develop decisions through slow-paced problem solving rather than the rapid, spontaneous decision making that occurs under actual or simulated emergency conditions. TTXs can be breakout (i.e., groups split into functional areas) or plenary (i.e., one large group).

Task: This term refers to a set of response actions (steps) an individual responder or team at a specified location (e.g., an EOC, JIC, hospital, or a specified field location) performs. Officials prepare an EEG as the tool for observing, gathering, and analyzing data about each response task.

This page intentionally left blank.

Appendix I: Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAR	After-Action Report
ACP	Access Control Point
AMC	Army Materiel Command
Army	Department of the Army
BGAD	Blue Grass Army Depot
C&O	Concept and Objectives
C/E	Controller/Evaluator
CA	Cooperative Agreement
CAI	Chemical Accident or Incident
CAIRA	Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance
CENL	Chemical Event Notification Level
CERCLA	Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CMA	Chemical Materials Activity
CPG	Comprehensive Preparedness Guide
CSEPP	Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
DHS	U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DoD	U.S. Department of Defense
DRC	Disaster Recovery Center
EAS	Emergency Alert System
EDS	Equipment Decontamination Station
EEG	Exercise Evaluation Guide
EEI	Essential Element of Information
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
EndEx	End of Exercise
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EOP	Emergency Operations Plan
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
EPZ	Emergency Planning Zone
ERO	Emergency Response Outcome
ExPlan	Exercise Plan
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FE	Functional Exercise
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FOSC	Federal On-Scene Coordinator
FPM	Final Planning Meeting
FSE	Full-Scale Exercise
HSDL	Homeland Security Digital Library
HSEEP	Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
IAP	Incident Action Plan
ICS	Incident Command System
IMT	Incident Management Team

IP	Improvement Plan
IPAWS	Integrated Public Alert and Warning System
IPE	Integrated Performance Evaluation
IPM	Initial Planning Meeting
IPP	Integrated Preparedness Plan
IPPW	Integrated Preparedness Planning Workshop
IPT	Integrated Process Team
IRF	Initial Response Force
IRZ	Immediate Response Zone
JIC	Joint Information Center
JIS	Joint Information System
LEP	Limited English Proficiency
LLIS	Lessons Learned Information Sharing
MCE	Maximum Credible Event
MEG	Medical Evaluation Guide
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPM	Midterm Planning Meeting
MSEL	Master Scenario Events List
NCP	National Contingency Plan
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NRC	National Response Center
OSC	On-Scene Coordinator
OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PAD	Protective Action Decision
PAO	Public Affairs Office/Officer
PAR	Protective Action Recommendation
PAZ	Protective Action Zone
PCD	Pueblo Chemical Depot
PDS	Personnel Decontamination Station
PIO	Public Information Officer
POC	Point of Contact
PPD	Presidential Policy Directive
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
SimCell	Simulation Cell
SIP	Shelter in Place
SitMan	Situation Manual
SitRep	Situation Report
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
StartEx	Start of Exercise
STEL	Short Term Exposure Limits
TCP	Traffic Control Point
THIRA	Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
USACE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
VIP	Very Important Person

WEA	Wireless Emergency Alert
WG	Work Group
XPA	Extent of Play Agreement

This page intentionally left blank.

Appendix J: Bibliography

All URLs in this appendix were verified as accessible October 3–16, 2019.

“Administrative Data Standards and Related Requirements.” Title 45 *Code of Federal Regulations*, Part 164. (45 CFR 160). http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?tpl=/ecfrbrowse/Title45/45cfr164_main_02.tpl

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. “CDC recommendations for civilian communities near chemical weapons depots: Guidelines for medical preparedness.” *Federal Register* 60(123): 33308–33312 (June 27, 1995). See also corrections at 60 FR 38564 (July 27, 1995). <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1995-06-27/pdf/95-15657.pdf>

Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program. *CSEPP Pre-hospital Medical Evaluation Guidance (MEG) tool*. 2016. https://www.cseppportal.net/secure/portal/ipts/medical_IPT/Medical%20Preparedness%20Documents/Revised%20Pre-Hospital%20Medical%20Evaluation%20Guidance%20Tool%2020161215%20%20BH%20edits.xls (login required)

Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program. *CSEPP Hospital Medical Evaluation Guidance (MEG) tool*. 2016. https://www.cseppportal.net/secure/portal/ipts/medical_IPT/Medical%20Preparedness%20Documents/Revised%20Hospital%20Medical%20Evaluation%20Guidance%20Tool%2020161215.xls (login required)

Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program. *Recovery plan workbook*. 2003. <http://www.ipd.anl.gov/anlpubs/2003/07/47099.pdf>

Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program, *Shelter-in-place protective action guide book*. 2006. <https://www.osha.gov/chemicalexecutiveorder/LLIS/CSEPPSIPGuideBook.pdf>

“Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (Superfund),” Title 42 *United States Code*, section 9601 *et seq.* (42 U.S.C. § 9601 *et seq.*) as amended. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-94/pdf/STATUTE-94-Pg2767.pdf>

Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-145 (1985). <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-99/pdf/STATUTE-99-Pg583.pdf>

Edgewood Chemical Biological Center. *Guidelines for mass casualty decontamination during an HAZMAT/weapon of mass destruction incident: volumes I and II*. 2013. https://www.nfpa.org/~media/files/news-and-research/resources/external-links/first-responders/decontamination/ecbc_guide_masscasualtydecontam_0813.pdf?la=en

Federal Emergency Management Agency. *Community Lifelines implementation toolkit*. Version 1.0. 2019.

https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1550596598262-99b1671f270c18c934294a449bcca3ce/Tab1b.CommunityLifelinesResponseToolkit_508.pdf

Federal Emergency Management Agency. *Developing and maintaining emergency operations plans: Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101 (version 2.0)*. 2010.

http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1828-25045-0014/cpg_101_comprehensive_preparedness_guide_developing_and_maintaining_emergency_operations_plans_2010.pdf

Federal Emergency Management Agency. *National Disaster Recovery Framework: Strengthening disaster recovery for the nation*. 2016.

https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1466014998123-4bec8550930f774269e0c5968b120ba2/National_Disaster_Recovery_Framework2nd.pdf

Federal Emergency Management Agency. *National Preparedness Goal*. 2nd Edition. 2015.

https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1443799615171-2aae90be55041740f97e8532fc680d40/National_Preparedness_Goal_2nd_Edition.pdf

“Hazardous waste operations and emergency response,” Title 29 *Code of Federal Regulations*, Part 1910.120 (29 CFR 1910.120).

http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/06/f1/29CFR-1910-120_ssm-05.pdf

“Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5: Management of Domestic Incidents.” 2003.

<https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Homeland%20Security%20Presidential%20Directive%205.pdf>

“National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan,” Title 40 *Code of Federal Regulations*, Part 300 (40 CFR 300).

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title40-vol28/pdf/CFR-2011-title40-vol28-part300.pdf>

“Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8: National Preparedness.” The White House. 2011.

<http://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparedness>

Occupational Safety and Health Administration. *Major requirements of OSHA’s Respiratory Protection Standard 29 CFR 1910.134*. 2006.

https://www.osha.gov/dte/library/respirators/major_requirements.pdf

Occupational Safety and Health Administration. “Medical & dental offices: A guide to compliance with OSHA standards.” 2004.

<https://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3187.pdf>

Social Security Administration. "Compilation of the Social Security laws: Examination and treatment for emergency medical conditions and women in labor."

http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/ssact/title18/1867.htm

U.S. Department of Defense. *DoD Instruction 6025.18: Health Insurance Portability Act (HIPAA) privacy rule compliance in DoD health care programs*. 2019.

<https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/602518p.pdf>

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. *Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program: Program Guidebook*. 2019.

https://www.cseppportal.net/Training%20Documents/2019_Program_Guidebook_clean_FINAL.pdf

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. *Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)*. 2020. <https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/Homeland-Security-Exercise-and-Evaluation-Program-Doctrine-2020-Revision-2-2-25.pdf>

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. *National Incident Management System*. Third Edition. 2017. https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1508151197225-ced8c60378c3936adb92c1a3ee6f6564/FINAL_NIMS_2017.pdf

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. *National Response Framework*. Third Edition. 2016. https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1466014682982-9bcf8245ba4c60c120aa915abe74e15d/National_Response_Framework3rd.pdf

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. *Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assistance Guide (THIRA) and Stakeholder Preparedness Review (SPR) Guide: Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 201*. Third Edition. 2018

https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1527613746699-fa31d9ade55988da1293192f1b18f4e3/CPG201Final20180525_508c.pdf

U.S. Department of Labor. *OSHA best practices for hospital-based first receivers of victims from mass casualty incidents involving the release of hazardous substances*. 2005.

https://www.osha.gov/dts/osta/bestpractices/html/hospital_firstreceivers.html

U.S. Department of the Army and Federal Emergency Management Agency. *CSEPP accident investigation guide*. 1997.

[https://www.cseppportal.net/secure/portal/ipts/pgsg/Guidance%20Review/CSEPP%20Accident%20Investigation%20Guide%20\(May%201997\).doc](https://www.cseppportal.net/secure/portal/ipts/pgsg/Guidance%20Review/CSEPP%20Accident%20Investigation%20Guide%20(May%201997).doc) (password required)

U.S. Department of the Army and Federal Emergency Management Agency. *CSEPP Off-post Monitoring IPT Report*. 1999.

https://www.cseppportal.net/secure/portal/topics/Guidance/off_post_monitoring_ipt_report.pdf (password required)

U.S. Department of the Army and Federal Emergency Management Agency. *Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of the Army and the Federal Emergency Management Agency*. March 2004.

U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Directive 2013-03: Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance*. 2013.

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ad2013_03.pdf

U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 15-6: Procedures for investigating officers and boards of officers*. 2016.

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/r15_6.pdf

U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 40-905: Veterinary health services*. 2006. https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/r40_905.pdf

U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 50-6: Chemical surety*.-2018

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN3125_AR50-6_WEB_FINAL.pdf

U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 165-1: Army Chaplain Corps activities*. 2015.

http://www.armyg1.army.mil/hr/suicide/docs/AR165_1%20Army%20Chaplain%20Corps%20Activities.pdf

U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 190-59: Chemical Agent Security Program*. 2012. (Common Access Card or registered login ID required for access.)

U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 200-1: Environmental protection and enhancement*. 2007.

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/r200_1.pdf

U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 360-1: The Army Public Affairs Program*. 2011.

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN6644_AR360-1_Admin_WEB_FINAL.pdf

U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 385-10: The Army Safety Program*. 2017.

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN16777_ARN16343_AR385_10_FINAL.pdf

U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Regulation 525-27: Army Emergency Management Program*. 2019.

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN4163_AR525-27_FINAL.pdf

U.S. Department of the Army. *Pamphlet 638-8: Procedures of the Army Casualty Program*. 2015.

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN16284_AR638-8_CC_FINAL.pdf

U.S. Department of the Army. *Pamphlet 27-162: Claims procedures*. 2008.

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/p27_162.pdf

U.S. Department of the Army. *Pamphlet 385-40: Army accident investigations and reporting*. 2015.

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/p385_40.pdf

U.S. Department of the Army. *Pamphlet 385-61: Toxic chemical agent safety standards*. 2018.

<https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/pam385-61.pdf>

U.S. Department of the Army. *Pamphlet 385-64: Ammunition and explosives safety standards*. 2013 (Rapid Action Revision).

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/p385_64.pdf

U.S. Department of the Army. *Pamphlet 525-27: Army Emergency Management Program*. 2012.

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/p525_27.pdf

U.S. Department of the Army. *Pamphlet 638-2: Procedures for the Army Mortuary Affairs Program*. 2015.

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/p638_2.pdf

“Worker Protection,” Title 40 *Code of Federal Regulations*, Part 311 (40 CFR 311), <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2004-title40-vol26/pdf/CFR-2004-title40-vol26-part311.pdf>

This page intentionally left blank.